The English economy before 1800 - EconStor

The English economy before 1800 - EconStor

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Ready for revolution? The English economy before 1800 Working Paper Series, UCD Centre for Economic Research, No. 14/18 Provided in Cooperation with: UCD School of Economics, University College Dublin (UCD)

Suggested Citation: Kelly, Morgan; Ó Gráda, Cormac (2014) : Ready for revolution? The English economy before 1800, Working Paper Series, UCD Centre for Economic Research, No. 14/18, UCD Centre for Economic Research, Dublin

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UCD CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH WORKING PAPER SERIES 2014 Ready for Revolution? The English Economy before 1800 Morgan Kelly and Cormac Ó Gráda, University College Dublin WP14/18 November 2014

UCD SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN BELFIELD DUBLIN 4

  Ready  for  Revolution?   The  English  Economy  before  18001             Morgan  Kelly   [email:  [email protected]]     and       Cormac  Ó  Gráda    [email:  [email protected]]                                                                                                                           1

Revised  version  of  the  paper  presented  at  the  conference  commemorating  the  50th   anniversary  of  the  founding  of  the  Cambridge  Group  for  the  History  of  Population  and  Social   Structure,  16-­‐18  September  2014.    Thanks  to  Jeremy  Boulton,  Stephen  Broadberry,  Nick  Crafts,   Neil  Cummins,  Romola  Davenport,  Morgan  Kelly,  David  Mitch,  Joel  Mokyr,  Karl-­‐Gunnar   Persson,  Peter  Razzell,  Alex  Shepard,  Richard  Smith,  Peter  Solar,  and  David  Stead  for  help  on   various  points.    The  standard  disclaimer  applies.

  ABSTRACT:     Sustained  economic  growth  in  England  can  be  traced   back  to  the  early  seventeenth  century.    That  earlier  growth,   albeit  modest,  both  generated  and  was  sustained  by  a   demographic  regime  that  entailed  relatively  high  wages,   and  by  an  increasing  endowment  of  human  capital  in  the   form  of  a  relatively  adaptable  and  skilled  labour  force.   Healthier  and  savvier  English  workers  were  better  equipped   to  profit  from  the  technological  possibilities  available  to   them,  and  to  build  on  them.  Technological  change  and   economic  growth  stemmed  from  such  human  capital  rather   than  Boserupian  forces.    They  were  the  product  of  England’s   resource  endowment  and  its  institutions.           Keywords:  economic  history,  industrial  revolution     JEL  classifications:  N,  N3,  N5,  N6      

 

 

 

1  

Ready  for  Revolution?      

Metaphors  such  as  ‘histoire  immobile’  and  ‘Malthusian  roller  coaster’  capture  an  

economy  before  the  Industrial  Revolution  that  was  stationary  in  the  statistical  sense.   But  in  a  context  where  some  margin  above  subsistence  was  a  precondition  for   economic  growth  even  small  changes  were  historically  very  important.    By  today’s   standards  every  European  economy  was  poor;  literacy  rates  and  life  expectancy  are   much  higher  in  today’s  Nepal  or  Nigeria  than  in,  say,  ancien  régime  France.    By  the   same  token,  differences  in  consumption  levels  that  would  seem  trivial  nowadays  might   mean  the  difference  between  stagnation  and  growth  in  the  eighteenth  century.    This   paper  argues  that  such  differences  were  a  feature  of  the  British  economy  before  the   late  eighteenth  century.     1.    Growth:   Although  economic  growth  before  the  mid-­‐nineteenth  century  was  very  slow   by  later  standards,  the  latest  attempts  at  estimating  British  output  and  productivity  in   the  more  distant  past  reveal  an  upward  trend  in  GDP  that  began  long  before  the  ages   of  cotton  and  steam  (Broadberry  et  al.,  forthcoming;  Nuvolari  and  Ricci  2013).  Figure  1   describes  the  movements  in  GDP  and  GDP  per  head  (both  measured  in  logs)  in  20-­‐ year  blocks  between  1390-­‐1409  and  1850-­‐69  implied  by  Broadberry  et  al.1  Over  this   period,  GDP  grew  about  ten  times  as  fast  as  GDP  per  head.    Note  that  from  the  early   seventeenth  century  on,  GDP  per  head  was  higher  in  each  period  than  in  the  previous   period:  growth  henceforth  was  somehow  built-­‐in.    Note  too  the  implication  that  the   growth  rate  of  GDP  per  head  fell  during  the  eighteenth  century  before  accelerating    

2  

again  early  in  the  nineteenth.       GDP per capita, 1600-1870

3

4

4.5

5

GDPPOP

5

6

7

5.5

GDP and GDP per capita in England, 1400-1870

1500

1600

1700 period

GDP

 

1800

1900

4

1400

GDPPOP

1600

1650

1700

1750

1800

period

1850

 

Figure  1.  GDP  and  GDP  per  capita  in  England  1400-­‐1870     There  are  other  signs  of  progress  in  this  pre-­‐Industrial  Revolution  era.    One  is  

the  remarkable  increase  in  literacy  (on  which  more  below):  between  1600  and  1750   England  moved  from  being  essentially  a  pre-­‐literate  society  to  one  where  more  than   half  of  all  adults  could  at  least  sign  their  names.    And  although  literacy  (as  measured   thus)  did  not  increase  much  for  some  decades  thereafter,  its  quality  did.    This  is   reflected  in  the  increasing  number  of  books  published  and  read  and  in  the  rising   circulation  of  newspapers,  from  less  than  a  million  in  1690  to  7.3  million  in  1750  and  16   million  in  1800,  despite  hefty  increases  in  stamp  duty  paid  (Aspinall  1946,  1948;  Black   1991;  Mokyr  2009:  43;  Gardner  2013).    Books  were  mostly  the  province  of  the  middle   classes;  but  while  the  high  cost  of  newspapers  and  books  constrained  their  purchase  to   the  elite  and  the  middle  ranks,  their  readership  reached  wider:  ‘ask  a  landlord  why  he   takes  the  newspaper:  he’ll  tell  you  that  it  attracts  people  to  his  house’  (Feather  1985:   43;  Erickson  1990;  William  Cobbett,  Political  Register,  26  September  1807,  as  cited  in   Aspinall  1946:  37).    

 

3  

Another  indicator  is  the  increasing  urbanization  and  openness  of  the  economy.     The  proportion  of  the  population  living  in  towns  or  cities  of  ten  thousand  or  more   rose  from  5.8  per  cent  in  1600  to  13.3  per  cent  in  1700  and  20.3  per  cent  in  1800  (de   Vries  1984:  Table  1.7).    With  increasing  commercialization  came  increases  in  the   variety  of  goods  consumed  (McCants  2007;  Hersh  and  Voth  2008),  and  McCants   (2007:  461)  notes  that  consumption  of  the  new  ‘exotic’  products  from  the  Americas   and  Asia  was  not  confined  to  the  rich.       A  further  gain  was  the  significant  rise  in  adult  life  expectancy,  evident  in  the   case  of  the  elite  from  the  seventeenth  on  (Edwards  2008;  Johansson  2010;  Cummins   2014).    Although  Wrigley  and  Schofield’s  (1981:  230)  original  back-­‐projection  estimates   detected  little  evidence  of  an  increase  in  life  expectancy  at  birth  during  those   centuries,  Wrigley  et  al.’s  family  reconstitution  volume  (1997:  295)  found  an  increase   during  the  eighteenth  century.    This  tallies  with  Landers’  (1993:  168-­‐74)  finding  that   the  life  span  of  the  ‘general  population’  of  London  rose  from  the  1730s  on.     These  outcomes  are  summarized  in  Figure  2.2  

30 20

25

e[0]

35

40

 

1650

1670

1690

1710 1730 period W et al 1997 Landers

1750

1770

1790

WS 1981

 

Figure  2.  Life  expectancy  in  England,  1650-­‐1800   Note:  estimates  of  e0  in  Wrigley  and  Schofield  (1981);  Wrigley  et  al.  (1997);   and  Landers  (1993:  171).      

 

4  

  The  significant  downward  drift  in  the  coefficients  of  variation  of  cereal  prices   across  nine  English  regions  between  the  1640s  and  1740s  implies  significant  market   integration,  presumably  the  product  of  improved  communications,  before  the  mid-­‐ eighteenth  century  (Figure  3).3    The  gradual  decline  in  the  share  of  the  labour  force   employed  in  agriculture  also  implies  economic  progress,  although  estimates  of  the   extent  of  that  decline  differ  (see  Figure  4a).  The  disparities  underline  the  tentative   character  of  much  of  the  data  invoked  in  this  essay.4    Shaw-­‐Taylor  and  Wrigley’s   estimates  inform  their  case  for  the  high  productivity  of  pre-­‐industrial  English   agriculture,  while  Clark’s  estimates  underpin  his  bleak  assessment  of  agricultural   progress  on  the  eve  of  and  during  the  Industrial  Revolution,  as  described  in  Figure  4b;   we  return  to  this  issue  later.     CV of Oats and Barley Prices, 1650s-1740s

.1

.1

.15

CV

CV .2

.15

.25

.2

.3

CV of Wheat Prices, 1640s-1740s

1670

1690 decade

1710

oats

barley

1730

.05

1650

 

1640

1660

1680

1700

1720

1740

decade

Figure  3.  Coefficients  of  Variation  of  Cereal  Prices  (9  Regions),  1640s-­‐1740s  

 

 

5  

 

Labour Productivity Growth in Agriculture 1700-1800

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100

30

120

% 40

1700=100 140

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160

60

180

Share of LF in Agriculture c. 1525-1850

1525

1700

1851

1720

Clark ST&W

1740

1760

1780

1800

year

year

Allen Broadberry

BO&vL

Clark

 

Figure  4.  Estimates  of  (a)  Agriculture’s  Occupational  Share  and  (b)  Labour   Productivity  Change  in  Agriculture  c.  1525-­‐1850  

 

 

  As  discussed  later,  productivity  improvement  may  be  identified  in  certain  other   sectors  before  the  Industrial  Revolution.  In  sum,  the  slow  but  self-­‐sustaining  advance   of  the  British  economy  antedates  the  Industrial  Revolution  by  a  century  or  more.    

 

2.    Industrializing  on  an  Empty  Stomach?   This  sort  of  slow  growth  is  not  entirely  consistent  with  recent  historical   estimates  of  English  calorie  supplies,  which  imply  significant  levels  of  malnutrition  at   the  lower  end  of  the  socio-­‐economic  spectrum  well  into  the  nineteenth  century.    Fogel   (2004:  9)  put  per  capita  supplies  in  England  at  2,168  kcals  in  1750  and  2,237  kcals  in   1800,  while  Broadberry  et  al.  (2011)  propose  2,248  and  2,165  kcals,  respectively,  for  the   same  dates.    Bearing  in  mind  that  one  of  the  United  Nations’  current  preconditions  for   declaring  a  famine  is  one-­‐fifth  or  more  of  the  population  subsisting  on  fewer  than   2,100  kcals  of  food  per  diem,  such  averages  are  consistent  with  extreme  deprivation  as   a  steady  state  on  the  eve  of  the  Industrial  Revolution.    

 

6  

Note,  moreover,  that  those  estimates  refer  to  a  representative  year:  year-­‐to-­‐year   fluctuations  in  output  before  c.  1800  can  only  have  exacerbated  a  malnutrition   problem  initially  highlighted  by  Fogel  (1994).    If,  as  indicated  by  Broadberry  et  al.   (2011),  agricultural  output  declined  by  one  fifth  or  more  on  a  dozen  occasions  between   1550  and  1800,  with  cumulative  shortfalls  of  two-­‐fifths  or  more  in  1594-­‐97,  1629-­‐31,  and   1709-­‐10,  then  at  the  non-­‐crisis  rates  proposed,  massive  mortality  among  the  poor   would  surely  have  been  unavoidable  in  crisis  years.  Yet  only  in  the  1590s  did  England   suffer  a  nation-­‐wide  famine,  and  excess  mortality  then  accounted  for  no  more  than   one  per  cent  of  the  population  (Ó  Gráda  2014a).5   Not  surprisingly,  these  bleak  estimates  of  calorie  availability  on  the  eve  of  the   Industrial  Revolution  have  provoked  a  response  (Kelly  and  Ó  Gráda  2013;  Meredith   and  Oxley  2014;  Harris  2014).    While  it  is  tempting  to  compare  in  detail,  what  needs   emphasizing  most  is  that  all  estimates  are  subject  to  considerable  margins  of  error.     While  broader  interpretations  of  economic  trends  and  consumption  levels  must  not   rest  on  such  data  alone,  the  estimates  in  Table  1  imply  consumption  levels  comfortably   above  barebones  subsistence  on  the  eve  of  the  Industrial  Revolution.    These  more   generous  estimates  of  calorie  availability6  are  easier  to  reconcile  with  evidence  that   while  the  positive  check,  in  the  sense  of  the  short-­‐run  response  of  mortality  to  price   and  real  wage  shocks,  was  powerful  in  the  Middle  Ages,  it  had  virtually  disappeared  by   the  late  eighteenth  century  (Kelly  and  Ó  Gráda  2014a).     These  revisions  also  avoid  the  uncomfortable  implication  that  on  the  eve  of  the   Industrial  Revolution  per  capita  calorie  consumption  in  France  matched  that  of   England.    That  would  be  difficult  to  square  with  the  latter’s  considerable  advantage  at   this  point  in  terms  of  mean  adult  height,  real  wages,  life  expectancy,  and  labour  

 

7  

productivity  in  agriculture.7  Kelly  and  Ó  Gráda  (2013)  and  Kelly  et  al.  (2014a)  link  the   advantage  English  workers  had  over  French  in  terms  of  calorie  supplies  to  their  higher   stature  and  higher  productivity.    

  Table  1.  Calories  per  head  and  per  consuming  unit  in  E&W  (1750-­‐1800)  and   France  (in  1705  and  1800)   Year  

kcals  per  capita  

kcals  per  consuming  unit  

England  

 

 

1750/70  

2,900/2,950  

3,600/3,650  

1800  

2,750/2,950  

3,450/3,650  

 

 

1705  

1,657  

2,209  

1800  

2,000  

2,667  

France  

Sources:  Toutain  1995;  Fogel  2004:  9;  Kelly  and  Ó  Gráda  2013    

    3.  Literacy  and  Numeracy   Today  both  theoretical  and  empirical  research  highlights  the  link  between   educational  achievement  as  a  measure  of  human  capital  and  cause  of  economic   growth.    There  is  even  some  evidence  that  educational  human  capital  matters  more  in   less  developed  economies  than  in  more  developed  economies  (e.g.  Hanushek  and   Woessman  2012).  Whether  this  evidence  has  a  bearing  on  Britain  on  the  eve  of  the   Industrial  Revolution  remains  moot.    As  noted  earlier,  literacy  rates  grew  impressively   in  pre-­‐industrial  England,  which  between  c.  1500  and  c.  1750  shifted  from  being  mainly   a  society  of  illiterates  to  one  where  half  of  all  brides  and  grooms  could  at  least  sign  a   marriage  register  (Stephens  1990:  555).    On  the  other  hand,  England’s  failure  to  lead  in  

 

8  

the  literacy  stakes  (again  as  measured  by  the  ability  to  sign  a  marriage  register)  has  led   a  widespread  belief  that  literacy  cannot  have  mattered  much  for  industrialization   (Mokyr  2009:  239-­‐40;  Mitch  1992:  14-­‐15,  213-­‐14;  Mitch  1993;  Reis  2005:  206;  Allen  2009:   226fn8).8    In  this  regard  England  was  behind  the  Netherlands,  and  its  lead  over  France   was  attenuating  in  the  eighteenth  century  (Table  2).9       Schooling’s  role  is  complicated  by  its  dual  consumption  and  human  capital   aspects  and  by  its  dual  affective  and  cognitive  functions  (Reis  2005).  Some  of  the   consumption  demand  for  literacy  was,  presumably,  driven  by  religion;  in  the   seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  the  parish  clergy  everywhere  played  a  key  role   in  running  the  schools  and  controlling  the  curriculum.  But  the  religious  content  of   what  people  read  fell  over  time.    In  1670  items  devoted  to  narrowly  religious  topics  (i.e.   prayer  books,  sectarian  disputes,  ecclesiastical  history,  etc.)  accounted  for  about  one   publication  in  four;  in  1680-­‐81,  when  popish  plots  were  much  in  the  air,  for  30  per   cent.10    The  proportion  of  published  books  devoted  to  religious  and  philosophical   subjects,  more  broadly  defined,  fell  from  nearly  two-­‐fifths  of  the  total  in  the  1700s  to   about  one-­‐fifth  in  the  1790s  (Mokyr  2009:  47).     Table  2.  Literacy  in  England  and  France,  1750-­‐1789  (%)    

France  

England  

Decade  

M  

F  

M  

F  

1750-­‐9  

39  

19  

61  

37  

1760-­‐9  

44  

20  

62  

37  

1770-­‐9  

45  

23  

62  

38  

1780-­‐9  

46  

23  

62  

39  

Source:  Houdaille  1977:  68;  Schofield  1981:  207    

 

9  

  As  elsewhere  in  Europe,  in  England  the  ability  to  read  and  write  had  strong   social  class,  urban-­‐rural,  and  gender  dimensions  (Houston  1988:  52-­‐53;  130-­‐33).  Prescot   in  southwestern  Lancashire,  epicenter  of  England’s  watchmaking  industry  since  the   early  eighteenth  century  (Bailey  and  Barker  1969),  is  a  case  in  point.    Prescot’s  parish   registers  contain  data  on  the  professions  of  grooms  and  their  (in)ability  to  sign  the   marriage  register  from  the  1770s.    Several  points  stand  out.    First,  the  overall  literacy   rate  was  low—52  per  cent  of  grooms  and  78  per  cent  of  brides  failed  to  sign—and   showed  little  sign  of  any  increase  before  the  mid-­‐nineteenth  century.    This  would   seem  to  support  the  claim  that  industrialization  did  not  require  widespread  literacy.     Second,  however,  there  was  considerable  variation  in  literacy  across  occupations.     Colliers  were  nearly  all  illiterate  throughout  the  period,  as  were  shoemakers  and   laborers.    Farmers  were  much  less  likely  to  be  illiterate—and  Thirsk  (1985:  571-­‐4)  has   highlighted  the  role  of  print  in  hastening  the  diffusion  of  agricultural  techniques—but   less  so  than  their  wives.    White-­‐collar  workers,  invariably  literate,  married  literate   women.    And,  more  significantly,  watchmakers  and  allied  tradesmen/artisans  were   much  less  likely  to  be  illiterate  than  the  average  but—and  this  suggests  that  for  them   literacy  was  more  an  investment  rather  than  sheer  consumption—their  wives  were   usually  illiterate.    It  was  likewise  with  shoemakers,  wheelwrights,  and  weavers.11     The  pattern  in  the  neighbouring  parish  of  Warrington  St.  Elphin’s,  where  data   are  available  for  1754-­‐1776,  was  rather  similar,  although  literacy  rates  there  were   higher.    Warrington,  like  Prescot,  was  a  locus  of  craft  industry  before  the  Industrial   Revolution.    For  Warrington  shoemakers  the  ratios  for  not  signing  was  25/81  and  it   was  64/81  for  their  brides;  for  yeomen  and  their  wives,  the  ratios  were  3/39  and  21/39.    

 

10  

And  while  all  of  Warrington’s  fourteen  watchmakers  signed,  only  half  of  their  wives   did.    In  Warrington  too,  nearly  all  wheelwrights  and  millwrights  were  likely  to  be   literate,  but  their  brides  were  unlikely  to  sign.    Again  nearly  all  the  wives  of  the   relatively  affluent  could  sign.  In  both  parishes  all  cabinetmakers  could  sign.    The   rather  complex  pattern  found  in  Prescot  and  Warrington  reflects  the  dual   investment/consumption  aspect  highlighted  by  Reis  (2005).        

Data  on  numeracy,  arguably  more  important  for  economic  development  than  

literacy,  are  harder  to  come  by.    In  a  classic  paper  Keith  Thomas  (1987:  104,  128)  made   the  case  for  an  increase  in  the  early  modern  period,  but  conceded  that  ‘the  change   cannot  be  quantified’.    His  observation  that  innumeracy  prompted  people  ‘to  use  some   numbers  rather  than  others’  (1987:  125-­‐7)  anticipated  the  use  of  estimates  of  age   heaping  as  a  proxy  for  numeracy  and,  more  broadly,  human  capital  (A’hearn  et  al.   2009).    However,  age  heaping  is  only  one,  rather  narrow,  aspect  of  numeracy.    Clearly   an  economy  in  which  prices  and  weights  and  measures  played  a  role  could  not   function  without  a  modicum  of  rudimentary  numeracy,  widely  diffused  across  the   population.12       Data  on  age  heaping  have  so  far  not  yielded  much  evidence  on  England  before   the  nineteenth  century.  Figure  5  describes  trends  in  age  heaping,  as  measured  by   Whipple’s  Index  in  four  different  sources.  The  first  refers  to  over  thirteen  thousand   witnesses  appearing  before  English  church  courts  between  1550  and  1728.  A  very  high   level  of  age  heaping  is  indicated,  although  there  are  interesting  signs  of  a  decline  in   the  seventeenth  century.13    The  others  refer  to  three  London  populations:  (a)  men  and   women  admitted  to  St  Martins  in  the  Fields  workhouse  between  the  1740s  and  the   1820s;  (b)  men  and  women  buried  at  St  Martins  in  the  Fields;  and  (c)  defendants  tried  

 

11  

at  the  Old  Bailey,  1750-­‐1900.  One  surprising  aspect  of  (a)  and  (b)  is  the  apparent   tendency  for  males  to  age-­‐heap  more  than  females:  less  surprising  is  the  higher  values   for  the  poor  burials.    All  series  trend  downwards  over  time,  however.  In  the  case  of  the   Old  Bailey,  data  are  thin  before  1800,  so  we  grouped  defendants  for  the  1750-­‐99  period   together;  we  divided  the  nineteenth  century  into  five  twenty-­‐year  periods.    Except  in   the  final  period  (1880-­‐99)  the  trend  in  Whipple  Index  values  is  consistently   downwards.14    A  database  of  offenders  awaiting  trial  at  the  Old  Bailey  between  1791   and  1805  returns  a  similar  result:  1.31  for  males  (n=5,546)  and  1.37  for  females   (n=2,088).15       Whipple Index: St Martin's Workhouse, 1740s-1820s

1

1.8

1.2

2

1.4

2.2

1.6

1.8

2.4

Whipple Index: Court Witnesses, 1550-1728

1550

1600

1650

1700

1740

1760

1780 Period

Period Males

Females

Males

1820

Females

 

Whipple Index: Old Bailey Defendants, 1750-1875

1760

1780

1800 Period

allf poorf

 

1820

1.1

1.2

1.2

1.4

1.3

1.6

1.4

1.8

2

1.5

2.2

1.6

Burials: Martins-in-the-Fields, 1750s-1810s

1800

1750 allm poorm

1800 period males

1850 females

Figure  5.  Some  evidence  on  trends  in  age-­‐heaping  c.  1550-­‐1850     The  focus  on  literacy  and  numeracy  discounts  the  skills  of  agricultural  

 

12  

 

labourers  and  factory  workers  in  the  past.  The  earnings-­‐by-­‐age  profiles  constructed  by   Boot  (1995)  and  Burnette  (2006)  for  early  nineteenth-­‐century  factory  and  farm   workers,  respectively,  show  sharp  increases  up  to  ages  30  or  35,  indicating  increases  in   skill  due  to  on-­‐the-­‐job  experience.  Burnette’s  and  Boot’s  focus  is  on  acquired  skills;   Bessen’s  analysis  of  the  skills  of  textile  workers  in  Massachusetts  in  the  1830s  and  1840s   adds  that  prior  schooling  eased  the  acquisition  of  on-­‐the-­‐job  skills,  which  may  point  to   an  unsuspected  link  between  literacy  and  earnings,  even  in  occupations  where  such  a   link  might  not  have  been  expected  (Bessen  2000,  2012).    An  alternative  interpretation   of  Bessen’s  finding  is  that  the  link  that  mattered  most  in  the  textile  factories  was  that   between  schooling  and  affective  skills  rather  than  that  between  schooling  and  literacy   (Bowles  and  Gintis  2011).  The  link  between  schooling,  literacy,  human  capital,  and   industrialization  may  be  more  complicated  and  indirect  than  we  realize.    But  our  main   point  here  is  that  there  were  improvements  in  both  literacy  and  numeracy  before  the   Industrial  Revolution.     4.  Demographic  Regime    

Wrigley  and  Schofield’s  Population  History  (1981)  continues  to  prompt  several  

analyses  of  the  short  run  response  of  births,  marriages,  and  deaths  to  harvest  shocks.     Applying  a  multilevel  regression  approach  to  the  Cambridge  Group’s  404  parishes,   Kelly  and  Ó  Gráda  (2014a)  found  that  the  strength  of  the  positive  check  diminished   considerably  between  1540  and  1700,  only  to  rise  again  during  the  first  half  of  the   eighteenth  century,  a  period  that  suffered  two  sharp  mortality  crises,  in  the  late  1720s   and  early  1740s.  During  the  second  half  of  the  eighteenth  century,  the  positive  check   again  disappeared  across  most  English  parishes.    Applying  the  same  multilevel    

13  

regression  approach  to  marriages  and  births,  Kelly  and  Ó  Gráda  (2012)  found  evidence   for  a  significant  preventive  check  at  work,  which  peaked  in  the  early  eighteenth  

25

35

30

40

35

45

40

50

45

century.    

1740

1750

1760 decade

1780

1740

1750

1760 decade

1770

e1

f0

1780

f1

30

32

34

36

38

e0

1770

1740

1750

1760 decade e25

1770

1780

f25

Source  :  Wrigley  et  al.  1997  :  224,  256,  291,  295;   Blayo,  ‘Mortalité’,  138-­‐42;    Tables  1a-­‐1b  

 

 

  Figure  6.  e0,  e1,  and  e25  in  England  and  France,  1740s-­‐1780s  

  Comparing  Cambridge  Group  and  INED  family  reconstitution  studies  suggests   that  on  the  eve  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  life  expectancy  at  birth  in  England  was   considerably  higher  than  in  France  (Figure  5).  The  comparison  implies  that  in  the   second  half  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  former’s  edge  over  the  latter  was  a  striking   10-­‐12  years.16    True,  the  gap  was  largely  due  to  lower  infant  and  child  mortality,  but  this   still  means  that  survivors  of  childhood  in  England  were  less  likely  to  be  scarred  by  

 

14  

disease  than  their  French  counterparts,  with  attendant  advantages  in  adult  height  and   health.  Recent  research  on  the  impact  of  adverse  shocks  (e.g.  being  conceived  or  born   during  a  famine)  or  pro-­‐active  interventions  in  utero  and  during  early  childhood  (e.g.   better  medical  care  and  nutrition)  points  to  significant  long-­‐term  implications  for   adult  physical  and  mental  health  and,  indeed,  also  cognitive  penalties  (e.g.  Maluccio  et   al.  2009;  Hatton  2011;  Barham  et  al.  2013;  Currie  and  Vogl  2014).    Surely  it  is  not   implausible  to  extend  that  link  to  the  past?    

Family  reconstitution  data  also  imply  that  total  fertility  rates  (TFRs)  in  England  

on  the  eve  of  the  Industrial  Revolution  were  substantially  lower  than  in  France  (Table   4).    The  gap—about  one  child  for  women  who  married  at  25-­‐29  years—may  have  been   linked  to  England’s  lower  infant  and  child  mortality  rates  but,  as  just  noted,  that  also   had  broader  implications  for  human  capital  formation  and  child  quality.  So  would   evidence  that  definitive  celibacy  was  more  common  in  England  than  in  France:  but   such  evidence  is  more  elusive.17    

 

 

 

15  

  Table  3.    TFRs  by  Female  Age  at  Marriage  

   

Region  

AAM  15-­‐19  

AAM  20-­‐24  

AAM  25-­‐29  

France  

 

 

 

NW  

7.54  

6.03  

4.29  

NE  

8.79  

6.90  

4.94  

SE  

7.25  

6.33  

4.55  

SW  

6.49  

5.75  

4.20  

Average  

7.52  

6.25  

4.50  

England  

6.19  

5.02  

3.56  

Source:  Wrigley  and  Schofield  (1983:  173).  Note  the  English  data  refer  to  1600-­‐ 1799,  the  French  to  1670-­‐1769.    French  average  is  the  unweighted  mean  of  the   four  regions.    

The  data  are  consistent  with  birth  and  death  rate  schedules  like  those  described   in  Figure  7.    The  two  equilibria  represent  ‘England’  (E)  and  ‘France’  (F).    The  death   rates  (dr)  and  birth  rates  (br)  are  negative  and  positive  functions,  respectively,  of  the   real  wage  (w).    The  slopes  reflect  the  apparent  relative  power  of  the  checks  in  England   and  France,  with  the  virtual  flatness  of  the  English  dr  schedule  reflecting  the   disappearance  of  the  short-­‐run  positive  check.    Both  English  schedules  are  below  the   French  schedules,  but  such  as  to  produce  a  higher  zero-­‐population-­‐growth  (br=dr)   wage  in  England.    The  finding,  going  back  to  Weir  (1982),  that  England’s  demographic   regime  was  softer  than  France’s  broadly  corroborates.    Since  the  other  part  of  the   Malthusian  model  did  not  apply—because  the  equilibrating  mechanism  driving   population  growth  to  zero  was  trumped  by  productivity  growth  (compare  Persson   1988,  2008;  Møller  and  Sharp  2014)—the  equilibria  in  Figure  5  are  ‘virtual’,  i.e.  they   were  not  observed.  

 

16  

! !

brF#

dr# # &# # #br##

drF## brE# drE##

−"""""""""""""−" WF ########WE#

Wage#

Figure  7.  Demographic  ‘Equilibria’  in  England  and  France  

 

  Another  possibility  suggested  by  this  Anglo-­‐French  comparison  is  that  English   couples  were  better  positioned  to  trade  off  child  quantity  for  quality.    Did  they  invest   more  in  children’s  health  and  education?    The  jury  is  still  out  on  this.  Klemp  and   Weisdorf  (2012a),  using  Cambridge  Group  data,  claim  to  have  found  evidence  for  a   trade-­‐off  in  England  in  the  eighteenth  century—‘a  decrease  in  the  chances  of  finding   literacy  among  all  family  offspring  for  each  additional  surviving  child  of  eight   percentage  points’—but  Clark  and  Cummins  (2013),  using  probate  data,  failed  to  find   any  evidence  for  such  a  trade-­‐off  before  the  mid-­‐nineteenth  century.18         5.    North  and  South   The  Industrial  Revolution  turned  the  economic  geography  of  England  on  its   head  (Foster  and  Jones  2011;  2013:  3-­‐36).    Between  1750  and  1850  the  population  share    

17  

of  England’s  northern  ‘industrial’  counties  rose  from  17.7  to  29.2  per  cent,  while  that  of   its  midland  and  southern  ‘agricultural’  counties  fell  from  46  to  33  per  cent  (Shaw-­‐ Taylor  and  Wrigley  2014).  Figure  8  describes  wages,  nutrition,  and  heights  on  the  eve   of  the  Industrial  Revolution,  and  subsequent  industrial  growth.    The  wages  of   unskilled  workers  in  the  north  were  relatively  low  at  the  outset;  their  switch  to  being   relatively  high  magnifies  the  contribution  of  the  northern  counties  (Hunt  1986).  In   addition,  the  higher  quality  of  food  in  the  north  is  reflected  in  anthropometric  data,  so   that  prospective  employers  in  the  north  were  at  a  double  advantage:  not  only  was  the   wage  cost  of  northern  labour  in  mid-­‐century  at  the  outset  lower,  but  the  quality  of  the   labour  in  terms  of  height  and  health  was  higher  (Hunt  1986;  Horrell  and  Oxley  2012a,   2012b).19    Growth  rates  are  proxied  by  the  growth  of  aggregate  money  income  between   1766  and  1833.   The  combined  effect  of  wage  and  population  growth  during  the  Industrial   Revolution  is  captured  in  the  cartograms  in  Figure  9,  where  counties  are  re-­‐scaled  in   proportion  to  their  aggregate  labour  income  (wageXpopulation)  in  the  1760s  and   1830s.  The  shades  reflect  the  wage  rates  of  agricultural  labourers  in  each  period  (Hunt   1986).    Figure  9  also  highlights  the  disproportionate  importance  throughout  of  London   and  its  hinterland  to  the  English  economy  (Wrigley  1967).     Preliminary  cross-­‐county  regressions  analysis  not  reported  here  (see  Kelly,   Mokyr,  and  Ó  Gráda  2014)  finds  that  the  two  most  important  predictors  of   industrialization  (as  crudely  measured  in  Figure  8)  were  small  farms20  (which  were   associated  with  a  high  biological  standard  of  living)  and  high  population  density   relative  to  farmland,  an  indicator  of  the  extent  of  proto-­‐industrial  employment.   Between  them,  these  two  variables  explain  four  fifths  of  the  variation  in  industrial  

 

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employment  outside  London  in  the  early  nineteenth  century.    

  Figure  8.  North  and  South  

 

 

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Figure  9.  County  shares  weighted  by  population  and  wages  in  1760s  and  1830s  

  Easier  access  to  land  in  the  north  of  England  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  nutrition   was  better  there.  Smallholdings  offered  an  indispensable  supplement  to  income  from   other  activities,  one  that  could  generate  some  capital  for  small-­‐scale  industrial  activity   like  weaving  or  watch  making,  or  fund  the  apprenticeship  of  children  in  learning   useful  skills.    In  addition,  the  dairy  farming  and  small-­‐scale  industry  of  northern  areas   probably  generated  greater  demand  for  female  labour  than  the  wheat  growing   monoculture  of  the  southeast,  further  increasing  household  income.    At  the  same  time   northern  counties  with  low  population  density  relative  to  overall  area  had  high   densities  relative  to  their  agricultural  potential.    The  high  populations  of  these  areas   were  supported  by  non-­‐agricultural  activities,  such  as  spinning  and  weaving,  and   metal-­‐working.  This  density  relative  to  agricultural  land  therefore  serves  as  a  proxy  for   proto-­‐industrial  activity.   The  results  are  consistent  with  the  view  that  human  capability  and  skills   derived  from  existing  proto-­‐industrial  activity  were  central.  As  noted  above,  human   capital  is  often  dismissed  as  a  source  of  industrialization  on  the  grounds  that  English   literacy  was  unimpressive  by  Continental  European  standards,  but  our  regression   analysis  also  suggests  that  literacy  had  a  positive  impact  on  industrialization.     6.    Institutions:   An  older  literature  held  that  two  very  English  institutions—the  Old  Poor  Law   and  apprenticeship—were  impediments  to  economic  growth.    The  former,  it  was  

 

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believed,  spurred  excessive  population  growth,  reduced  labour  supply,  and  hindered   labour  mobility;  while  the  latter  inhibited  technological  change,  directly  through  its   prohibitions  and  indirectly  through  maintaining  a  supply  of  cheap  trainee  labour.    A   revisionist  literature  argues  that,  on  the  contrary,  these  institutions  supported   economic  activity  and  technological  change.     The  Old  Poor  Law  (OPL),  long  the  brunt  of  attacks  by  Malthus  and  his   followers,  did  a  good  job  of  relieving  the  elderly,  alleviating  local  food  shortages,  and   treating  cyclical  poverty.    Indeed,  the  dietary  regime  in  OPL  workhouses  was  relatively   benign:  it  involved  meat  or  cheese  being  provided  several  times  weekly  and  bread,   accompanied  by  broth  and  beer  (or  oatmeal  and  milk  in  the  north),  served  twice  daily.     In  practice  workhouse  fare  was  far  more  generous  than  that  indicated  by  workhouse   diet  schedules  (Ottaway  2013:  2).    The  expansion  of  the  OPL  was  probably  fuelled  by   the  rising  incomes  noted  earlier,  offering  the  possibilities  of  shielding  an  increasing   proportion  of  the  population  against  destitution  and  attendant  social  costs.    A  canvas   of  mid-­‐  to  late  eighteenth-­‐century  data  suggests  that  much  of  the  variation  in  poor   relief  across  parishes  and  counties  is  attributable  to  differences  in  resource  constraints   and  the  cost  of  living  (Kelly  and  Ó  Gráda  2011).  Still,  the  key  institutional  features  of   the  OPL  emphasized  by  historians—funding  through  the  parish  unit,  the  link  between   entitlements  and  settlement,  and  local  administration  as  a  means  of  reducing  moral   hazard  and  the  gap  between  principal  and  agent—owed  more  to  history  than  to  rising   GDP  (Solar  1996).    Economic  growth  may  have  been  a  pre-­‐condition  for  more   spending  on  relief,  but  the  structure  of  the  OPL  ensured  its  effective  redistribution.   Nor  is  there  much  evidence  that  the  OPL  spurred  population  growth  and  reduced   wages,  at  least  before  the  later  eighteenth  century:  the  proportion  of  never-­‐marrieds  

 

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remained  above  ten  per  cent  and  the  mean  age  at  which  women  married  remained   above  26  years  until  mid-­‐century  (Wrigley  and  Schofield  1981:  255).       Adam  Smith  believed  that  apprenticeships  were  ‘altogether  unnecessary’   because  the  acquisition  of  artisanal  skills  required  no  ‘long  course  of  instruction’;  the   Statute  of  Artificers  [1562],  the  legislation  underpinning  the  system,  merely  restricted   competition  and  reduced  output.    However  plausible  Smith’s  argument  a  priori,  recent   research  shows  that  in  England,  far  from  being  some  ‘dinosaur  of  a  corporate   cretaceous’,  apprenticeship  was  an  effective  vehicle  for  transmitting  artisanal  skills   before  and  during  the  Industrial  Revolution.  Resilient  and  adaptable,  it  was  capable  of   adapting  supply  to  the  skills  most  in  demand.    Though  not  affordable  by  all,  it   provided  many  poor  boys  with  the  prospect  of  marketable  skills:  most  of  the  inventor-­‐ entrepreneurs  of  the  early  Industrial  Revolution  were  from  relatively  humble   backgrounds,  and  trained  as  apprentices  (Mathias  1975;  Ó  Gráda  2014b).    The  most   convincing  refutation  of  Smith’s  assertions  is  that  the  system  thrived  as  a  ‘voluntary’   mechanism  in  his  day,  and  in  several  occupations  outlasted  the  guilds  and  the  repeal   of  the  Statute  of  Artificers  in  1814.  By  and  large,  the  human  capital  embodied  in   apprentices  complemented  the  technological  changes  of  the  early  Industrial   Revolution  (Smith  1776:  I,  X[2];  Humphries  2003,  2011;  Minns  and  Wallis  2013;  Van  der   Beek  2014;  Epstein  2004;  Prest  1960:  87-­‐8).             7.    Productivity  Growth  Before  the  Industrial  Revolution  

 

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In  the  eighteenth  century  agriculture  was  still  the  largest  sector  of  the  English  

economy.    Estimates  of  productivity  growth  in  agriculture  before  the  Industrial   Revolution  range  so  widely  that  very  little  useful  can  be  inferred  from  them.    Allen   (2000),  Clark  (2002),  and  Broadberry  et  al.  (2014)  have  constructed  competing   estimates  of  output  per  agricultural  worker  c.  1700,  c.  1750,  and  c.  1800.    Turner  et  al.   (2001:  227)  have  estimates  for  c.  1750  and  c.  1800  based  on  wheat  production  only.   Clark  paints  a  picture  of  virtual  stagnation  during  the  eighteenth  century  (Figure  5)  as   do  Turner  et  al.  for  1750-­‐1800,  while  Allen  (2000:  19-­‐21;  compare  Allen  2005;  Crafts   1989)  reckons  that  English  agricultural  output  per  worker  rose  by  a  quarter,  but  with  a   labour  productivity  growth  rate  of  about  0.6  per  cent  per  annum  during  the  first  half   of  the  century  giving  way  to  modest  decline  (of  about  0.15  per  cent  per  annum)  in  the   second  half.    Broadberry  et  al.’s  numbers  are  in  stark  contrast.    They  reckon  that   output  per  worker  grew  at  0.70  per  cent  annually  in  1700-­‐50  and  0.37  per  cent  annually   in  1750-­‐1800.    Broadberry  et  al.’s  squares  more  readily  with  traditional  stories  of   productivity  gains  from  parliamentary  enclosures,  new  fodder  crops,  and   improvements  in  livestock  quality  (Apostolides  et  al.  2008;  Broadberry  et  al.  2014).     Against  this,  Turner  et  al.’s  finding  that  wheat  and  barley—though  not  oats—yields   failed  to  rise  during  the  eighteenth  century  is  derived  from  a  rich  database  of  farm   accounts,  but  it  also  carries  the  implication  that  yields  were  already  high  by  1700   (Turner  et  al.  2001:  129,  153,  158).       But  it  does  seem  plain  that  some  industries  did  achieve  significant  productivity   growth.  Gerhold  (1996:  494;  see  too  Bogaert  2014)  has  estimated  productivity  growth   in  road  freight  at  1.1  per  cent  annually  between  the  1730s  and  the  1800s.    Brewing  too   was  transformed  before  the  Industrial  Revolution,  even  though  per  capita  beer  

 

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consumption  was  in  decline.  The  introduction  in  the  1720s  of  a  new  beer  variety,   porter,  led  to  significant  scale  economies  in  brewing,  first  in  London  and  then  in  the   bigger  provincial  towns.    Mathias  has  described  the  invention  of  porter  as  ‘exactly   equivalent  in  its  own  industry  to  coke-­‐smelted  iron,  mule-­‐spun  muslin  or  ‘pressed-­‐ ware’  in  pottery’.21    Glassmaking  is  also  significant,  for  two  reasons.  First,  its  reliance   on  coal  began  early.    The  beneficiary  of  a  patent  using  coal-­‐fired  furnaces  to  make   ‘green  glass  for  windows’  spent  £30,000  perfecting  his  method,  experimenting  with   different  coals  and  moving  sites  accordingly  (Barker  1977:  2).    Second,  plate  glass   production,  a  highly  capital-­‐intensive  activity,  was  one  of  the  first  industries  in  Britain   to  benefit  from  joint-­‐stock  legislation  in  1773.22  Estimates  of  productivity  growth  in   coastal  shipping  in  this  era  are  also  subject  to  an  embarrassingly  wide  margin  of  error,   while  recent  research  on  the  speed  of  ocean  going  sailing  ships  c.  1750-­‐1830  is   consistent  with  productivity  gains,  though  it  does  not  directly  address  that  issue  (Ville   1987;  Solar  2013;  Kelly  and  Ó  Gráda  2014c).   A  more  precise  but  still  indirect  estimate  is  possible  in  the  case  of  pocket   watches.    During  the  eighteenth  century  there  was  a  significant  rise  in  the  ownership   of  pocket  watches  in  England.    This  arose  in  part  from  an  increasing  interest  and  value   in  knowing  the  time,  but  watches  were  also  recognized  as  stores  of  value  and  as  male   fashion  items.    By  the  end  of  the  century  annual  watch  consumption  in  England  had   reached  about  0.2  million  (Styles  2007,  2008),  or  about  one  for  every  tenth  adult  male.     In  The  Wealth  of  Nations  Adam  Smith  invoked  watchmaking  as  a  case  study  of  the   division  of  labour  in  action,  claiming  that  a  watch  movement  that  could  be  had  for   twenty  shillings  in  his  own  day  was  superior  to  one  costing  twenty  times  as  much  in   the  mid-­‐seventeenth  century  (Smith  1976:  260;  cited  in  Cipolla  1970:  144;  Foster  and  

 

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Jones  2011).    Smith  in  effect  inferred  a  twenty-­‐fold  growth  in  productivity  from  the  95   per  cent  decline  in  the  price  of  watches.    A  more  careful  analysis  of  the  course  of   watch  prices  over  roughly  the  same  period  suggests  that  Smith  exaggerated,  but  not  by   all  that  much:  the  real  price  of  watches  of  all  kinds  plunged  by  three-­‐quarters  or  so   during  the  eighteenth  century,  implying  an  annual  productivity  growth  rate  of  about   1.4  per  cent  (Kelly  and  Ó  Gráda  2014b).  This  growth  was  largely  the  product  of  steady,   incremental  improvements  by  unknown  artisans  in  an  industry  in  which  the  division   of  labour  leaves  pin  making  in  the  shade.    In  1817  a  Coventry  watchmaker  described   the  several  divisions  of  the  industry  as  follows  (BPP  1817:  77):   Movement  maker,  is  divided  into  frame  mounter,  brass  flatter,  pillar   maker,  crew  maker,  cock  and  pittance  maker,  wheel  maker,  wheel   finisher,  barrel  maker,  barrel  arbor  maker,  pinion  maker,  balance   maker,  verge  maker,  ratch  and  click  maker,  and  other  small  steel  work;   dial  maker,  copper  maker,  enameller,  painter,  hand  maker,  glass   maker,  pendant  maker;  case  maker,  divided  into  silver  flatter,  box   maker,  case  maker,  joint  finisher;  motion  maker,  divided  into  bolt   maker,  slide  maker,  motion  wheel  maker,  motion  maker,  spring  maker;   chain  maker,  divided  into  riveter,  finisher  and  preparer;  engraver,   which  is  divided  into  cock  and  slide  engraver,  name  engraver;  cap   maker,  jeweler,  scapement  maker,  finisher,  wheel  and  fuzee  cutter,   case  spring  maker,  spring  and  liner  and  polisher;  key  maker,  and   several  other  branches  to  the  number  of  102  in  the  whole.     The  trajectory  in  watch  prices  bears  comparison  with  those  of  two  other   consumer  durables  largely  made  of  silver.  Chamberlayne  (1676:  II,  19)  reported,  no   doubt  with  some  exaggeration,  that  silver  spoons  were  commonplace  in  the  houses  of     ‘mean  mechanicks  and  ordinary  husbandmen’  while  silver  tankards  were  common  in  

 

25  

taverns  during  the  eighteenth  century  (Howard  1903).    Note  the  implication  that   productivity  change  in  flatware  and  tankard  production  was  much  slower  than  in   watchmaking:  hardly  surprisingly,  given  the  far  greater  scope  for  specialization  in  the   latter  (Figure  9).    But  whether  watchmaking  was  exceptional,  or  merely  one  of  several   industries  registering  quiet  productivity  growth  in  the  era  before  the  Industrial   Revolution—a  mushroom  rather  than  yeast  in  the  parlance  of  Harberger  (1998;   compare  Crafts  and  Harley  1991;  Temin  1998)—is  an  issue  beyond  the  scope  of  this   paper.     Real Price of Spoons and Tankards, 1720s-1780s

.5

.5

1

Ln (Real Price) 1 1.5

2

Ln [Real Price] 1.5 2

2.5

2.5

Real Price of Watches and Tablespoons c. 1700-1815

1720 1700

1720

1740

1760

1780

watch

tabspoon

1740

1760

1780

YEAR

1800

Decade

tspoon tankard

 

tabspoon

 

Figure  10.  Watches,  Spoons,  and  Tankards  c.  1700-­‐1800     8.    Conclusion:   Sustained  economic  growth  did  not  begin  in  Britain  with  the  Industrial   Revolution.    It  can  be  traced  back  to  the  early  seventeenth  century.    That  earlier   growth  was  manifested  in  urbanization,  commercialization,  and  technological   progress  in  several  sectors  of  the  economy.    Albeit  modest,  it  both  generated  and  was   sustained  by  an  increasing  endowment  of  human  capital  in  the  form  of  a  relatively   healthy  and  adaptable  and  skilled  labour  force.  Healthier  and  savvier  English  workers  

 

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Technological  Progress  in  Europe  Oxford:  Basil  Blackwell.   Persson,  Karl-­‐Gunnar.  2008.  ‘The  Malthus  delusion’.  European  Review  of  Economic   History,  12(2):  165-­‐173.   Prest,  John.  1960.  The  Industrial  Revolution  in  Coventry.  Oxford:  Oxford  University   Press.   Razzell,  Peter.  2014.  ‘Mortality,  population  growth  and  economic  development  in   England,  1600-­‐  1850.’  Unpublished.     Reis,  Jaime.  2005.  ‘Economic  growth,  human  capital  formation  and  consumption  in   Western  Europe  before  1800’,  in  Robert  C.  Allen,  Tommy  Bengtsson  and  Martin  Dribe,   eds.  Living  Standards  in  the  Past:  New  Perspectives  on  Wellbeing  in  Asia  and  Europe   Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  pp.  195-­‐225.   Schofield,  Roger.  1973.  ‘Dimensions  of  illiteracy  1750-­‐1850’,    Explorations  in  Economic   History  10:  437-­‐54.   Shaw-­‐Taylor,  Leigh  and  E.  A.  Wrigley.    2014.  ‘Occupational  structure  and  population   change’  in  R.  Floud,  Jane  Humphries,  and  Paul  Johnson,  eds.  The  Cambridge  Economic   History  of  Modern  Britain,  4th  edition.  Cambridge:  CUP   [http://www.geog.cam.ac.uk/research/projects/occupations/abstracts/paper26.pdf].     Shepard,  Alexandra  and  Judith  Spicksley.  2011.  ‘Worth,  age,  and  social  status  in  early   modern  England’,  Economic  History  Review,  64[2]:  493-­‐530.     Smith,  Adam.  1976  [1776].    An  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  and  Causes  of  the  Wealth  of   Nations.  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press.     Solar,  Peter  M.  1996.  ‘Poor  relief  and  English  economic  development  before  the   industrial  revolution’,  Economic  History  Review,  48[1]:  1-­‐22.     Solar,  Peter  M.  2013.  Opening  to  the  East:  Shipping  Between  Europe  and  Asia,  1770– 1830.  Journal  of  Economic  History  73[3]:  625-­‐61.     Stephens,  W  B.  1990.‘Literacy  in  England,  Scotland,  and  Wales,  1500-­‐1900’,  History  of   Education  Quarterly  30[4]:  545-­‐571.   Styles,  John.  2007.The  Dress  of  the  People:  Everyday  Fashion  in  Eighteenth-­‐Century   England.  New  Haven:  Yale  University  Press.   Styles,  John.  2008.  ‘Time  piece:  working  men  and  watches’,History  Today  58[1].   Temin,  Peter.  1997.  ‘Two  views  of  the  Industrial  Revolution’,  Journal  of  Economic   History,  57[1]:  63-­‐82.   Thirsk,  Joan.  1985.  ‘Agricultural  innovations  and  their  diffusion’  in  J.  Thirsk,  ed.  The   Agrarian  History  of  England  and  Wales,  vol.  5[II],  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University    

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Press,  pp.  533-­‐89.   Thomas,  Keith.  1987.  ‘Numeracy  in  early  modern  England:  the  Prothero  lecture’,   Transactions  of  the  Royal  Historical  Society  37:  103-­‐132.   Turner,  Michael  E.,  John  V.  Beckett,  and  Bethanie  Afton.  2001.  Farm  Production  in   England,  1700-­‐1914.  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press.   Van  der  Beek,  Karine.  2014.  ‘England’s  eighteenth  century  demand  for  high  quality   workmanship:  evidence  from  apprenticeship,  1710-­‐1770’,  in  John  Nye,  Avner  Greif,  and   Lynne  Kiesling  eds.,  Institutions,  Innovation,  and  Industrialization:  Essays  in  Economic   History  and  Development,  Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press.   Ville,  Simon.  1986.    ‘Total  factor  productivity  in  English  shipping:  the  north-­‐east  coal   trade,  1700-­‐1870’,  Economic  History  Review.  39[3]:  355-­‐70.     Weir,  David  R.  1982.  ‘Life  under  pressure:  France  and  England,  1670-­‐1870’.  Journal  of   Economic  History  44[1]:  27-­‐47.     Wrigley,  Edward  Anthony.  1967.    ‘A  Simple  Model  of  London's  Importance  in   Changing  English  Society  and  Economy  1650-­‐1750’  Past  and  Present  37(1):  44-­‐70.     Wrigley,  Edward  Anthony.  2007.  'English  county  populations  in  the  later  eighteenth   century',  Economic  History  Review,  60[1]:  35-­‐69.     Wrigley,  Edward  Anthony  and  Roger  S.  Schofield.    1981.  The  Population  History  of   England  1541-­‐1871:  A  Reconstruction.  London:  Edward  Allen.     Wrigley,  Edward  Anthony  and  Roger  S.  Schofield.  1983.  ‘English  Population  History   from  Family  Reconstitution:  Summary  Results  1600-­‐1799’,  Population  Studies,  37[2]:   157-­‐184.   Wrigley,  Edward  Anthony,  Ros  S.  Davies,  James  E.Oeppen,  and  Roger  S.  Schofield.   1997.  English  Population  History  From  Family  Reconstitution,  1580-­‐1837  Cambridge:   Cambridge  University  Press.     ENDNOTES                                                                                                                   1

 These  numbers  are  the  best  available  but  not  definitive:  see  Kelly  and  Ó  Gráda  2013;  

Harris  2014.   2  Razzell  (2014:  10-­‐15)  offers  some  added  evidence  consistent  with  a  reduction  in  adult  

mortality  during  the  eighteenth  century  that  extended  to  all  regions  and  all  socio-­‐ economic  groups.  The  second  reports  the  percentages  of  fathers  of  spinsters  aged  

 

34  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        under  21  reported  alive  (Razzell  2014).  The  data  refer  to  20-­‐year  averages,  except  that   in  the  second  panel  1720-­‐39  refers  to  the  1730s  only.   3

 The  data  are  taken  from  Bowden  1985:  864-­‐7.  

4

   According  to  Clark  (2010:  56),  agriculture’s  share  dropped  from  60  per  cent  c.  1525  to  

48  per  cent  in  1700,  43  per  cent  in  1800,  and  34  per  cent  in  1851.    According  to   Broadberry,  Campbell,  and  van  Leeuwen  (2011)  the  shares  in  those  years  were  about   58.1,  38.9,  31.7,  and  23.5  per  cent,  while  Shaw-­‐Taylor  and  Wrigley  (2014)  have  proposed   percentages  of  49.8  c.  1710,  35.7  c.  1817,  and  26.9  in  1851.  These  disparities  probably   stem  in  part  from  whether  they  exclude  (Clark)  or  include  females.    Broadberry  et  al.   rely  on  simplifying  assumptions  about  female  labour  force  participation  that  may   inflate  their  estimate  of  the  non-­‐farming  labour  force  around  1700.  Shaw–Taylor  and   Wrigley  offer  a  compromise  estimate.    Given  the  shifting  importance  of  domestic   industry,  it  seems  best  to  include  the  females. 5

 Comparing  Wrigley  and  Schofield’s  estimate  of  the  aggregate  deaths  rate  in  1597  and  

1598  with  the  average  of  those  in  1589-­‐1596  and  1599-­‐1606  implies  an  excess  death  rate   of  10.1  per  thousand.    In  a  population  of  3.9  million,  that  would  have  meant  about   40,000  lives  lost.    By  the  same  token  the  number  of  births  ‘lost’  was  about  34,500   (derived  from  Wrigley  and  Schofield  1981:  531-­‐32).   6  Muldrew’s  estimates  are  more  generous  still  (Muldrew  2011).   7

 The  belief  that  English  workers  were  better  fed  than  their  French  counterparts  was  

pervasive  during  the  eighteenth  century  (compare  George  1953:  25-­‐28).   8

 Long’s  analysis  of  English  census  data  for  1851-­‐1881  is  rather  an  outlier  in  that  it  

points  to  significant  economic  returns  to  schooling  in  the  mid-­‐Victorian  era  (Long   2006:  1047).   9

 And  this  glosses  over  considerable  regional  variation  within  France  (Houdaille  1977).  

10

 

 Derived  from  the  British  Library’s  catalogue  of  early  printed  books.  

35  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        11  The  data  described  in  this  and  in  the  following  paragraph  are  derived  from   http://www.lan-­‐opc.org.uk/Prescot/  and  http://www.lan-­‐ opc.org.uk/Warrington/stelphin/.   12 13

 Thanks  to  Alex  Shepard  for  insisting  on  this  point.  

 The  data  are  taken  from  UK  Data  Archive,  'Worth'  of  Witnesses  in  the  English  

Church  Courts,  1550-­‐1728    (SN  5652,  compiled  by  Alex  Shepard).   14

 The  admission  records  of  St.  Luke’s  Workhouse  in  Chelsea  also  survive.  The  

databases  are  very  small,  however.    The  86  males  and  214  females  on  which  there  are   data  in  1743-­‐55  returned  W  values  of  1.80  for  both  males  and  females;  based  on  139   males  and  252  females,  W  was  1.22  and  1.59  in  the  1790s.     Age  data  are  also  given  in  the  transcripts  of  settlement  examinations  in  St.   Martins  in  the  Fields.    In  this  case  data  on  women  far  exceed  those  on  men.    In  the   case  of  women,  the  value  of  Whipple  Index  fell  from  1.96  up  to  1736  to  1.41  in  the  1790s.       These  values  are  based  on  713  and  453  observations,  respectively.   15

 UK  Data  Archive  SN  6412  Offenders  Awaiting  Trial  at  the  Old  Bailey  as  Listed  in  the  

Newgate  Calendars,  1791-­‐1805    (SN  6412,  P.  King,  Open  University).   16

 However,  as  noted  earlier,  Razzell  (2014)  argues  for  a  significant  increase  in  English  

adult  life  expectancy  during  the  eighteenth  century.    This  could  mean  that  the  gap  at   e25  after  mid-­‐century  was  wider  than  implied  by  Figure  5.   17

 Houdaille  and  Henry  (1978:  81)  imply  little  change  in  France  in  the  female  

percentages  never  married  at  aged  50  between  the  1760s  and  the  1810s:     Period     1765-­‐9     1795-­‐9     18

%     88.2     86.4    

Period     1775-­‐9     1805-­‐9    

 

%     86.8     86.9    

Period     18785-­‐9   1815-­‐9    

%   86.0   87.6  

 And  Klemp  and  Weisdorf’s  ingenious  analysis  of  the  fetal  origins  hypothesis  (Klemp  

and  Weisdorf  2012b),  based  on  the  same  Cambridge  Group  dataset,  yields  such  an   implausible  outcome  that  one  worries  about  the  representativeness  of  their  data.    

 

36  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        19  Eden  refers  to    ‘the  north  country  fare  of  milk,  potatoes,  barley  bread  and  hasty-­‐ pudding’  [1797:  vol.  1,  p.  14;  see  too  vol.  3,  p.  779  (Westmoreland);  vol.  3,  p.  822   (Yorkshire  West  Riding)].   20

 Systematic  data  on  farm  size  in  the  eighteenth  century  are  lacking  so  we  measure  

the  prevalence  of  such  smallholdings  across  counties  as  the  ratio  of  farms  that  did  not   employ  labourers  to  those  that  did  in  1831  (Marshall  1833,  10).  Although  too  late  to  be   ideal,  the  data  corroborate  Shaw-­‐Taylor  (2012:  Table  7-­‐12)  and  Arthur  Young,  whose   tours  imply  that  typical  holdings  in  small-­‐farm  counties  were  much  smaller  than  those   in  large-­‐farm  counties.       21

 Mathias  1959:  13.    Mathias  (1959:  373)  has  also  reckoned  that  brewers  were  extracting  

twenty  per  cent  more  beer  from  a  given  quantity  of  malt  c.  1820  than  a  century  earlier.       22

 Its  shaky  start  drew  criticism  from  Adam  Smith,  who  was  opposed  to  the  creation  of  

joint  stock  companies  in  manufacturing.  

 

37  

UCD CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH – RECENT WORKING PAPERS WP13/13 David Madden: 'Born to Win? The Role of Circumstances and Luck in Early Childhood Health Inequalities' September 2013 WP13/14 Ronald B Davies: 'Tariff-induced Transfer Pricing and the CCCTB' September 2013 WP13/15 David Madden: 'Winners and Losers on the Roller-Coaster: Ireland, 2003-2011' September 2013 WP13/16 Sarah Parlane and Ying-Yi Tsai: 'Optimal Contract Orders and Relationship-Specific Investments in Vertical Organizations' October 2013 WP13/17 Olivier Bargain, Eliane El Badaoui, Prudence Kwenda, Eric Strobl and Frank Walsh: 'The Formal Sector Wage Premium and Firm Size for Self-employed Workers' October 2013 WP13/18 Kevin Denny and Cormac Ó Gráda 'Irish Attitudes to Immigration During and After the Boom' December 2013 WP13/19 Cormac Ó Gráda '‘Because She Never Let Them In’: Irish Immigration a Century Ago and Today' December 2013 WP14/01 Matthew T Cole and Ronald B Davies: 'Foreign Bidders Going Once, Going Twice... Protection in Government Procurement Auctions' February 2014 WP14/02 Eibhlin Hudson, David Madden and Irene Mosca: 'A Formal Investigation of Inequalities in Health Behaviours after age 50 on the Island of Ireland' February 2014 WP14/03 Cormac Ó Gráda: 'Fame e Capitale Umano in Inghilterra prima della Rivoluzione Industriale (Hunger and Human Capital in England before the Industrial Revolution)' February 2014 WP14/04 Martin D O’Brien and Karl Whelan: 'Changes in Bank Leverage: Evidence from US Bank Holding Companies' March 2014 WP14/05 Sandra E Black, Paul J Devereux and Kjell G Salvanes: 'Does Grief Transfer across Generations? - In-Utero Deaths and Child Outcomes' March 2014 WP14/06 Morgan Kelly and Cormac Ó Gráda: 'Debating the Little Ice Age' March 2014 WP14/07 Alan Fernihough, Cormac Ó Gráda and Brendan M Walsh: 'Mixed Marriages in Ireland A Century Ago' March 2014 WP14/08 Doireann Fitzgerald and Stefanie Haller: 'Exporters and Shocks: Dissecting the International Elasticity Puzzle' April 2014 WP14/09 David Candon: 'The Effects of Cancer in the English Labour Market' May 2014 WP14/10 Cormac Ó Gráda and Morgan Kelly: 'Speed under Sail, 1750–1850' May 2014 WP14/11 Johannes Becker and Ronald B Davies: 'A Negotiation-Based Model of Tax-Induced Transfer Pricing' July 2014 WP14/12 Vincent Hogan, Patrick Massey and Shane Massey: 'Analysing Match Attendance in the European Rugby Cup' September 2014 WP14/13 Vincent Hogan, Patrick Massey and Shane Massey: 'Competitive Balance: Results of Two Natural Experiments from Rugby Union' September 2014 WP14/14 Cormac Ó Gráda: 'Did Science Cause the Industrial Revolution?' October 2014 WP14/15 Michael Daly, Liam Delaney, Orla Doyle, Nick Fitzpatrick and Christine O’Farrelly: 'Can Early Intervention Policies Improve Well-being? Evidence from a randomized controlled trial' October 2014 WP14/16 Thérèse McDonnell and Orla Doyle: 'Maternal Employment, Childcare and Childhood Overweight during Infancy' October 2014 WP14/17 Sarah Parlane and Ying-Yi Tsai: 'Optimal Sourcing Orders under Supply Disruptions and the Strategic Use of Buffer Suppliers' October 2014 UCD Centre for Economic Research

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