The United Nations' Political Aversion to the European - Deep Blue

The United Nations' Political Aversion to the European - Deep Blue

UN-WELCOME: The United Nations’ Political Aversion to the European Microstates -- A Thesis -- Submitted to the University of Michigan, in partial ful...

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UN-WELCOME: The United Nations’ Political Aversion to the European Microstates -- A Thesis --

Submitted to the University of Michigan, in partial fulfillment for the degree of HONORS BACHELOR OF ARTS Department Of Political Science

Stephen R. Snyder MARCH 2010

“Elephants… hate the mouse worst of living creatures, and if they see one merely touch the fodder placed in their stall they refuse it with disgust.” -Pliny the Elder, Naturalis Historia, 77 AD

Acknowledgments Though only one name can appear on the author’s line, there are many people whose support and help made this thesis possible and without whom, I would be nowhere. First, I must thank my family. As a child, my mother and father would try to stump me with a difficult math and geography question before tucking me into bed each night (and a few times they succeeded!). Thank you for giving birth to my fascination in all things international. Without you, none of this would have been possible. Second, I must thank a set of distinguished professors. Professor Mika LaVaque-Manty, thank you for giving me a chance to prove myself, even though I was a sophomore and studying abroad did not fit with the traditional path of thesis writers; thank you again for encouraging us all to think outside the box. My adviser, Professor Jenna Bednar, thank you for your enthusiastic interest in my thesis and having the vision to see what needed to be accentuated to pull a strong thesis out from the weeds. Professor Andrei Markovits, thank you for your commitment to your students’ work; I still believe in those words of the Moroccan scholar and will always appreciate your frank advice. Professor Jana von Stein, thank you for taking the time to read my thesis and take part in my defense. Professor Rob Franzese, thank you for your early support of my research and the direction with which you provided me. Many thanks to those professionals, current and former, at the United Nations who helped me gain insight into the Organization, its inner workings and the countries that they so proudly represent. Thank you to Johannes de Millo Terrazzanni at the Monégasque Permanent Mission, Andreu Jordi Tomàs at the Andorra Permanent Mission, Georg Sparber and René Holbach at the Liechtenstein Permanent Mission. Thank you as well to Ambassador Melvyn Levitsky, now a professor at the Ford School for Public Policy at the University of Michigan. To my students, who decided to take a risk and sign up for a course entitled Little Countries, Big World. You all helped me so much to further clarify my opinions, arguments and statements of fact. Your interest in the microstates inspires me and fills me with hope that one day more people will follow my path and take up serious research on these so interesting countries. To all my friends who put up with me talking endlessly about my thesis and never shut me up, thank you. To Sam Burns who was helpful throughout the writing process of my thesis and was instrumental in helping me towards my final breakthrough. Last, but never least, thank you to my extremely gifted classmates whose excellent work and insightful questions always challenged me and made me want to improve my own work. Through our classroom sessions and outside encounters, you were there in moments of growth, commiseration and creativity. I wish you all the best of luck on the completion of your diverse and interesting theses and defenses and the best of luck in your promising future endeavors. Clearly, I could not have written this thesis all by myself and I am deeply grateful to all those who helped me along the way. Stephen Snyder Ann Arbor, Michigan March 26, 2010

Table of Contents Preface






Chapter One: Important Aspects of the United Nations System


Chapter Two: The Microstates


…Table I


Chapter Three: Examining Previous Explanations


Chapter Four: 1946-1960: The Cold Shoulder of the Cold War


Chapter Five: 1960-1989: The Decolonization Double Standard






Preface The following thesis is the result of two and a half years of research and a lifetime of interest. Since receiving a children’s encyclopedia at age 6 as a present from my grandmother, I have always been fascinated by the countries of the world. Four entries for which the encyclopedia provided scant information were those of Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San SNYDER | 5 Marino. Their absence provoked curiosity, fascination and an urge to learn more about these countries and their truly unique natures. Eventually, this curiosity would prompt my first research proposal with which I gained entry into the Political Science Honors program at the University of Michigan in October 2007. I could never have then imagined the complexity which would be necessary to answer even the simplest questions on the European microstates. While these states have often been relegated to trivia and crossword puzzles, they are case studies of entities resting upon the threshold of sovereignty. Those brave legal scholars who have previously approached the European microstates have no doubt been intrigued by their unique situations that allow otherwise theoretical situations to manifest themselves as real. Just as the microstates are unique situations so too is that of the speck of international land that overlooks the East River, the United Nations, its headquarters only one twenty-seventh the size of Monaco, the smallest of the microstates. At this point, representatives from 192 countries converge and make decisions that affect the entire world. In order to make these decisions the most effectively and to the best of the members’ liking, barriers to admission exist, some technical, others political. Even when one entity suffices to clear certain hurdles, others may prevent it from eventual membership. It was exciting for me as a student to find that the study of microstates is beyond encyclopedic but that journal articles and books have been devoted to it. Studying them is much more than learning arcane facts to impress people with at cocktail parties, but really an exercise in nuance and all that is possible in international law. I never expected that my investigation of the microstates would entail far-reaching concepts like the neutrality of Finland or swing of Latin American countries from West to South. I found it an amazing and rewarding journey and hope that you too will find its final report amazing and rewarding.

Abstract The European microstates of Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein and San Marino long desired membership in international organizations but were consistently denied. Following their original attempt at joining the League of Nations in 1920, the microstates were left out of toplevel international politics for seven decades until 1990 through 1993 when they were admitted with no opposition whatsoever. This thesis argues that they were excluded for political reasons and not due to their limited sovereignties, small size, incapacity to fulfill Charter obligations or lack of willingness as others have previously assumed. To prove this point, I look at the voting patterns of the General Assembly and how the microstates would have voted were they members. From the years 1945 to 1960, I argue that they would have acted as centrists between the polarized Soviet Union and United States with their voting blocs. I use a conceptual argument to show why no members would desire admitting more states that they perceived would act as centrists. Other states that shared this foreign policy, like Austria and Finland, were able to overcome this opposition due to persistence and deep diplomatic resources which the microstates lacked. Another group of centrist states were allowed to enter because of an ambiguity over which way they would vote and either pole believing they would have these new members’ support. From the years 1960 to 1989, I argue that the microstates would have voted along with Northern states against Southern states when the key polarizing issue was decolonization. As the South, organized by the Non-Aligned Movement took control of the General Assembly through increased membership, it discriminated against the European microstates by providing membership to states with less sovereignty, smaller size and diminished capacity who were perceived to politically agree with it on its importance issues.


Introduction Despite common misperceptions, the European microstates were feared as potentially disruptive actors in the United Nations whose moderate decision-making threatened to increase the cost of winning resolutions between East and West and whose Northern sympathies tip the scales between North and South. Many people are quick to dismiss Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino (from now on, collectively referred to as the European microstates) and oversimplify their role in international politics. Prior to the beginning of the 1990’s, these states were marginalized and excluded from participation in international politics and its premier arena, the United Nations Organization. Many look at them with derision and write them off as the “accidents of history.” International politics, critics say, ought to be left for the elephants and not the mice. Though the microstates were sovereign states for centuries, well before many of the states who denied them membership, they did not receive membership in the United Nations or its predecessor the League of Nations for seven decades. Following hotly contested bids in the League and United Nations Specialized Agencies and failed diplomatic efforts at membership, each microstate gained membership by acclamation in quick succession from 1990-1993, with no dissent. This sudden removal of any obstacle is puzzling and prompts the question: Why were the European microstates denied admission for so long to the United Nations until the early 1990’s when they were accepted with no opposition? It would be safe to assume that the non-participation of the microstates stems from some sort of bias on the part of giants. The conventional wisdom is that the microstates long had little to contribute to international politics and were not capable of making any impact on this level. With no armies, little national identity to distinguish themselves from their larger neighbor and arcane forms of government, the microstates are often perceived as innocuous, incapable of


influencing or directing global politics. They are just as often the subjects of farce and trivia as they are the subjects of serious investigation. Surely, any claim that these microstates wielded any significant power could not be SNYDER | 8

supported, common sense would argue; public discourse and academic work over the last halfcentury have argued that it is their limited sovereignties, small size, incapacity to fulfill Charter obligations and unwillingness to join the United Nations that kept them out. While certain authors have accepted these justifications, they only camouflage what was really taking place. In this thesis, I argue that contrary to conventional wisdom, the European microstates did in fact have the potential to hold this powerful position, which the existing power blocs wished to deny them. After presenting well-reasoned rejections of previously existing arguments, I argue that the political groups present in the General Assembly from 1945-1989 made the admission of new members with the anticipated voting behaviors of the microstates undesirable for the status quo. The existing blocs in power would not have benefited from the inclusion of the microstates that would lessen the ease with which those blocs could pass or block resolutions. This fear of a potential check to the established power created a barrier to admission: a wall too high for the microstates to climb, but which other states of similar foreign policies (e.g. Austria, Finland and Ireland) could overcome. In short, for states with the geopolitical positions of the microstates, entry to the United Nations required a level of tenacity and persistence to overcome the barriers raised by their political positions which the microstates could not muster. This work is not intended exclusively for those interested in the small states of Europe, as its hypothesis could be extended to other states that share a similar foreign policy position. These states too would face steep barriers in their attempts to join the United Nations. One might even

argue that all states face barriers to entry in the United Nations or any international organization based on their foreign policy stances. By nature of their political position, the barriers that the microstates faced were especially high and the microstates lacked the capacity to overcome them SNYDER | 9

until the barriers were later lowered. To arrive at this point, we must examine the political topography of the United Nations. As the General Assembly has not had a single character throughout its entire history but has rather evolved, shifting with the changing geopolitical climate, I will refrain from characterizing the actors of the United Nations into blocs once and forever. Instead, I look at the United Nations in two eras, 1945-1960 and 1960-1989. After establishing preliminary information about the political system in the General Assembly, information about the European microstates themselves and dispelling previous arguments, I present my argument that the microstates were politically unacceptable to the powers in the United Nations which in turn created obstacles to admission that the microstates could not overcome. To support my thesis, I first present and explain a model for the barriers to the microstates in the time period from 1945-1960 when Cold War politics dominated the General Assembly. Second, I outline and explain a model for the barriers to the microstates in the time period from 1960-1989 when the North-South split between developed and developing countries dominated the General Assembly. This period ends not only with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the most obvious shift in world politics, but also with the unraveling of the Non-Aligned Movement which reigned supreme over the United Nations for three decades. Certainly these periods overlap, as the Cold War never truly subsided from the General Assembly’s agenda until 1992 and decolonization resolutions were raised from the first session. Nonetheless, this thesis separates the two time periods for reasons of simplicity.

The structure of my thesis is as follows. Chapter One presents the rules of the game. This includes conditions of admission of new members, the voting system in the General Assembly, the concepts of sovereign equality and ways with which we can analyze voting behavior. This SNYDER | 10

enables us to later understand the contours of the General Assembly and how the admission of the microstates would have changed the status quo. Chapter Two establishes common knowledge by presenting information on the European microstates. First, I give basic facts about the microstates and describe their forms of government, some of which are unique in the world. Second, I examine their relations with larger neighbor states, involving powers that they voluntary have deputed. Next, I describe their economic situations qualitatively and quantitatively where possible. Lastly, I explain why membership in international organizations is particularly attractive to the microstates. This information is a foundation for the following chapter in order to prepare the reader for arguments that have traditionally been used against expanding membership to the European microstates. Chapter Three gives these existing reasons and examines each one. I disprove each of the old hypotheses beginning with the argument that the microstates did not possess sufficient sovereign power to qualify as United Nations members. By pointing to other existing United Nations members that had equivalent or lesser sovereignty, I show that the microstates’ sovereignties were sufficient enough for them to qualify for membership. Then, I show that the argument that European microstates were too small is not a valid argument either based on the inclusion of states with disproportionately small populations from the inception of the United Nations and the gradual inclusion of states with limited territories decades in advance of the entry of the European microstates. Third, I contend that the argument that microstates were unwilling to join the United Nations is also incorrect based on their top priority of recognition

and extension of diplomatic contacts as outlined in the previous chapter. Last, I disprove the argument that the European microstates were incapable of membership in terms of upholding the Charter obligations toward financial contributions and the maintenance of international security. SNYDER | 11

Here, I use evidence that countries were regularly admitted to the United Nations despite financial incapacity and the lack of militarized forces or unwillingness to participate in economic sanctions. I summarize these arguments as the following null hypotheses: HO-A: The European microstates had deputed too many of their sovereignties to be members of the United Nations. HO-B – The European microstates were too small in terms of geographic area and population to be members of the United Nations. HO-C – The European microstates did not wish to become members. HO-D – The European microstates were not capable of fulfilling United Nations Charter obligations. Chapters Four and Five are dedicated to my alternate hypothesis that the powerful blocs of the General Assembly created a barrier which the microstates could not overcome but other states with similar foreign policies but greater resources could. Chapter Four looks at the first time period, 1945-1960, and the Cold War politics that took place in the General Assembly during that period. I begin with the context of the period to establish what was at stake for East and West adversaries. Then, I present a conceptual argument that analyzes the benefits of any actor in a bipolar regime with either side lacking the power to enact resolutions on its own and requiring the aid of a group of centrist states. This conceptual argument is based around the hypothesis that: HA-A: In a bipolar system where neither side controls a two-thirds majority necessary to pass resolutions (like the General Assembly of 1945-1960), a new actor who is perceived to enter at the center will face opposition from the existing actors resulting in barriers to that state gaining membership.

I show how the European microstates would have entered as centrist states within this model and that no group, neither the poles nor the centrists, would support their admissions as the costs of securing passage or blockage of a resolution become steeper with the inclusion of new centrist SNYDER | 12

members and existing centrist states see their positions weakened as they become replaceable. I then support this model as a true representation of Cold War politics in the United Nations by presenting evidence of both poles and a centrist ground existing. Following that, I argue that within this context, the European microstates would have certainly been centrists. To conclude, I test my thesis against the cases of Austria, Finland, Ireland and ex-colonial countries and show that their persistence in lobbying for membership or ambiguous stance enabled them to overcome obstacles that the European microstates could not. My hypothesis holds up to this test and shows that while opposition to membership was surmountable for some states, it was not for the microstates. Chapter Five looks at the following time period, 1960-1989, when the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) rose to power and dominated the General Assembly. After providing context, I again use a conceptual model that features two poles, except this time one of the poles is vastly more powerful than the other and requires no support from the center in gaining passage of its favored resolutions. In this case, it is advantageous for the powerful bloc to discriminate against new members with whom it would disagree. At the same time, it would be welcoming of new members with whom it would agree. I build the conceptual argument around the following hypothesis: HA-B: In a bipolar system where one side controls a two-thirds majority necessary to pass resolutions (like the General Assembly of 1960-1989), a new actor who is perceived to enter with the minority bloc will face opposition from the powerful bloc resulting in barriers to that state gaining membership.

I then place this model into the context of the actual politics taking place at the time and show that while the dominant NAM lowered the standards of admission for new members who would support its agenda, it did not extend the same courtesy to the European microstates. I then SNYDER | 13

provide evidence that the European microstates would have voted with the former colonial powers in North-South issues. Finally, I argue that the loss of cohesion within the NAM that took place at the end of the 1980’s and the concurrent collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe put international politics into a period of chaos during which there was no organized opposition to the European microstates. Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino were in turn welcomed as states looked for new coalition partners. My thesis concludes by discussing how political concerns outweigh any codified procedure of admission in international organizations. My hypotheses invite more inspection from those who may spatially model and prove the regime I describe. This way admissions attempts in other organizations can be examined with regards to their political contexts. Just as the elephant does not fear the mouse for its sheer size (certainly there are other small animals that it does not mind), the giants of the United Nations did not fear the microstates for their size, but rather their character. The thesis proves that the common explanations based around sovereignty, size, capacity and willingness do not suffice and points instead toward political attitudes. I say that we should stop focusing on the mouse, but instead focus on its roar. That is to say, it was not the microstates themselves that were unacceptable, but their positions in the context of General Assembly voting.

Chapter One Important Aspects of the United Nations System Before looking at the European microstates themselves, in order to understand their exclusion from the United Nations we must understand the basic system of the General Assembly. This chapter present information on the voting procedure of the General Assembly, the key concept of sovereign equality, why sovereign equality mattered so much to the European microstates and methods with which scholars have modeled voting in the General Assembly. This establishes the rules of the game that I will use to argue as to how General Assembly politics made the microstates unacceptable. General Assembly Voting Voting in the United Nations General Assembly is governed by Article 18 of the Charter which reads: 1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote. 2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1 (c) of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions. 3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.1 In the history of the United Nations, nearly all resolutions have been approved by two-thirds majority or acclamation.2 From this fact, I will assume in my models that a bloc must contain

1 2

United Nations Charter, Article 18. Goodrich, 172. Peterson, 74-77.


two thirds of all votes in the Assembly in order to control the agenda. That bloc will therefore wish to build, maintain or extend that supermajority when it comes to the admission of new members. Conversely, any opposition or minority bloc needs not a majority of votes but only a SNYDER | 15

third of votes to effectively oppose the dominant bloc and stop its agenda. For those reasons we must look at the two-thirds barrier as the limit above which a dominant bloc may control the admission of new members as it wishes and below which, the minority bloc may block the admission of new members as it wishes. Member-states have four voting options on any resolution: yes, no, abstain or absent. An absent vote may be cast even if the delegate is present but wishes not to have any opinion recorded on an issue. Sovereign Equality The concept of sovereign equality in international law emerges from Woodrow Wilson who, in establishing his doctrine toward Latin America, argued that just as people enjoyed equal rights within a state, states too should be treated on an equal basis on the international stage.3 This was a major departure from the previous world order wherein the European “Great Powers” decided all issues of international concern. The international regime of the 19th and early 20th centuries featured the emergence of multilateral diplomacy through such important conferences as the Congress of Vienna, the Berlin Conference and the Paris Peace Conference. Though multilateral, they were certainly exclusionary, being dominated by a core of Europe’s large military powers. When Wilson carried his view of sovereign equality into the Paris Peace Conference and secured its role in the League of Nations,4 naturally there was trepidation on the part of large

3 4

Klein, 64. Ibid., 67, 69.

states. This new system of equality went against the old hierarchy of states.5 This had less to do with the actual size of states than it did their previous presence in international affairs. China, Brazil, Spain and Australia for example, were viewed by the European powers as “small states.” SNYDER | 16

The terminology “small state” truly referred to any state that was not a “Great Power,” regardless of size. The powers did not want to give up their control of world affairs and sought a tiered system by which they would retain certain checks over the rest of the League. Hence, it was decided to have two principal organs: the Assembly, in which all member-states may participate, and the Council, in which the Great Powers would have final say and, as it was later compromised, there would be rotating membership for the small states.6 The Powers saw the Council as responsible for “the real work of the League” and were privately frustrated that small states received any presence whatsoever.7 The entire concept of the League was a seismic shift in international relations in that the consent of a greater amount of states was sought. Here, the world’s most powerful states devolved sovereignty to the rest of the world for the first time in history. To allay the American Senate’s fears of ceding too much power to smaller states, the drafters included a provision for a requirement of unanimity on nearly all decisions of the League under Article 5, though ultimately the United States defected nonetheless.8 Increasingly, it was the barrier of unanimity-building with small states that led to the frustration of powerful members and their resulting abandonment of the League in the prelude to World War II. Mussolini purportedly stated, in announcing Italy’s departure from the League, “the League is very well when sparrows shout, but no good at all when eagles fall.”


Rappard, 546. Ibid., 557. 7 Ibid., 550, 553. 8 Walters, 46. 6

Later, the tradition of sovereign equality made its way into the United Nations. As early as the Quebec Conference of 1943, the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union agreed on the importance of sovereign equality to the organization while maintaining a primary role for 9

the Great Powers as a world police. The dissolution of the League of the Nations led the three powers to conduct multiple meetings throughout World War II in order to plan for the rebuilding of Europe after the war’s end. In the planning for the United Nations, the powers recognized the importance of maintaining the concept of sovereign equality but wanted to lessen the disproportionate power that small states could wield due to the requirement of unanimity. This too was a painful sacrifice on the part of the Allies as the conferences of Quebec, Tehran, Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks had reasserted the concept of great power primacy.10 In laying out the Organization’s founding principles, sovereign equality was reflected in Article 2, Section 1 of the United Nations Charter which reads: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”11 This was expounded in Article 18, cited above, which guarantees one state, one vote.12 The General Assembly with its two-thirds majority requirement was adopted so that small states may be welcome but cannot impede the progress and functionality of the organization. This supranational form of governance is an even greater concession of sovereignty for any state as resolutions are passed whether that state agreed with it or not. Though resolutions are non-binding,13 they carry much political weight and even led to serious action. The Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950, stemming from United States frustration over the paralysis of the Security Council, enabled the General Assembly to authorize peacekeeping forces in cases where 9

Klein, 112, 110. Ibid., 110. 11 United Nations Charter, Article 2, Section 1. 12 Bentiwch & Martin, 12. 13 Ryan, 42. 10


the Security Council has been prevented from taking action.14 This was invoked to allow peacekeepers to take a role in Korea and the Suez Canal.15 This disproportionate voting power small states retain in comparison to their size is rather SNYDER | 18

important, then, in the eyes of the larger powers. At the outset of the United Nations, the Kremlin expressed fears that it would be overshadowed by small countries who did not contribute nearly as much to the war effort that the Soviet Union did.16 Throughout the years of the organization, the great powers grew further frustrated with the admissions of small states. American Deputy Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Richard Gardner stated in 1965, at the height of the entry of postcolonial states, that the influx of new members distorted the real global balance of power.17 Yet the international community as a whole remained firm in its acceptance of new members and in denial that they in any way diminished the efficiency of international politics. Before his passing, Dag Hammarskjöld commented, “Even though the United States, for example, has merely one vote, its ability to influence gives it strength and comparative advantage.”18 His statement warns that though grand states may bemoan the equality of small states, they ought to recognize that influence tends to come from the big states upon the little, not the other way around. Sovereign Equality and the European Microstates There is no doubt that the European microstates hold sovereign equality to be quite dear. To states, for which it is often difficult to voice their points of view, sovereign equality gives as much say in the General Assembly or other international organizations as even the largest states. Former Andorran Foreign Minister Juli Minoves-Triquell illustrates that point: 14

Ibid., 41. Diehl, 490. 16 Klein, 110. 17 Gardner, 233. 18 Ibid., 234. 15

International law guarantees sovereign equality of states, regardless of size and population. Therefore in large countries, the task of the Foreign Ministry is to concentrate on defending the interests of the state and the projection of community values outside the borders of the country. In smaller states, though, we have the additional task of making ourselves known, often explaining from scratch the reality of our country in all its SNYDER | 19 complexity.19 For the microstates, it provides an equal say and makes other states more attentive to their opinions. This makes the microstates active players in international politics; no longer are they pushed about by larger countries without any concern for policies’ effects on the microstates. However, we must be careful not overstate sovereign equality’s importance in the microstates’ foreign policies. First and foremost, the primary objective for the microstates to join the United Nations was as a way of affirming their existences. Secondly, the microstates wanted to use their membership as a method of extending bilateral diplomatic relations with countries with whom they could not afford to establish traditional bilateral relations. Given their limited foreign policy agendas, the actual participation in international decision making seems to have lesser importance for the microstates. In fact, their top priorities have often been procedural or dealing with the codification of international law and Security Council reform. Coincidence and Bloc Voting To have an informed discussion on how states vote, it is important to first have a methodological basis. Many analysts of United Nations bloc voting use a Coincidence Index (CI) system to plot coincidence in the General Assembly. One example is that of Mexican diplomat and researcher Miguel Marín-Bosch. To show how different states voted with each other, his CI is on a scale of 0 to 1000 with 0 being no agreement between two states and 1000 being absolute agreement. As abstentions are not necessarily for or against a certain resolution, Marín-Bosch


Minoves-Triquell. (Convivències), 5.

counts votes in which one state abstained and the other voted yes or no as a half vote. His formula is as follows:


Other analysts’ formulas do not fundamentally differ and will be used in this thesis equally.21 Though CI’s demonstrate similarity in voting, they do not prove collaboration on an issue. The General Assembly sees many binary combinations that lack easy explanation as the states do not share alliances. The first fifteen years of the General Assembly had Guatemala and France, Mexico and Belgium and the Republic of China and Norway all paired with CI’s greater than 950 though these states are not traditionally partners with each other.22 While there are many individual actors who have made their decisions once and for themselves according to their own standards, it important to recognize that the United Nations operates as a community. Cohen points out, “[i]t is… necessary to emphasize that the decisionmaker here is the community at large rather than any one state.”23 Thus, as we look at the attitudes of the organization as a whole, we must understand the driving forces within the United Nations that arrive at these decisions: the voting blocs. For these reasons it is useful not to look so much at individual voters on either pole or in the center but to look at those blocs as a whole and then the microstates, or other states on which we may predict their behavior, as individuals in relation to these blocs. Why the United Nations and not other stages of international politics? The General Assembly was of course but one theater of conflict during the Cold War. The belligerents often found it more practical to resort to unilateral action outside the restraints 20

Marín-Bosch, 118. Holloway, Newcombe, Hovet, et al. 22 Marín-Bosch, 143. 23 Cohen, 1127-28. 21


of the United Nations Charter. The Berlin blockade, Soviet quelling of Czech revolts and militarized conflict in Vietnam all attest to this fact. There has always been debate as to the effectiveness of the United Nations and recent United States administrations’ disinterest in the SNYDER | 21

organization also evidences this. Nonetheless, the General Assembly has always retained an important role as the premier stage of multilateral international politics and a forum in which the rivals have sought advantage. In the context of the Cold War, it allowed for a space of conflict without confrontation in that the United States and the Soviet Union could compete for influence without the consequences of militarized war.24 The United Nations is also advantageous in that it commands a level of respect, prestige and legitimacy that uni- and multilateral actions cannot match. On the international stage, an opinion is universally accepted when the world gives its assent through the United Nations. Though individual states may disagree, an approved resolution of the United Nations carries a sacrosanct weight, providing strong support in any international dispute. No state wants to abandon the United Nations entirely and let world opinion be developed without its input. The General Assembly’s political dimension is of great importance as resolutions have the ability to shape the geopolitical discourse and are generally considered to be the opinion of the world. These symbolic acts influence other interactions between states. The amount of lobbying expended by states on General Assembly resolutions is proof ipso facto of the importance that states consider resolutions to have. If states were truly indifferent about resolutions in the General Assembly, they would simply ignore the United Nations (as some recent American presidents have tended to do). While before the institution of the United Nations, international opinion was guided exclusively by the great powers, this power, along 24

Russell, 324.

with that to authorize peacekeeping forces, had been devolved to all states equally through the General Assembly. Just as had been done in the League, in order to maintain some leverage, the great powers hold permanent seats on the Security Council, again with a provision for the SNYDER | 22

rotating membership of small states. From state to member-state In order to become a member of the United Nations, states must go through a certain procedure and meet certain criteria enumerated in Article 4, Section 1 of the Charter: Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.25 The judicial organ of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, was asked for an advisory ruling in 1949 on what specific criteria are necessary for membership and listed: (1) statehood, (2) peace-loving, (3) acceptance of the obligations of the Charter, (4) ability to carry out those obligations in the judgment of the United Nations, (5) the willingness to do so in the judgment of the United Nations. The court went further stating, “[A] Member of the United Nations… is not juridicially entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said Article.”26 More explicitly, a member may only consider these given criteria when deciding the admissibility of a state. In theory, it may consider neither size nor political attitudes of potential members. The first criterion, statehood, requires some further clarification. In evaluating an entity’s statehood, many observers pay attention to the attribute of sovereignty. The Montevideo Convention of 1933 established four criteria that an entity must possess in order to be considered a state: a permanent population, a clearly defined territory, an effective government and the 25

United Nations Charter, Article 4, Section 1. Admission of a State to the United Nations. Advisory Opinion, International Court of Justice Reports, 1947-1948 . 57.


capacity to engage in international relations.27 Many scholars consider this, however, to be insufficient, as many sub-state entities like colonies, provinces, Soviet Republics or states possessed these qualities. For that reason, many consider sovereignty (often used SNYDER | 23

interchangeably with the term independence as it is in this thesis) to be a necessary criterion for statehood. In the United Nations, sovereignty takes precedence over other criteria for statehood.28 The requirement that a state be peace-loving originally pertained to those states who were opposed to the Axis, the original member-states of the United Nations.29 This criterion is seldom invoked, although United States Ambassador Edward Perkins once raised objections to the candidature of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on this ground in 1992.30 Undoubtedly, states which are not entirely peace-loving have been admitted to the United Nations. However no objections have ever been raised in reference to the European microstates on this criterion and it will not be pursued in this thesis. Procedurally, in order for a country to become a member state, it must first submit its candidature to the UN Security Council which may choose whether or not to consider an application.31 If worthy of consideration, the Security Council then refers the application to the Committee on the Admission of New Members, a standing committee composed of one representative of each Security Council member.32 The Committee then makes a recommendation to the Security Council who votes on the recommendation. Based on this approval, the General Assembly then votes on membership.


Grant, 5. Goodrich, 89. More on the sovereignties of the European microstates on pages 31-42. 29 Ibid., 90. 30 United Nations Document A/46/PV.86. 31 Goodrich, 93. 32 Ibid., 93. 28

Conclusion Now that we understand the structure of the United Nations, we may analyze the validity of explanations for the exclusion of the European microstates. Voting in the United Nations requires a two-thirds majority for nearly all issues, making building that coalition or a blocking one-third coalition, the goal of any voting bloc. The concept of sovereign equality plays a most important role as it levels the playing field and states’ size, once they are accepted, no longer matters. The big states’ distaste of this principle makes them tentative before admitting a small state. Despite other forums of international interaction, the United Nations has always been the most important for its prestige and the legitimacy that its decisions have. Importantly, we understand the legitimate basis upon which a member-state is supposed to judge the admission of new states. The basis constructed in this chapter is instrumental in understanding the practice of admission discussed in Chapter Three and the political functions of the General Assembly discussed in Chapters Four and Five.


Chapter Two The Microstates Let us now turn our attention to the European microstates, the cases at the focus of this thesis. In order to understand why they were excluded from the United Nations, it is important to first lay out some basic information about these states. This chapter begins with a discussion on how I arrived at the sample set of Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino. Then, I provide information on the governmental structures, histories, limited sovereignties, geographic size and population of each of the microstates. This information will be important in dispelling the alternate explanations that have been so far given, to be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three.

What is a microstate? Though there is no strict definition of what constitutes a microstate, as size is a relative term, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino constitute a distinct group of states from other small countries in the world. They are bound by the facts that they are independent countries with populations under 100,000, an extremely small area (granted, this is a relative term) and are located on the European continent. Each of these states has a well established history dating back hundreds of years (San Marino is the oldest, its history dating to 301 AD, and Liechtenstein is the newest, an intact entity since the 14th Century). Accordingly, these states are not the remnants of colonialism but have long been their own international persons. Additionally, they hold the distinction of being non-members of the United Nations for most of the organization’s existence in common. As such, these four countries form the focus of my thesis. The only other state with wide international recognition that is not currently a member of the United Nations is Vatican City. The Vatican occupies a unique place in world politics in that


it is both sovereign over its own territory and the seat of an international religious organization. It is dissimilar from the other countries in the sense that it has no permanent population, citizenry or industry. The Vatican has repeatedly stated that it does not wish for full membership in the SNYDER | 26

United Nations and maintains observer status with full rights (except for that to vote) as granted in 2004. Additionally, we must differentiate these states from entities with small area and some degree of sovereignty but limited international recognition. Due to competing territorial claims, ethnic rivalries and Cold War rivalries, there were and continue to be numerous state-like regions that satisfy many of the traditional criteria for statehood except that of international recognition. Some countries went through a protracted process that eventually led to their membership in the United Nations Organization. The two Germanys and two Koreas were not deemed admissible until 1972 and 1992, respectively. The political controversy that today surrounds the recognition of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Kosovo and the fact that their two most prominent detractors (the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, respectively) hinder the possibility that either will be admitted in the near future. Examples of state-like entities like South Ossetia, Palestine and Nagorno-Karabakh are much thornier issues which require a much wider scope than I might be able to cover in this thesis. The simplest explanation for these entities’ absences is that their situations are highly controversial and membership is unachievable without massive geopolitical controversy, yet this is merely conjecture. There exist no competing territorial claims, ethnic rivalries or geopolitical instability surrounding the statuses of the European microstates.

Governmental Information The next part of this chapter focuses on unique aspects of the microstates divided by category. I begin with some information on the governmental structures of each state, accompanied by a table to organize those data. Second, I discuss the issue of sovereignty and detail how each state has deputed certain practical, political and economic sovereignties to its larger neighbor state. Next, I present the economic situations of each of these countries mostly dependent on qualitative data. Finally, I discuss the desires of the microstates to join intergovernmental organizations and the goals that membership helps them fulfill. Some of the information included in this section is summarized in Table I. Andorra Located high in the Pyrenees between France and Spain, Andorra is a truly unique political manifestation. Inhabited for at least four millennia, the Principality was first formally recognized as an independent entity by Charlemagne in 806 AD.33 In order to understand the political structure of Andorra prior to its 1993 Constitutional reform, we must look at the CoPrince system. This form of governance is the only one of its kind in the world. Dating back to Andorra’s founding document, the Paréatge of 1278, feudal powers were equally shared between the Bishop of Urgell, a nearby Spanish diocese, and the Count of Foix, a nearby commune in modern France.34 Throughout history, the Count of Foix’s powers passed higher through aristocratic ascendancy to the French royal house and today the French Republic’s President. As Andorra is remarkably remote from Paris, the Co-Prince President appoints a permanent delegate who resides in nearby Perpignan, France.35 France viewed the maintenance of Andorra’s


Rogatnick, 24. Ibid., 27. 35 Ibid., 48. 34


Table 1: The European Microstates

Andorra Liechtenstein Monaco San Marino Capital




San Marino






Form of Government








French Monégasque


Head of State


Captains Regent

Nicolas Sarkozy Prince Hans-Adam II Joan Enric Vives Sicília

Prince Albert II

Stefano Palmieri Francesco Mussoni







468 km²

160 km²

2 km²

61 km²



Swiss Franc



Sister States

July 2009 Estimate.

France Spain

July 2009 Estimate.


July 2009 Estimate.


July 2009 Estimate.

Italy Population & Area Source: CIA World Factbook

international affairs as its exclusive responsibility stating: “The external relations of the Valleys of Andorra are guaranteed by the President of the French Republic in his role as Co-Prince.”36 As for the Episcopal Co-Prince, his capacity as Co-Prince of Andorra has no bearing on Spanish SNYDER | 29

influence. Furthermore, the Catholic Church has no power over the Episcopal Co-Prince’s actions within the Principality aside from the power to appoint. The Pope does not issue any specific instructions on the governance of Andorra.37 Formerly, the Co-Princes had the authority to execute judicial powers, administer public order and supervise internal security. Feeling the cumbersome duties of operating simultaneously as French President and Andorran Co-Prince, President Valérie Giscard d’Estaing relented to persistent requests from the Consell General and initiated procedures to draft an Andorran constitution, devolving powers to the Andorran people in the mid-1970’s.38 The constitution, introduced in 1993, severely limited the roles of the Co-Princes and allowed for the creation of executive ministries, most notable of which is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, under control of Andorran civil servants. It also introduced an Executive Council to assume the internal responsibilities formerly maintained by the Co-Princes.39 Liechtenstein Nestled in the Alpine mountains between Switzerland and Austria, Liechtenstein united under the fiefdom of the Liechtenstein family in 1396.40 The Liechtenstein family’s true motivation in acquiring this land was to reclaim a permanent seat on the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire of which Liechtenstein was then a part.41 In fact, the royal family did not even inhabit the territory until the 20th Century. Upon the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, 36

Duursma, 360. Ibid., 368. 38 Tomàs. 39 Duursma, 321. 40 Rogatnick, 74. The fiefdom gained its status as an autonomous principality in 1719. 41 Beattie 16. 37

Liechtenstein became a state of the Confederation of the Rhine. When the Confederation dissolved in 1866, rather than becoming an exclave of the German Empire, Liechtenstein opted for independence and affiliation with Austria. SNYDER | 30

Internally, the Principality of Liechtenstein is a constitutional monarchy with a democratically elected Diet (the Landtag). In 2003, voters approved a constitutional reform that granted Prince Hans-Adam II greater powers, perhaps the only time in history that power has willfully been conceded by an electorate.42 Monaco Located along the Côte D’Azur, the territory that is now Monaco has been inhabited since Roman times. The Grimaldi dynasty conquered the territory that had previously been a monastery in 1191 and officially became a sovereign Principality in 1215. Incapable of providing for its own defense, the Grimaldi family frequently sought protection from its larger neighbors, variously being a Spanish, French and Sardinian protectorate until complete sovereignty in 1861. The Principality is governed by its Prince, currently Albert II, and a democratically elected parliament and her Chief of Government, the Princely-appointed Minister of State. San Marino Today an enclave of Italy, according to legend, the Most Serene Republic of San Marino was founded in 301 AD by Saint Marino, a mason forced to leave Dalmatia under persecution for his Catholicism. Marino found refuge on Mount Titano, a peak at the center of the modern day Republic, and there established a fiefdom. During the Risorgimento, San Marino retained its independence by sheltering Italian revolutionary Giuseppe Garibaldi while forces loyal to Italian King Victor Emanuel II pursued him. Upon conquest of Italy, Garibaldi allowed San Marino to retain its independence as a favor. 42

“Liechtenstein prince wins powers.” BBC.

San Marino also has a unique governance system. Her citizens elect the Grand and General Council, its parliament, which then elect the Captains Regent, San Marino’s heads of state. Two Captains Regent serve concurrent six-month terms and may not run for re-election. SNYDER | 31

Sovereignty Before delving into the circumstances of each state, let us first take an overview of the concept of sovereignty. Often used interchangeably with “independence,” sovereignty is understood to be the condition when, in the words of longtime Italian judge on the International Court of Justice Dionisio Anzilotti, “the State has over it no other authority than that of international law.”43 It should be understood, and it is stressed by many authors who discuss the microstates, that sovereignty is a relative and not an absolute quality.44 Even the largest and most powerful countries cannot be said to be entirely independent, basing their decisions on the behavior of other countries around them and being mindful of the consequences of their decisions.45 Especially in today’s world of globalization and interdependence, states are increasingly willing to give up certain powers to international organizations and neighbor states that at one time were solely the sovereign power of states. Given that sovereignty is a relative concept, there is no denying that the European microstates have de facto incredibly limited sovereignties with respect to other countries of the world. One of stated that the microstates “belong to a grey area on the border-line between constitutional law and international law, where it is not easy to distinguish autonomy from sovereignty.”46 Though provisions in treaties and constitutions guarantee the de jure recognition


Cohen, 1139. Rogatnick 206. Sovereignty is a murky concept and when speaking of its relative quantity, many international legal scholars instead refer to independence. I use the two terms interchangeably to remain consistent with other writers on the subject of European microstates. 45 Kohn 549. 46 Adam, 84. 44

of its independence, each European microstate has had to rely throughout history on one or two larger neighbors to provide services where needed due to its limited resources, its “sister states.” We may separate this dependence into practical, political and economic domains.47 Practical SNYDER | 32

cooperation is how the microstate and sister state will coordinate on issues like the coordination of border crossings, control of radio frequencies and other practical apolitical matters. Political cooperation is how two states will coordinate on political issues which can be seen in constitutions, diplomatic and consular matters, defense issues and conformity in foreign policy. Economic cooperation involves how two states will coordinate on economic, fiscal, banking, customs, commercial and gambling issues. Andorra Practical matters between Andorra and her neighbors extend to border patrol, postal unions and radio frequency agreements. The French government asserted itself in regulating Andorra’s radio frequencies as a result of Radio Andorra, a state-owned station, running programming on frequencies already occupied by other European stations in 1947.48 The situation escalated as France jammed the frequencies and refused Andorran shepherds the formerly customary right to graze their sheep on the French side of the border. In response, Andorra received assistance from Madrid which eased restrictions on the flow of Spaniards into the Co-Principality whose business compensated for the lost revenue from the French radio interference. Eventually a settlement was reached to the War of the Wavelengths in 1963 permitting Spanish regulation of Radio Andorra. Though de jure they have been marginalized to a ceremonial role, the Co-Princes still enjoy a great deal of influence on Andorran internal affairs. For example, though many

47 48

This separation of domains is used by Duursma, 125-126. Rogatnick. 44.

Andorrans are open-minded on the issue of abortion, the Bishop of Urgell’s religious beliefs make such an operation unacceptable.49 As such, Andorrans wish not to offend the Co-Prince and agitate him to the point where he would resign his position. Similarly, the French Co-Prince SNYDER | 33

President’s threat to resign his post in the wake of 2009’s G-20 Summit that named Andorra on a list of tax havens, forced concessions on the part of Andorra which responded by easing bank secrecy laws.50 In terms of security, Andorra is a non-militarized and traditionally neutral country.51 Through the 1993 Treaty of Vicinage, the Co-Principality is assured consultation and the possibility of military assistance from Spain and France in case of attack. Andorran nationals may receive consular assistance at either Spanish or French embassies, missions and consulates in countries where Andorra does not represent itself.52 In these third countries, Spanish and French diplomats may represent Andorra but only if a specific framework for this has been established with the consent of both co-Princes.53 Economically, customs unions bounded Andorra to Spain and France through an agreement with both powers in 1867.54 Today, Andorra is party to the larger European Union Customs Union (formerly European Community).55 Prior to the introduction of the euro, the French franc and Spanish peseta were both accepted with the latter seeing more frequent use though neither were regulated by treaty.56 The sister states have informal influence on fiscal matters, as previously mentioned, though neither the treaty of vicinage nor other agreements give any formal authority to either France or Spain. 49

Tomàs. Bitterman, Jim. “Cracking down on tax havens.” CNN. 8 April 2009. YouTube. 19 January 2010. 51 Duursma, 345. This neutrality has never been officially proclaimed. 52 Duursma, 339, 347. 53 Ibid. 54 Mourou, 156. 55 Duursma, 347. 56 Ibid., 341. 50

Liechtenstein For practical concerns, Liechtenstein has had little reliance on Austria or Switzerland. Liechtenstein maintains its own police force and the three countries operate joint patrol of the 57

borders. In appreciation of the Swiss assistance, Liechtenstein provides police officers to help maintain security at the World Economic Forum meetings every January in nearby Davos, Switzerland.58 Politically, Switzerland and, in one case, Austria have a modest presence in Liechtenstein through defense, diplomatic and consular representation and juridical posts. As all Austria, Liechtenstein and Switzerland are officially neutral, there are no formal guaranties of security between the countries.59 Though never contentious, Swiss troops have accidentally “invaded” Liechtenstein on numerous occasions during exercises.60 Formerly being diplomatically represented abroad by the Austrian foreign service from 1880 until 1918,61 Liechtenstein requested that Switzerland represent its interests in countries where it has no representation in 1919.62 Liechtenstein’s agreement is similar in concept to Andorra’s with its neighbors but Vaduz went further and stipulated that any interaction with third states and action on behalf of its citizens abroad may only be taken at the Principality’s request.63 Liechtenstein remains free to establish its own diplomatic and consular representation, a freedom it has exercised by placing ambassadors in Austria, Belgium, Vatican City and Switzerland and permanent missions at multiple international installations.64


Beattie, 349-350. Ibid.. 59 Duursma, 169. 60 Oliver, BBC. 61 Raton, 47. 62 Duursma, 161. 63 Duursma, 162. 64 Ibid.. 58


Economically, Liechtenstein had long been tied to Austria before World War I. However the severe devastation wrought upon Vienna by the war caused the Landtag to denounce its 1852 customs treaty with Austria in 1919 and replace it instead with a union with Switzerland which 65

entered into effect in 1924. At the same time Liechtenstein transitioned from the severely depreciated Austrian kronen to the Swiss franc in 1920.66 This new union afforded other opportunities as it became an appendage of the European Free Trade Association in 1960. With the European movement toward a single market, Liechtenstein and Switzerland split as the Principality opted to join the European Economic Area by referendum in 1992.67 By nature of being a full EFTA member, Liechtenstein maintains its free trade privileges with Switzerland. Fiscally, Liechtenstein’s opaque banking practices have never been questioned by the Swiss, but rather the G-20 which pressured Liechtenstein into more transparent laws as it did Switzerland in 2009.68 Monaco France has a small presence in Monégasque practical issues as it provides the gendarmerie that patrols and maintains order in the Principality.69 There are no border guards. In terms of political cooperation, Monaco adopted its first Constitution in 1911 followed seven years later by the Franco-Monégasque Treaty of 17 July 1918 which remained until 2002 the bedrock of relations between the states.70 For purposes of interpretation, the Treaty was accompanied by an exchange of letters. France initiated requests for the first treaty during World War I out of fear that ascendency to the throne may fall into the German side of the Grimaldi


Beattie, 51, 53. Ibid., 56. 67 Ibid., 168-9. A parallel referendum in Switzerland failed by less than 1 percent. 68 Jolly. 69 De Millo Terrazzani. 70 Duursma, 265. 66


family.71 The series of treaties introduced a significant French presence in Monaco’s domestic politics, security apparatus, consular and diplomatic system, foreign affairs and judicial branch. First, in terms of domestic governance, any pretender to the Monégasque Crown must be agreed SNYDER | 36

upon with the French government and that Monaco will revert to a French protectorate in case of a vacancy on the throne.72 France may have, in theory, refused confirmation of a Monégasque pretender and thus incorporate Monaco into the Republic.73 The Franco-Monégasque Convention of 28 July 1930 introduced further limitations on the Monégasque executive branch. The Head of Government is not the Prime Minister of Monaco’s Parliament, but rather the Minister of State who is appointed by the Prince and is aided by three Government Counsellors.74 These leaders are not responsible to the Parliament, but rather to the Prince himself. As put forward in the Convention of 1930, the Minister of State as well as the Gouvernment Counsellor responsible for interior matters must both be career diplomat French nationals who come from a seconding process parallel to that of the judicial branch.75 Second, in terms of security, by the 1918 Treaty France guarantees Monaco’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and provides for it defense.76 Previously, Monaco had been neutral.77 Third, in terms of foreign relations, the 1918 Treaty demands parfaite conformité of political, military, naval and economic interests between France and Monaco.78 In addition, under Article 2, first paragraph, Monaco may not ally itself with a third state without prior consent of France.


Laroche, 289. 1918 Franco-Monégasque Treaty, Article 3, paragraph 2. 73 Duursma 282. 74 Ibid., 264. 75 Franco-Monégasque Convention of 1930, Article 5. 76 1918 Franco-Monégasque Treaty, Article 1, paragraph 1. 77 Rogatnick 115. 78 1918 Franco-Monégasque Treaty, Article 1, paragraph 2. 72

Monaco and France have shared a customs union since 1861.79 Monégasque use of the French franc was formalized in 194580 though today the Principality uses the euro as legal tender.81 In terms of economic limitations of sovereignty, France has repeatedly raised objections SNYDER | 37

concerning Monaco’s loose fiscal policies though it has never protested the opulent Principality’s well-known gambling establishments. The Principality’s practice of low taxation and its active solicitation of companies to incorporate themselves on its territory led to high tensions between Paris and Monte-Carlo in the 1960’s. As French businesses evaded taxes by incorporating in Monaco, France accused her neighbor of being in violation of the 1918 Treaty’s stipulation on perfect conformity of economic interests.82 To resolve the problem, France resorted to pressure tactics outside of the treaty. Due to Monaco’s position as an enclave, France may coerce Monaco by controlling the thoroughfares into and out of the country. This was the case in 1962 when French dissatisfaction boiled over and France began controlling frontier posts, restricting the flow of goods and persons into and out of the Principality.83 After six months, Monaco relented and conceded to France a greater role for the Minister of State and increased taxation of foreign companies in Monaco. In 2002, France and Monaco revised their relations and repealed many of the limitations especially on the executive branch. Most importantly, the Minister of State no longer must be French, the succession of a new Prince no longer must be approved by France and there no longer must be a previously arranged verbal agreement on foreign policy positions.84 However, as this thesis analyses what forestalled Monaco’s entry into the United Nations, we must


Mourou, 149. Duursma, 289. 81 European Council Document, 1999/96/EC (31 December 1998). 82 Rogatnick, 133. 83 Duursma, 277. 84 Grinda, 35. 80

recognize the limits on sovereignty present when Monaco was excluded with lesser appreciation for changes made later. San Marino SNYDER | 38

In terms of practical matters, Italy and San Marino have been generally cooperative. San Marino was not permitted to establish its own television or radio stations until Italy permitted it to do so in 1987.85 There are no border guards between the two countries. Italy interfered with San Marino’s internal politics during the Communist regime of the post-war era. Unnerved by a Communist government so close by, Italy began slowing payments of subsidies in an unsuccessful attempt to undermine domestic confidence.86 Aside from this one dispute, relations have been historically harmonious between the two states. San Marino is officially neutral and there are no agreements between the Republic and its larger neighbor for security as this would go against San Marino’s policy of non-alliance. Diplomatically, San Marino allowed Italy to provide consular assistance to Sammarinese abroad by the Treaty of 1939.87 However, there are no stipulations for Italian diplomatic representation on behalf of San Marino. Economically, San Marino entered into a customs union with Italy in 1939 that was replaced in 1992 with a union with the rest of the European Community (now European Union Customs Union).88 The Italian lira became the official tender of San Marino in 1862.89 This monetary union proved costly after the Second World War when inflation, unemployment and poverty struck San Marino, its links with Italy dragging it down.90 These dire economic conditions permitted a Communist regime to come to power. The Soviet Union provided 85

Duursma, 231. Rogatnick, 174-175. 87 Duurmsa, 228. 88 Ibid., 229. 89 Ibid., 231. 90 Rogatnick, 176. 86

subsidies to try to assist the flailing Republic, but economic adversity persisted and the country would only regain strength after the Communist government was forced out in 1957.91 The lira now defunct, San Marino uses the euro as legal tender, governed by an agreement with the 92

European Union. San Marino’s sovereign attempt to construct a casino as a source of revenue during the post Second World War depression aroused strong Italian opposition. Italy responded to what was perceived as a fiscal and moral threat by establishing passport controls and suspending payment of the Republic’s subsidies.93 In 1951, after two years of blockade, San Marino relented and shut down its casino, but only after this heavy interference by its larger neighbor. Discussion As we see, the microstates vary in the types of powers given to their larger neighbors and the extent to which they are given. Duursma ranks the states from most independent to least as Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco and lastly Andorra.94 Eccardt disagrees based upon the 1993 reframing of Andorra’s constitution which reduced the role of the French and Spanish co-princes to ceremonial positions.95 Weil believes that Monaco’s 2002 Treaty with France makes her continuity “no longer threatened by the sword of Damocles.”96 There can be no question that Liechtenstein possesses an unrivaled degree of sovereignty while, I believe, the other three microstates are all significantly restrained by their neighbors. Though it is tempting to generalize that having two sister states as opposed to one confers special privileges or more leeway to the microstate, this truly depends on the presence of the foreign state in the domestic government. Liechtenstein’s relations with Switzerland and Austria 91

Rogatnick, 174-177. European Council Document, 1999/97/EC (31 December 1998). 93 Duursma, 225. 94 Ibid., 145. 95 Eccardt, 28. 96 Grinda, VII. 92


have been minimally invasive and full sovereignty resides with the Prince. This allowed the Principality on the Rhine to balance its relations between its two neighbors and manage their influence. In practice, being a wedge instead of an enclave gave Liechtenstein alternatives when SNYDER | 40

the Austro-Hungarian Empire Collapsed in 1918 and the Principality could change its alliance to Switzerland. San Marino, as an enclave, did not have this option when Italy collapsed following the Second World War along with the Italian lira. As a result, San Marino suffered with Italy, leading to the election of a Communist government prolonging the Republic’s misery for more than a decade.97 These cases show the opportunity afforded by a second neighbor as opposed to the limiting affect of encirclement. However, Andorra has not been as fortunate with its two neighbors. Though the War of the Wavelengths shows tactful balancing of Spanish and French interests, the outsized presence of France and the Bishop of Urgell in Andorra’s internal government established barriers to Andorrans’ sovereign political discourse and financial policies. It would seem that instead of the quantity of neighbors on which a microstate is dependent, more crucial to understanding the limits on sovereignty is the circumstantial involvement of the neighbors in governing the microstate.

Sovereign Powers Retained Despite whatever limitations, it is important to remain aware of certain functions only practicable by sovereign states in which the microstates took part. International litigation before the International Court of Justice by Liechtenstein was received and ruled upon in Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, 1955.98 Such actions can only be brought by sovereign states.

97 98

Rogatnick, 174-177. D’Olivier Farran, 134, 140.

In addition, the microstates have long established bilateral treaties with states other than their immediate neighbors. Notable among these are extradition treaties. These agreements are important to outside states who want to ensure that criminals may not take refuge in otherwise SNYDER | 41

safe havens. In return, the microstates gain an affirmation of their sovereignties. States would not bother concluding extradition treaties with the microstates if there were guarantees that the microstate’s larger neighbor would instead secure any fugitive on that territory. To just name a few, Monaco concluded extradition treaties with Belgium in 1876, Spain in 1882, Russia in 1883, Liberia in 1926 and the United States in 1939.99 San Marino has extradition agreements dating as far back as 1899 with the United Kingdom.100 This shows the serious with which other countries regarded the microstates, for were they really not sovereign states, these treaties would have been unnecessary. States’ declarations of war are also key indicators of their sovereignties, especially when it is not in conformity with its neighbor. After seeing battle on its own soil during World War II, San Marino declared war on Germany during the latter stages of the conflict in September 1944 against the wishes of Italy.101 One scholar says that this declaration “demonstrates a true liberty of action in foreign relations.” Though Liechtenstein, like Switzerland, was a venue of much illicit activity during the War and though Hitler threatened a putsch of its government,102 it never took part in any hostilities nor did it declare war. Lastly, the microstates’ perceived sovereignties were recognized in the 1940’s by none other than the United Nations. Based on the obligations to protect and promote non-independent entities that seek to become independent listed in Articles 73 and 74 of the Charter, the


Mourou, 370. British and foreign state papers, version 72, 537. 101 D’Olivier Farran, 143. 102 Eccardt, 183. 100

Organization annually produces a list of non-self-governing territories. In no iteration of the list, originally published in 1946 and most recently revised in 2002, were any of the European microstates ever recognized as non-self-governing.103 We can then deduce that the United SNYDER | 42

Nations viewed them as sovereign independent states by their absence from this list. In the following chapter, I examine the arguments used against the microstates for reason of limited sovereignty. It is important then to keep in mind what has been above presented in order to dispute those claims and compare the microstates’ sovereignties to those of other states.

Economic Statuses Often caricaturized as the playgrounds of the wealthy, people do not often realize the industrial force and business presence that the European microstates have. While some quickly deride the microstates as tax havens and gambling harems, the microstates’ economic situations are robust and generate nearly all of their revenue from taxes. The European microstates, despite some occasional periods of turbulence, have been quite prosperous throughout the 20th Century and up until today. Despite a paucity of statistical information on these countries, I will attempt to assess the historic economic capacities of the countries using historical and some statistical information. Andorra Following the Second World War, Andorra had difficulty establishing its economy in an impoverished Europe. Yet due to the political situation of its neighbor to the south, Spain, Andorra grew an industry as “Europe’s window into Spain;” an intermediary between free and fascist Europe. The Franco era became known in Andorra as the “years of Tergal, nylon and Duralex.”104 Later, Andorra would diversify into a financial and tourist center. With low taxes, 103 104

Marín-Bosch, 179-182. Mateu, 122.

banking secrecy, a luxury tourism sector featuring spas and skiing slopes and abundant duty-free shopping, Andorra’s economy grew significantly giving it momentum into the post-Franco era.105 Andorra reported 0% unemployment in 1989. In Andorra’s first year of United Nations 106

membership, it contributed $42,521 in dues. Liechtenstein

Liechtenstein’s economy has been one of the strongest in the world, so much so that today it boasts the top GDP per capita of any country in the world.107 Untouched during World War II and with the benefit of an unaffected trade partner in Switzerland, Liechtenstein was insulated from the economic depression that blighted Europe in the 1940’s and 50’s. In 1949, Liechtenstein became the first net energy exporter of Europe.108 The Principality’s technically advanced goods (Liechtenstein is the leading exporter of dentures in the world) have insulated it from external shocks such as the 1970’s Oil Crisis. The Principality provides more jobs than its labor supply can support on its own. Accordingly, instead of Liechtenstein forming a part of “Greater Switzerland” some economic analysts call adjacent Swiss cantons and Austrian states “Greater Liechtenstein.”109 Liechtenstein has historically had such low unemployment that it can be measured in single digits with four unemployed persons in 1960 and three in 1980 though recent immigration has pushed those figures higher.110 Liechtenstein has long posted large budget surpluses. At the time of the United Nations’ debate on microstates during the 1960’s, Liechtenstein had a surplus of 6.1 Million CHF which grew to 25.6 M CHF in 1970 and 62.7 M


Armstrong, 1243 United Nations Document ST/ADM/SER.B/422, 28 December 1993. 107 CIA World Factbook, 2009. 108 Beattie, 139. 109 Ibid., 283. 110 Ibid., 139. 106


CHF in 1980.111 Clearly, Liechtenstein surpassed any minimum financial standard of capacity at any time of consideration. Monaco SNYDER | 44

Monaco, with its casinos and posh lifestyle, has long been known as an opulent resort. Any argument that Monaco would be unable to contribute to the United Nations budget would be undermined by the fact that Monaco voluntarily paid dues for a long time, including $27,000 toward the budget in 1964.112 Monaco’s observer mission to the United Nations, maintained from 1956 forward, evidences Monaco’s capacity to afford the human resources costs of sending a delegation to New York.113 By the mid-1960’s it paid an estimated $200,000 on all costs for the United Nations both in New York and on its home soil.114 In Monaco’s first year as a member it paid $59,530 in contributions.115 The Principality is adamant not to be mischaracterized by its luxurious reputation. As famous as her casinos are, they only bring in 3% of government revenue, the rest of which comes from her aggressively low business tax.116 San Marino San Marino’s economy is largely based on industrial production and the service sector.117 San Marino has seen more economic instability than the other European microstates. The crisis that followed World War II rendered San Marino so poor that its dire economic situation forced it to not consider applying for United Nations membership.118 San Marino holds a slightly lower tax rate than Italy, causing many otherwise Italian companies to register there as limited liability


Beattie, 270. Blair, 7. 113 Mendelson, 626. 114 Blair, 39. 115 United Nations Document ST/ADM/SER.B/422, 28 December 1993. 116 De Millo Terrazzani. 117 Duursma, 207. 118 Ibid., 227, 236-242. 112

corporations.119 San Marino, however, does not have a comparable taxation system with the other microstates due to pressure that Italy has placed on the small republic. Perhaps due to its stricter adherence to international tax norms than the other European microstates, San Marino SNYDER | 45

has not seen as much prosperity. A report conducted in 1995 concluded that San Marino has a lower GDP per capita than the surrounding Italian regions of Emilia-Romagna and The Marche.120 Nonetheless, San Marino had sufficient wealth by the end of the 1980’s to establish an observer mission to the United Nations and apply for membership in 1992.121 Though information is limited, an educated guess would say that San Marino could long sufficiently satisfy the minimum financial obligations imposed by United Nations membership. In sum, it is quite evident that the European microstates maintain robust economies. This information will be useful during the next chapter when I examine these data in relation to Article 17 of the United Nations Charter which obligates member-states to annual financial contributions. From this and a comparison with states that were allowed to join despite lesser financial capacities, I will debunk the alternate hypothesis that the microstates’ financial situations prevented them membership.

Desire to Join International Organizations The European microstates have constantly fought for recognition since their inceptions. With the emergence of globalized politics in the 20th Century, their campaigns to be noticed extended beyond Western Europe and to the world at large. Since the invention of international organizations, microstates have sought membership as a method of gaining the world’s attention, establishing diplomatic contacts and contributing some, albeit limited, input into international affairs. In this section I talk generally about the attractions of membership to microstates. 119

Duursma, 208. Armstrong, 1235. 121 Duursma, 254. 120

As compared to larger states whose interest in world politics may be characterized by a desire to protect and promote interests in far away corners of the world, the microstates have a much simpler foreign policy. Atop the foreign policy objectives for each country is the assertion 122

of its sovereignty and the state’s recognition by other sovereign states.


Though there are some

particular interests (e.g. Monaco places a great deal of energy into advocacy for marine protection), the microstates’ other top desire is to establish diplomatic contacts with other states. In terms of logistics, for a small country with limited resources to send diplomatic delegations to all of the countries of the world would be costly in terms of money and manpower.123 When one considers further that only nationals may serve as diplomats and that nationals often make a plurality or minority in the microstates, this becomes an even more arduous task. For these reasons, it is more practical to establish a diplomatic post at the headquarters of an international organization which serves as a locus where diplomats from nearly all the countries of the world congregate.124

Conclusion The microstates have unique governmental systems and share some of their sovereignties with their neighbors, often due to limitations of capacity and in other cases due to intimidation and interference. Generally, the microstates are prosperous and though recently the world community has taken action against their controversial methods of raising revenue, they have consistently maintained a more than sufficient capacity to pay United Nations dues. Membership in international organizations is a top priority for the microstates as it reinforces their existence and efficiently expands their opportunities to interact with other states. 122

Tomàs, de Millo Terrazzani, Sparber. Blair, 26. 124 Plitshke, 48, 54. 123

Though these are particular reasons, there is nothing about these states that by itself makes them ineligible for membership either by the Charter or by the International Court of Justice advisory ruling. The next chapters provide some contrast between the SNYDER | 47

European microstates and shows that states with absolute and relative disqualifications which were accepted so long as the states were politically acceptable for the current United Nations members.

Chapter Three Examining Previous Explanations The purpose of the first part of this thesis was to provide the reader with the necessary information before evaluating the arguments provided by previous authors and then my own. The purpose of the second part of this thesis will be to use that information as a foundation to dispute the explanations that have so far been proposed and then provide an original answer to the research question. This chapter accomplishes the first of the two aims. Here, I present arguments that have been made by scholars that have studied the microstates and their relations with the United Nations. Considering this is the first scholarly work exclusively dedicated to the interactions between the microstates and the United Nations since they gained admission, I have the luxury which the other authors did not of greater historical perspective and seeing what transpired to finally gain the microstates their admission. Using the information presented in the first part of the thesis, I show that the previous explanations do not accurately explain the microstates’ absence from the United Nations. This chapter is crucial in setting up the final chapters in which I explain the political climate in the General Assembly and how the political positions of the microstates made them perpetually undesirable to the powers that controlled the United Nations. Previous assessments of why the microstates failed to gain entry to the United Nations centered on their peculiar aspects: their deputed sovereignties, their small size, a perceived incapacity to fulfill charter obligations or a lack of willingness. This section examines each of these null hypotheses beginning with where their foundations in previous writings and the public realm. I refute each hypothesis with evidence of other states that were admitted decades in


advance of the microstate in contradiction of the arguments presented. To remind the reader, the hypotheses that I am setting out to disprove are: HO-A: The European microstates had deputed too many of their sovereignties to be members of the United Nations HO-B – The European microstates were too small in terms of geographic area and population to be members of the United Nations HO-C – The European microstates did not wish to become members HO-D – The European microstates were not capable of fulfilling United Nations Charter obligations. The chapter will follow this order. As I eliminate these hypotheses, I clear way for my own hypothesis, in short, that the existing member-states created barriers to the European microstates based purely on political reasons.

H O - A : The European microstates had deputed too many of their sovereignties to be members of the United Nations Given the sovereign powers that the microstates have ceded to their sister states, many believe that the European microstates did not possess a sufficient amount of sovereignty to be members of the United Nations. In this regard, a state might be too susceptible to coercion or control from another state which would dictate its position on certain issues. Other states may fear that based on sovereign equality, coercive states would effectively control puppet votes to build disproportionate support for a resolution. The legal basis for this rejection relates back to the requirement in Article 4, Section 1 of the Charter that membership is open to states, with sovereignty being a requirement for statehood. Establishing the hypothesis Many academic perspectives support the hypothesis that the European microstates were not sufficiently sovereign for membership. The microstates’ requirements to follow their larger


neighbors on economic issues, some argued, would not allow them to independently enforce sanctions against those states.125 Others take the stated justification of Liechtenstein’s rejection from the League of Nations at face value, that the she was not sufficiently sovereign and reflect it 126

in their writing.


In the particular case of Andorra, scholars point to her inability to form her

own foreign affairs ministry until 1993 as a barrier to its membership.127 If the popular newsmagazine Time is any reflection of the conventional wisdom, its 1965 Guide to the United Nations, demonstrates the prevalence of the sovereignty argument against the microstates: “Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino are not eligible (for membership) being principalities rather than sovereign states.”128 This quote from such an authoritative source that is so influential in guiding the opinion of not only the public, but also of decision makers, shows the ubiquity of misinformation and assumptions made about the microstates. Let us now examine circumstances in which political actors refused the entry of the microstates to international politics based on their limited sovereignties. This comes in the form of historical attempts of the microstates to join international organizations that were opposed on the basis of their limited sovereignties. First, I discuss the League of Nation’s refusal of Liechtenstein’s application in 1920, then the Soviet Union’s opposition to Liechtenstein’s membership to the International Court of Justice in 1949. Following World War I, Liechtenstein wished to assert itself on the global stage in a “campaign for international recognition.”129 This included an attempt to attend the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 that gained it recognition by the powers attending, though not a seat at the 125

Mendelson, 621. Schwebel, 108 and Cohen, 1147. More on this rejection on pages 57-59. 127 Mateu, 112. 128 A Time Guide to the United Nations, 1965, Time, Ine. The publication itself is no longer available. Kohn, 547. 129 Beattie, 58. 126

table.130 On behalf of Liechtenstein, Switzerland submitted the Principality’s application for membership to the League in July 1920.131 The League voted against Liechtenstein’s proposed membership by a margin of 28 to 1, with 13 abstentions.132 In its reasoning, the League stated: SNYDER | 51

There can be no doubt that juridically the Principality of Liechtenstein is a sovereign State, but by reason of her very limited area, small population and her geographical position, she had chosen to depute to others some of the attributes of sovereignty. For instance, she has contracted with other Powers for the control of her Customs, the administration of her Posts, Telegraphs and Telephone Services, for the diplomatic representation of her subjects in foreign countries, other than Switzerland and Austria, and for final decisions in certain judicial cases. Liechtenstein has no army.133

This rejection touches on many possible justifications for Liechtenstein’s disqualification but centers ultimately on her deputed sovereignties. Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Edvard Benes isolates the priority placed on sovereignty over size: The reason given for the non-admission of the latter [Liechtenstein] is not, however, its small size, but its close connection with another State. . . . One may deduce from the decision taken with regard to these [mini-] States that, in practice, the smallness of a State does not prevent its being admitted into the League.134

Gunter goes on to argue, as I shall below, that the admissions of other members with limited sovereignties were tolerated, so sovereignty by itself cannot be the reason Liechtenstein’s application was rejected. Unfortunately for Liechtenstein, this rejection established a precedent, making the Principality reluctant to apply again for membership in international organizations for a long time thereafter. The rejection also established as precedent an exaggerated understatement of Liechtenstein’s relative sovereignty as certain facts in the statement were incorrect (e.g. aspects of postal administatration and customs control). The Soviet Union and Ukraine opposed Liechtenstein and San Marino’s applications to the International Court of Justice in 1949 and 1953, respectively, following this precedent that 130

Beattie, 60. Ibid., 66. 132 Gunter, 499. 133 League of Nations, First Assembly-Plenary Meetings, 563-64. 134 Ibid. 131

the microstates were not sufficiently sovereign.135 This most hypocritical of objections was not sustained and the USSR and Ukraine abstained from voting on the eventually successful applications of the two microstates. Beginning with this aforementioned example, let us now SNYDER | 52

look states that were granted membership in the United Nations despite having sovereignties that were just as limited as the European microstates. Why the hypothesis is wrong Despite the global community’s stated aversion to states that are not fully sovereign, contradictions arise in the cases of Ukraine, Belarus, India, the Philippines and Luxembourg’s memberships to the United Nations as original signatories of the San Francisco Treaty. These cases represent exceptions to the one-country, one-vote policy of sovereign equality and demonstrate that the United Nation’s exclusion of microstates by their limited sovereignties is a poor and inconsistent excuse. The inclusion of Ukraine and Belarus came upon the instance of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin during the Yalta Conference. This proposal was supported by Prime Minister Churchill who empathized with the devastation endured by the two Soviet Republics during the Second World War. The United Kingdom also wanted to ensure that members of the Commonwealth would gain membership and looked at the admissions of Belarus and Ukraine as a compromise.136 US President Franklin Roosevelt did not want to outright oppose his two counterparts given the delicate nature of the Yalta talks and instead of directly confronting the issue, he reasserted the concept of sovereign equality and his wish to see it instituted. US Secretary of State, James Byrnes vehemently opposed the proposal and reminded the President of a previous promise he made to a group of US Senators that should the Soviet Union gain

135 136

United Nations Documents S/1342 and S/3137. Byrnes, 40.

multiple votes, he would retort by demanding votes for all 48 US States. The United States ultimately relented and allowed Belarus and Ukraine their votes with no compensation to the US, acknowledging that this was a violation of the concept of sovereign equality as “the Soviet 137

republics are no more independent than the states of our Union.”

A reworking of the Soviet Constitution in 1944 permitted Union Republics to establish their own Commissariats of Foreign Affairs which Stalin argued would provide for independent foreign policies of Ukraine and Belarus, though in practice there was hardly ever any differentiation between the Union Republics’ voting and the Soviet Union’s. The Coincidence Index of the two sub-states to the Soviet Union’s votes in the General Assembly demonstrate nearly perfect coincidence for every five year period from the inception of the United Nations until 1980.138 Belarus and Ukraine recorded a CI of 992 with each other, one of the highest in United Nations history.139 The cases of Ukraine and Belarus invalidate the principle of sovereign equality as the Soviet Union clearly had three votes for one state. The cases of commonwealth possessions India and the Philippines also show that full sovereignty was not necessary for certain entities to achieve member-state status. In fact, British India was a comprehensive member of the League of Nations. However, this may be explained as the League of Nations Covenant made membership eligible to “any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony” with India specifically in mind.140 The United Nations Charter, however, was stricter in definition and refers merely to “states.”141 As India and the Philippines were not independent states until 1947 and 1946 respectively, their inclusion as original members of the


Ibid. Marín-Bosch, 133. There is one exception, the Ukraine showed differentiation from the USSR from 1971-1975. 139 Ibid., 121. 140 Rudzinski, 144-145. 141 See United Nations Charter Article 4, Section 1, above on page 22. 138


United Nations in 1945 is anomalous.142 In practice, in the League of Nations, despite some independence on minor issues, India’s votes reflected British foreign policy rather than the Indian public’s will.143 India only began asserting its own foreign policy in September 1946 144

when Indians were allowed to assume power.


Some scholars interpret the inclusions of India

and the Philippines as unique cases due to India’s long history in international affairs and the Philippines’ important role in World War II.145 However, these cases demonstrate the inconsistency of sovereign statehood as a requirement for membership and discredit those who argue that it can entirely explain the microstates’ exclusion. Lastly, Luxembourg provides perhaps the most glaring contradiction in that it has many restrictions on its sovereignty similar to those of the smaller microstates. Luxembourg is vastly different from Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino as it is quite large in comparison and was an original member not only of the United Nations but also the European Union.146 Her size makes Luxembourg capable of maintaining large agricultural and industrial sectors in her economy which the microstates do not have. Her size and geographic position, much to her chagrin, have also placed her between the great powers of France and Germany and the lesser power of Belgium, turning Luxembourg into a battlefield during both World Wars. The Grand Duchy, however, is similar to the microstates in that, prior to European integration, it formed a customs union with Belgium and the Netherlands dating back to 1921.147 Additionally, the conduct of consular representation in third states where, because of Luxembourg’s limited


Cohen, 1131. Indian Council of World Affairs, 4. 144 Ibid., 27. 145 Cohen, 1131. 146 Then, the European Steel and Coal Community. 147 Verzijl, 473. This union replaced Luxembourg’s membership in the German Zollverein which was interrupted by Germany’s invasion of the Grand Duchy. 143

resources, it has no representation, has been handled by the Netherlands since 1880.148 Verzijl, in fact, uses Luxembourg and Liechtenstein as parallel examples of consequences of voluntary agreements.149 The similarities between Luxembourg and the other microstates, though SNYDER | 55

especially Liechtenstein, demonstrate a double standard when discussing sovereignty. It seems that though Luxembourg had quite comparable sovereign attributes with respect to Liechtenstein, it received preferential treatment in its admission to international organizations. We might guess that its larger area and geographic position between Europe’s feuding powers of the 20th Century necessitated its membership to the League, setting a precedent for its future inclusion in other international organizations.150 Conclusion Eventually, when the European microstates did gain admission, many of the same restrictions on their sovereignties still existed. Most notably, Monaco was still bound to perfect conformity with French foreign policy until the treaty revision of 2002. This extended to votes in the General Assembly for which Monaco’s delegation had to confer with French diplomats to receive instructions on how to vote.151 Sovereignty could not have been a barrier to admission if, when finally admitted, Monaco was not sovereign but instead a second vote for France. Clearly, there are and there should remain lower limits beneath which entities lack enough sovereignty to be considered responsible for representing their own beliefs in the United Nations. British, American and French overseas territories come to mind in this context. Seeing that today’s lower thresholds for size in terms of population and geographic area have been lowered by the admissions of the European microstates, it is hard to rule out entities like


Verzijl, 476. Ibid. 150 Rudzinski vaguely seems to point to these factors overriding Luxembourg’s limited size, 173. 151 De Millo Terrazzani. 149

Gibraltar, Guam or French Polynesia simply on merits of size. Rather, these entities must be understood to be excluded because they are globally recognized as components of larger states. These examples are different from the European microstates prior to their admissions to the SNYDER | 56

United Nations as the microstates were universally recognized, sovereign states. The examples cited in this paragraph, however, do not currently possess the sovereign powers that the European microstates did neither de jure nor de facto. The cases of Ukraine, Belarus, India, the Philippines and Luxembourg lead me to a reasoned rejection that the limited sovereignties of the European microstates prevented them from being able to join the United Nations. While there is no doubt that each of the microstates had agreed to depute certain sovereign powers to its larger neighbors, there is equally no doubt that other entities with similarly deputed powers were received as members of the United Nations. Even the least sovereign of the microstates, Andorra, enjoyed just as much sovereignty as Belarus and Ukraine, if not more. India and the Philippines, also not independent at the time of their admission, also show the lax applicability of the criterion of sovereignty. Luxembourg had a sovereign status quite similar to that of the smaller European countries, proving that this level of sovereignty was acceptable to the United Nations. In sum, sovereignty could not have been a barrier to membership for the microstates as it was not one for other states.

HO-B – The European microstates were too small in terms of geographic area and population to be members of the United Nations The second existing hypothesis is that the European microstates, by reason of their diminutive size and limited population were not admissible. In any assessment of these countries, it is difficult to ignore the small size of Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino and the role that both their limited geographic land masses and small populations played in their

exclusion from the United Nations. The microstates’ small sizes are even implicit in the moniker “microstate.” Some authors use terms like exiguous, diminutive and Lilliputian, all emphasizing size as these states’ defining characteristic. Many states believed that to extend membership to SNYDER | 57

these states would be unreasonable and unfair to the larger states. Yet as the aforementioned 1948 advisory ruling of the International Court of Justice stated, a state’s candidature may only be considered based on the five listed criteria, of which size is not one. Thus, existing memberstates had no legal basis for excluding the microstates based on their diminutive sizes. Though noble in principle, this never stopped critics and politicians from invoking size as a justification for the non-inclusion of the European microstates. Historical precedent in the League of Nations shows that smallness, at the time, was a deeper justification than insufficient sovereignty for rejecting Liechtenstein and forcing San Marino and Monaco to withdraw their applications. Statements made in and actions taken by the United Nations demonstrate that the microstates’ small size in terms of both geography and population continued to pose an obstacle to their admission. Employing academic and historical arguments, I demonstrate that though standards of size have been invoked as justification, these standards have been arbitrary and inconsistent. Establishing the hypothesis Academic opinions support this claim as it seems to have been the most dominant explanation for the microstates’ exclusion for quite some time. Duursma believes that fears during the decolonization process that there would be an inundation of small states were exaggerated and once discovered to be unfounded allowed the European microstates to join and points out that a recurring trend has been the unwillingness of larger countries to give a

disproportionate amount of power to small countries.152 In analyzing Liechtenstein’s rejection from the League of Nations in 1920, Gunter does not trust the justification on record and believes instead that it was Liechtenstein’s small size that caused its exclusion.153 Raton, another SNYDER | 58

scholar on Liechtenstein concurs. Between these two authors we see quite easily that Liechtenstein’s rejection from the League created a precedent placing size at the forefront of how other states perceived the microstates. In tables, graphs and reports, especially from the 1960’s, there is a tendency toward hyperbole to overstate the extent to which membership may be extended. This created the impression that allowing the European microstates to join would be a step along a slippery slope that one day might lead to membership for entities like Pitcairn Island whose population is beneath 100. These fears ultimately were overblown and many of the potential states that reports listed never gained or desired independence. This easily is one of the favored opinions of conventional wisdom as size is the most defining trait of the European microstates, most obvious to even those who are not aware of the powers that the microstates have deputed to their larger neighbors, their lack of militarized forces or perceived unwillingness to join the United Nations. Many states, especially those with limited foreign affairs ministries, focus the better part of their foreign affairs budget on investigating the larger, more obviously potent states of the world with which they will need to interact on a more recurring basis. In such a case, these states are forced rely on their first impressions of the microstates and generalize that their small size is sufficient explanation for their exclusion. When Liechtenstein was rejected from the League of Nations in 1920, the formal reasoning was that its deputed sovereignties made it incapable of all the obligations imposed by

152 153

Duursma, 135. Gunter, 499.

the Covenant.154 However other diplomats present cited the smallness of the Principality. Though Czechoslovakian diplomat Edvard Benes attributed the rejection of Liechtenstein solely to its deputed sovereignties, it is worth mentioning that Czechoslovakia had a recent dispute with SNYDER | 59

Liechtenstein over the refusal of the Prince to pay new taxes on property he owned in Slovakia though what impact this might have on Benes’ statements is merely conjecture.155 The French representative on the Sub-Committee considering Liechtenstein’s admission did not think it would be proper for such a small state to have the same voting weight as a large state.156 Even Liechtenstein’s lone advocate Switzerland conceded that, “Liechtenstein is too small a state to be able to be admitted in the current conditions.”157 Mendelson believes that the Viviani Questionnaire, the survey designed to discern information from all applicants, asked questions about the size and population specifically to exclude states that it deemed too small.158 It is important to place this rejection within proper context. The League of Nations wanted to create an everlasting peace in Europe and wanted to maintain an aura of prestige and seriousness. Accordingly, the admission of small states with little recognition at a time when the League did not include such important states as Germany, Mexico and the Soviet Union would seem to undermine the legitimacy and grandeur of the League. The small size of the microstates also posed procedural questions. Sovereign equality gave each member of the League an equal voice. The League of Nations operated on unanimity on most issues and allowing a country of 10,000 inhabitants a veto over a world of 2 billion is quite reasonably objectionable. Disproving the hypothesis


See above, page 51. The dispute continues to this day and Slovakia and Liechtenstein still refuse to recognize each other. 156 Duurmsa, 171. 157 League of Nations, Records of the First Assembly, 4th-6th Committee (1920) no. 12, p. 11. Translated by author. 158 Mendeslon, 618. 155

As the international system evolved, the United Nations and its specialized agencies, moved away from a system of unanimity and created the conditions for small states to be accepted. This allowed the Organization to be more productive than its predecessor and SNYDER | 60

mitigated the disproportionate power that smaller states could have. Seemingly, the objections over size would disappear. In practice, small states became more acceptable to the specialized agencies in the post-war period. Liechtenstein applied to become party to the International Court of Justice in 1949. In its evaluation of Liechtenstein’s candidature, the Soviet Union and Ukraine raised objections on the grounds that Liechtenstein was not, in their perception, a sovereign state.159 Despite their misgivings, USSR and Ukraine rejected the concept of smallness for exclusion: The position of the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR is that, from the point of view of principle, we have always taken the stand that a State, however small, has the same rights as a large State in the matter of joining the United Nations or becoming a Party to 'the Statute of the International Court.’ The question of whether a given State has a large territory or a small one, of whether it has a considerable population or not, is of no consequence to us.160 From the earliest days of the United Nations, membership included states that were drastically smaller than the rest. The minimum in terms of geography was Luxembourg which covers 2,586 km2.161 As new small states emerged due to the decolonization process and other factors and were admitted to the United Nations without protest, the lower threshold was set progressively lower. Malta became independent in 1964 and was admitted to the United Nations despite its size of 316 km2. Singapore, despite its geographic small size of 697 km2, was admitted the same year as its independence in 1965. In the same session, the Maldives with an area of 298 km2 was admitted. The parade of small states continued with Barbados at 430 km2 in


United Nations Document S/1342. United Nations Document S/PV. 432. 27 July 1949. 161 Size and population figures from CIA World Factbook, 2009. 160

1966, Grenada at 344 km2 in 1974 and the Seychelles at 455 km2 in 1976. The question of land area becomes increasingly dubious as by 1965 the Maldives, smaller in area than Andorra’s 468 km2 and less than twice as large as Liechtenstein’s 160 km2, had been admitted. Any threshold SNYDER | 61

for size should have included the European microstates by the point in time. In the early days of the United Nations, the state with the smallest population was Iceland with a mere 122,000 inhabitants at its date of accession.162 The Maldives entered the United Nations in 1965 with a population of only 40,000.163 Rapoport questions then how any country with fewer inhabitants can be excluded. Comparing the largest state in the United Nations and this new member, he points out that there were 4,928 Indians for every one Maldivian.164 It seems with the Maldives any reasonable argument of a minimum size had crossed a point of no return. The admissions of the European microstates would not have made for a much more heinous ratio. Conclusion As we can see, states of similar proportions in terms of geography and population had long been members of the United Nations before the European microstates were admitted. Existing members could no longer argue against the admissions of Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino on these grounds without being hypocritical of past decisions they had made. With the progression of time, the size threshold lowered, but had well surpassed the European microstates before their admission. For these reasons we may reject the hypothesis of small size as a disqualification for membership.


Gröndal, 38. Frowein, 335. 164 Ibid. 163

HO-C – The European microstates did not wish to become members The simplest explanation of the microstates’ absence from the United Nations might be attributed to a lack of willingness on the part of the microstates. After all, unlike the League of Nations, the United Nations has never invited countries to join; states instead must apply in order to be considered for membership.165 This requirement for membership is outlined in Article 4, Section 1 in two parts: the third criterion of acceptance of Charter obligations and the fifth criterion of willingness to carry them out. In practice, a state must submit a statement, usually a piece of legislation by that state’s national assembly or decree by its monarch, declaring its acceptance as part of its application for membership. The European microstates never once submitted an application for membership and an observer might see this as the most logical explanation for why they did not become members. However, to imply that a lack of willingness or desire on the part of the microstates can explain their non-application would be an incorrect assumption. We can recall their reasons for wanting to join international organizations: the legitimacy that membership confers them and the efficient extension of diplomatic contacts that an international organization’s headquarters provides. Membership in the United Nations has long been the highest goal of each state. Membership, to them, is an irrevocable credential and affirmation of their existence. 166 By extension, to not try to join the United Nations is tantamount to admitting that the state does not exist. Of course, the microstates did officially try once, for the League of Nations. Following Liechtenstein’s rejection, Monaco withdrew its application and San Marino let its application lapse. Monaco and San Marino, I would infer, saw the precedent set by the refusal of Liechtenstein and did not want to face the same humiliation. The fear of a further rejection led 165 166

Rudzinski, 164. De Millo Terrazzani, Tomàs, Sparber,


the countries to be reticent in approaching the United Nations, as it seemed safer to wait for a window of opportunity than be rejected and push back their chances for another few decades. As such, when sensing opportunity, the microstates dispatched diplomats, either SNYDER | 63

individually or through observer missions to the United Nations to gauge reaction and sense when the moment was right. Monaco opened a permanent observer mission to the United Nations in 1956 as a way of keeping its finger on the pulse of the Organization.167 Liechtenstein engaged in quiet diplomatic outreach, dispatching emissaries to meet with diplomats for Security Council members in New York in the 1960’s and were dissuaded from applying but sent diplomats again in 1988 and were given encouragement to apply.168 To enhance its chances of admission, Liechtenstein even engaged in a measure of cultural diplomacy when Prince HansAdam II loaned his personal art collection for an exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum in New York in 1985 designed at raising awareness of the small country in the world’s capital.169 The entry of Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino into the United Nations Specialized Agencies beginning in the late 1940’s can also be seen as intent and desire to take part in comprehensive membership. One scholar views the specialized agencies as part of a larger mission to eventually join the top echelon: Monaco considered its admission to institutions linked to the United Nations as a trampoline which would permit it one day to become a full member of the United Nations; it is why the micro-state, always in search of international recognition, showed a systematic want to participate in institutions linked to the U.N.170

This trampoline strategy shows a great deal of forethought on the part of the microstates. Their participation in the Specialized Agencies served both to advance their campaigns for recognition but ultimately as stepping stones toward the grand prize, the United Nations. 167

Mower, 267. Duursma, 195. 169 Beattie, 159. 170 Mourou, 232. Translation provided by Snyder. 168

Lofty or unrealistic goals have never stood in the way of the microstates’ ambitions. Andorra-la-Vella bid for the 2010 Olympic Winter Games and finished dead last in the sevenway competition. Andorra, Monaco and San Marino are all members of the International Civil SNYDER | 64

Aviation Organization despite not having an airport. Endeavors like this are not designed to succeed or serve a great purpose, but rather draw attention to the country and are well worth the expensive entry fees that they entail. One author characterized the accession of Monaco, not as a sudden and new desire, but instead he says, “The admission in 1993 bestows the constant will of Monaco’s Princes… to promote all the initiatives tending to bring nations together to prevent conflicts.”171 In conclusion, to say that no formal application evidences a lack of desire is too simplistic an explanation. Clearly, the microstates were fighting for attention, but after repeated brush offs the microstates were reticent to put themselves out on a limb and get rejected. Their desire was always present yet their ability to transform this willingness into actual membership depended on the political climate in the General Assembly, as I will show in Chapters Four and Five.

HO-D – The European microstates were not capable of fulfilling United Nations Charter obligations. Another argument employed against the admission of the European microstates was that they were not able to sufficiently fulfill the requirements, financially and toward the maintenance of global security, put forth in the United Nations Charter. This basis for exclusion is in the fourth criterion for membership from Article 4, Section 1, the capacity to fulfill Charter obligations, in the judgment of the United Nations.172 The two most notable obligations for which the most objections have been raised to the microstates are Articles 17 and 43 which detail the financial and security obligations that member-states are required to uphold, respectively. 171 172

Grinda, 18. See above, page 22.

This section will deal first the context of those who voiced their opinion against the capacity of microstates and then with financial obligations and then obligations to maintaining world peace and security. SNYDER | 65

Context When the subject of the microstates arose again in the 1960’s, it was deeply intertwined with the global movement toward decolonization. As many new small states emerged from their previous colonial rulers, the United Nations was faced with the question of whether or not to include them. Under Secretary-General U Thant, the United Nations became reluctant to admit many of these states, fearing a deluge of new members. To justify this opposition, the SecretaryGeneral asserted that these states would be unable to fulfill the duties of membership.173 Chief among these obligations were the financial assessments demanded under Article 17 and the contributions to collective security in Article 43. Though the ultimate resolution of the 1960’s microstates debate was that microstates are incapable of fulfilling these obligations, this argument did not accurately assess the European microstates’ capacity and instead characterized them off assumptions of microstates from elsewhere. This period had a certain confusion between the European microstates and the ex-colonial microstates and when criticisms of one group were presented, they seemingly applied to both. Many authors backed up this opinion without questioning it, that the microstates did not have the means to fulfill financial obligations.174 Financial Obligations All member-states of the United Nations are required to contribute to the Organization’s annual budget as put forth in Article 17 of the Charter:

173 174

Duursma, 135. Vellas, 574, Blair, 25-27, Rogatnick , 248, et al.

1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization. 2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly. 3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned.175 Each year an assessment scale is negotiated between members of the General Assembly to be paid both by members and non-members who are part of the Specialized Agencies. A minimum amount may be paid by the least capable members, usually no less than 0.04% of the total budget. For states that join during a plenary session, an assessment is prorated. By Article 19, failure to pay contributions leads to a member-state losing its vote though this has never been enforced.176 Why the hypothesis is wrong Financial capacity, though as I have demonstrated above was not an insurmountable obstacle for the European microstates, would be a sufficient criterion for excluding certain states were it to have ever been practiced. The inclusion of several member-states with financial difficulties shows that it never was. The cases of the Gambia, the Maldives and newly independent island countries show that certain member states with large financial liabilities were tolerable to the United Nations though the financially capable European microstates were not. The Gambia, a small African country which was admitted to the United Nations in 1965, the same year that it gained its independence from the United Kingdom, addressed its financial difficulties to the plenary session on its first day as a member-state. D.K. Jawara, the Prime Minister of the Gambia, said in his address, “The Gambia finds that it is expected to contribute to the expenses of the United Nations on the basis of a minimum contribution which is out of

175 176

United Nations Charter, Article 17. United Nations Charter, Article 19.


proportion to its resources.”177 Throughout its first few years, the Gambia did not even maintain a permanent delegation in New York.178 The Maldives, a former colony of the United Kingdom, was also admitted to the United SNYDER | 67

Nations in 1965 shortly following its independence. Despite reservations on the part of the United States’ representative to the Security Council on the grounds of the Maldives’ financial capacity, the Security Council unanimously supported the Maldives’ application.179 In turn, this would lead to problems for the archipelago state in the long run as it found it expensive to even send its delegation to New York for plenary sessions, missing the entire 1971 session.180 Many other island and African states’ revenues were well below any realistic measure of sufficient wealth to handle United Nations obligations. During the 1960’s while all United Nations members of that time had revenues of at least $15 million, 75% of the island and emerging African and Asian entities had revenues of less than $15 million.181 Though many argue that the European microstates were not fit for membership and could not afford the financial obligations, United Nations practice in the admission of African and island countries without the means to contribute disprove this claim. One may reasonably ask then why these newly independent countries were admitted if their incapacity was so evident. This should have been an especially heightened concerned following the lack of funds that paralyzed the United Nations and forced it to remove nearly the entire agenda from its plenary session of 1964.182 The political climate at the time of decolonization was that of revulsion and contempt toward former colonizers and support for any goodwill for the newly independent countries. One


General Assembly Official Records, Twentieth Session, A/PV .1332, 21 September 1965. Rapoport, 131. 179 Schwebel, 109. 180 Ibid. 181 Blair, 30. 182 Marín-Bosch, 91. 178

author states, “Opposition to their admission would be equated by some members with a procolonialist stand. The willingness of the United Nations to admit [African] ministates goes hand in hand with one of the principal values of the present international system, the dismantling of the colonial system.”



This eagerness to appear supportive of the victims of colonization

overrode any attention to the economic viability of the new countries. Therefore if economic capacity of potential member-states was not assessed, it could not have truly proved a barrier to the European microstates’ admission. Even if it were, it is clear that the European microstates would have surpassed the low standards of financial capacity set by United Nations practice. The wise option for these small impoverished states may have been the path that Western Samoa, Nauru and Tonga took toward membership; deferring membership because of their financial incapacity despite Assembly resolutions encouraging them to join.184 Aside from academic conjecture, in practice questions were raised to the microstates’ capacity to handle financial obligations. Secretary-General U Thant was among the harshest critics of proposed membership stating that, “Such membership may, on the one hand, impose obligations which are too onerous for the ‘Micro-States.’”185 The Secretary-General assigned a Committee of Experts to investigate the matter further. The United States and the United Kingdom offered two alternative proposals to allow categories of non-full membership. The United States devised a category of “Associated Membership” by which states would “enjoy the rights of a Member… except to vote or hold office” and “bear the obligations of a Member except the obligations to pay financial assessments.”186 The British plan was for a similarly limited participation by which states “voluntarily renounce certain rights” and make a nominal


Gunter, 501. Menselson, 617. 185 United Nations Document A/6701/Add.1 (1967) p. 20 para. 164 186 United Nations Document S/9836 (1970). 184

financial contribution.187 These proposals single out a financial inability as the sole obligation that microstates were seemingly unprepared to fulfill, underlining its supremacy in the faults that United Nations members found with these countries. Eventually neither of these plans was SNYDER | 69

adopted as doing so would require amendments to the Charter, undesirable as Cold War adversaries or the Non-Aligned Movement may seek to manipulate other provisions in the Charter. The consequence of these proposals is that the European microstates were seen not only to be too poor, but apparently incapable of fulfilling other obligations. These criticisms aimed chiefly at postcolonial states, remained with the European microstates even well after the African, Asian and island microstates were admitted. These associate membership proposals were futile attempt on the part of the Northern powers to stop the flow of ex-colonial states into the United Nations that had collateral effects on the European microstates. Obligations to maintain global security As the microstates maintain no militaries but rather share power for their defense with their sister states, many authors believe that they may not fulfill the obligations laid out in the Charter to maintain global peace and security.188 They consider the obligations toward maintaining international peace and security to be the most fundamental of any obligation put forth in the Charter.189 Chapter VII of the Charter on “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression” contains these obligations. The duties of a member-state in the case of United Nations response to a disruption of the peace are outlined in Article 43:


United Nations Document S/9836. Gallois, 81; Tur, 10, 22, 30. 189 Rudzinski, 155. 188

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. 3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.190

During the San Francisco Conference, neutrality was explicitly discussed and ruled a disqualification for any potential member.191 It was for this explicit reason that Switzerland ceased consideration of joining the United Nations and that public opinion and government foreign policy in Switzerland turned sharply against accession to the United Nations.192 As such, all original members of the United Nations were countries with standing armies that all declared war against the Axis during World War II. While it is clear, as has been described in the chapter of this book devoted to sovereignty, that none of the microstates maintain any armed forces, certain neutral states’ admissions to the United Nations demonstrate that Article 43 is not strictly enforced and that exceptions can be made. The critique against the microstates’ incapacity in respect to military obligations was embedded in the League’s refusal of Liechtenstein. One sentence is particularly curt and sharp: “Liechtenstein has no army.” The precedent from the League decision certainly affixed the lack of militarized forces in the mindset of decision makers on the admissibility of Liechtenstein. But other nations lacked armies or refused to take part in other actions in order to maintain global peace and security. Aside from Article 43, there is the requirement in Article 41 that requires states to take part in any punitive action (including economic sanctions) when it has been ordered


United Nations Charter, Article 43. Goodrich, 91. 192 Belin, 121. 191


by the Security Council. The following cases of Iceland, Japan and Austria show that exceptions could be made for certain states who did not have the capacity or willingness to fulfill these requirements. SNYDER | 71

Iceland Iceland applied for United Nations membership in 1946 despite not having an army. During World War II, American troops operated an airbase on the island but there was much domestic opposition to a long term continued presence of American military on Iceland193 which spoke to an ingrained neutrality and opposition to war. Despite her aid to the Allies, Iceland never formally declared war on Germany.194 Gröndal illustrates this point: “Iceland was an ‘unarmed’ nation and had no military forces of any kind. This was one of the most deeply rooted traditions of the nation and had shaped the outlook of every Icelander. The idea that they could declare war was completely alien to them.”195

Consequently, there was a deep discomfort with the airbase’s continued use, be it by the United States or the United Nations. In order to achieve its objective without obliging the use of the airbase, Iceland communicated with the major powers to allow it to invoke clause (3) of Article 43 and maintain a check over unrestrained United Nations use of the airbase.196 Here, Iceland exemplifies that a member-state may participate in maintaining security without providing arms or armed forces. Similarly, no United Nations member objected to retaining Costa Rica as a member after it willfully demilitarized itself in 1949. Japan Following the atrocities it suffered during the Second World War, Japan officially renounced the right to war and abolished its armaments in its new constitution.197 However as 193

Neuchterlein, 53. Corgan, 48. 195 Gröndal, 37. 196 Neuchterlein, 56. 197 Gakkai, 197. 194

East Asia became a volatile region of the world in the late 1940’s with wars in nearby China and Korea, Japan began to fret for its security. To ensure its safety, many Japanese looked toward the United Nations as a solution. Yet this was problematic for Japan as the neutrality it desired SNYDER | 72

conflicted with the requirements of enforcement action in Article 43. Japan viewed this seeming dilemma by separating enforcement from military action and decided that it could willingly participate in enforcement action by offering facilities and other forms of assistance but drew the line at contributing military forces and possessing armaments.198 Austria At the same time that Japan was considering membership, Austria was as well. There was no opposition to her neutrality upon her admission, in fact it was essentially a condition.199 Though Austria willfully took part in the obligations toward military security enforcement, a point of which the state is quite proud, Austria was reluctant to take part in economic sanctions. In 1968, Austria refused to participate in sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, the only country to do so in the United Nations.200 Here, we see a full member-state lacking not just the capacity but also the will to carry out Charter obligations.

Conclusion If certain states failed to meet the requirement of capacity, we may legitimately question why they were still accepted. The financially incapable ones shared a certain character, they were former colonies and did not have well-developed economies or governmental structures at the time of their independence and admission to the United Nations. These countries had the benefit of similar attitudes on the issues of decolonization, human rights and Southwestern Africa with the Non-Aligned Movement which ruled the United Nations from 1960-1989. I go into greater 198

Gakkai, 209. Conforti, 29. See also Verdross and Kunz. 200 Conforti, 32. 199

detail about this in Chapter Five, but I believe that this political favoritism meant that the NAM bent the rules for countries with a similar political mentality. For these countries, incapacity was not a limit to their admission. SNYDER | 73

Iceland was a strong ally of the United States, as was Japan. As early as the Yalta Conference, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill pushed for the inclusion of Iceland.201 However her reluctance to declare war on Germany due to its neutrality forced it to wait until 1946 to attain membership. Iceland’s connection to the West is further evidenced by its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty. Japan, whose constitution the United States had a great part in writing, was an American ally. The United States, responsible for rebuilding Japan, left a lasting impression on Japanese foreign policy, the scope of which is beyond this paper; it suffices to say that Japan was a western-minded state in the United Nations. Austria, a neutral and centrist state, is a much more particular case. It not only was neutral but maintained its distance from NATO like Finland and Ireland, two other countries with which it entered the United Nations in 1955. There is not just a military but also a political aspect to these cases. As these cases have greater implications to the hypothesis I present in Chapter Four, I simply say now that these countries’ abilities to persist in fighting for their entry to the United Nations differentiated them from the microstates. Nonetheless, Austria had the limited capacity which was given as justification against the entries of the European microstates and she is evidence that the claim that incapacity to fulfill obligations was not a prohibition to membership. In sum, the concept of neutrality in the United Nations, though important and an obstacle to admission for certain member-states in the early days of the United Nations, was no longer seen as conflicting with the obligations of Article 43 by the 1950’s when Austria and Japan were 201

Gröndal, 36.

admitted and a limited ability to contribute to security enforcement measures did not prevent Iceland from becoming a member in 1946. For these reasons, the European microstates’ limited ability to contribute to security enforcement obligations or their neutrality cannot explain their SNYDER | 74

exclusion from the United Nations. Any argument that the European microstates could not satisfy any of the Charter obligations for membership, when judged against the existing members is lacking and incorrect. As shown here, none of the existing explanations for the exclusion of the European microstates up until this point are justifiable. The European microstates were no less sovereign than members Ukraine, Belarus, India, the Philippines or Luxembourg, no smaller than the Maldives, Barbados, Grenada and the Seychelles, no less wealthy than the Gambia or the Maldives and no less capable of contributing to international security than Iceland, Japan or Austria. The research question requires a new explanation. In the remaining chapters, I use the voting patterns of the General Assembly to rationally explain where the microstates would have voted and the interests of the existing members of allowing the microstates to enter and vote as such. This will point me toward the conclusion that existing voting blocs created barriers to the membership of states with the political character of the European microstates. While other states could overcome this barrier, the microstates could not until the barriers fell in 1989 which I show in the remaining chapters.

Chapter Four 1945-1960: The Cold Shoulder of the Cold War Now that I have disproven the former hypotheses, it is time for me to present my own. I believe that rather than being excluded for limited sovereignty, small size, lack of willingness or incapacity, the microstates were truly excluded for their potential to change the political balance in the General Assembly in ways of which the powerful voting blocs did not approve. In essence, the microstates would have held the power to sway votes against the liking of the regimes that ruled the General Assembly. Specifically for the period of 1945-1960 I hypothesize that: HA-A: In a bipolar system where neither side controls a two-thirds majority necessary to pass resolutions (like the General Assembly of 1945-1960), a new actor who is perceived to enter at the center will face opposition from the existing actors resulting in barriers to that state gaining membership. In the case of other states with greater diplomatic resources, it was possible to overcome this barrier. For the microstates, however this was not possible. In order to explain how political reasons placed insurmountable to membership barriers before the microstates in the first era of 1945-1960, this chapter endeavors to present first the context of the Cold War in the General Assembly. I follow this up with a conceptual argument based closely on the United Nations of that era and make sense of each group in the system’s motives in opposing hypothetical states that would occupy a space at the center of its bipolar spectrum. I back up this hypothetical argument with proof that such groups existed and that microstates in fact would have been centrists within this system. This section proves that the microstates’ exclusion from the United Nations during the first era in question was due to a centrist position within the contemporary political context. As I show, the barriers to the microstates’ membership had nothing to do with their size but their political centrism in the


context of the Cold War. While Austria and Finland, based on unique circumstances, could surmount these barriers, the microstates did not have that power and remained outside.

The United Nations as a Cold War Battleground In order to assert influence, the United States, the Soviet Union and their respective allies attempted to pass resolutions on a variety of issues whose implications could result in the shaming or punishment of an adversary. During the most heated years of confrontation between East and West in the General Assembly, 1947-67, one researcher counts 330 resolutions linked to the Cold War.202 After the development and use of atomic warfare during World War II, disarmament became a key issue with either side attempting to limit the ability of its adversary to grow its nuclear arsenal.203 The further admission of members was another point of conflict between the poles as neither Western- nor Eastern-allied states gained membership until the 1955 package deal.204 Issues of colonization provoked sharp differences as the Soviet Union sought to agitate the West and searched for new alliances with ex-colonial states.205 Some other examples of conflict included resolutions on the question over the legitimate representation of China, the acceptance of observer missions from North and South Korea, statements on the Greek Civil War, human rights in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Soviet intervention in the Chinese Civil War, the United States’ relations with Cuba and condemning the United States during the U-2 Crisis of 1960.206 The General Assembly passed resolutions even in domains typically reserved for Security Council (though they had no enforcement power and were simply expressing the opinion of the General Assembly), such as when the General Assembly passed


Gareau, 931. Mingst, 3. 204 Voeten, 199. 205 Ibid. More on this on page 88. 206 Gareau, 931. 203


resolutions expressing disapproval over the Soviet vetoes over the applications for membership of West Germany, South Vietnam and Mauritania among others.

A conceptual approach Keeping in mind the rules in the General Assembly that a two-thirds requirement is necessary for any successful resolution and that each actor receives one vote, let us imagine a situation in which there exist two poles, each lacking the two-thirds necessary for passage of a resolution. Second, let us also imagine that there is a centrist group of actors between the two poles. In order to win the passage of a resolution it is necessary for the center to support one of the poles so that a two-thirds supermajority may be reached. Each pole then develops methods for winning the support of the center. Though twothirds are necessary for the successful adoption of a resolution, only one third is necessary for its defeat. This means that the pole opposing a resolution must also lobby for votes from the center in order to ensure its blockage. Lobbying the center means the weakening of positions, as concessions from original or desired positions must be negotiated in order to receive the support of centrist voters. The center has its own prerogatives as well though they do not extend to introducing resolutions. In the common interest, the center wishes to soften the position of either side; were it partisan and were it to agree automatically with the proposals put forward by one pole, then it would not truly be the center. By softening either side’s proposals, it extracts gains in the sense that a proposal that previously favored one pole at the expense of the other pole is now more universally supported. The center plays the role of decisive kingmaker, providing the additional support necessary to either pole, but only on the terms of each individual member of the center.


A center voter may also be self-interested and have other interests such as the advancement of its own favored issues that are not controversial to the polarized Assembly at large. Interests in not expanding membership SNYDER | 78

Let us now take this system and see how its participants would respond in the event of the addition of a new member that would act as a centrist. This enlargement of membership entails costs to all parties. The poles must now expend more in lobbying the center. This involves both the costs of practical lobbying and the further softening of positions. The wider membership means that more individual votes must be controlled in order to win passage of a resolution. Neither pole wishes to spend more human resources in order to enlist the support of more centrist voters, nor does it wish to soften its stance on an issue any further. Therefore, the poles would reject the admission of new members in the center. For each individual member of the center, the introduction of new centrist members weakens its own position. Each member of the center’s vote now becomes replaceable to either pole as one or more of the new members may take that former voter’s place in the winning coalition. Accordingly, as it has been replaced in the coalition, the centrist may no longer extract the concessions that it was once able to gain from compromise with whichever pole. If it is replaced then its demands will no longer be reflected in the final resolution and the positions will be softened on the conditions of the replacement centrist. Should that state have held out in the past to gain more concessions from either pole, it may no longer do so without fear that the pole will abandon that centrist targeted for supported in the interest of a new centrist. Simply put, the expansion of the center makes each individual member of the center less powerful and less important to either pole when lobbying for support for a resolution. Therefore, the existing center would not wish to add more centrists.

How, then, might an outside potential voter gain access to this electorate? There must be an ambiguity in the perceived voting behavior of such a voter. If both poles believe that once admitted, that voter will vote in conformity with the pole and increase its voting share, making it SNYDER | 79

closer to achieving either a two-thirds supermajority to pass a resolution or a one-third share to block resolutions of the other pole, then both sides will support its inclusion. The poles’ dislike of centrists does not entirely necessitate their absolute prohibition from entry. Elements like persistency, diplomatic trade-offs and the ability to publicize the state’s exclusion as being against the intent of the Charter gave centrists the opportunity to overcome opposition.

Putting the concept into practice: The General Assembly of 1945-1960 The poles In the early years of the General Assembly, no clear majority emerged among member states.207 Many states voted their conscience and there was disarray as the General Assembly was a novelty, a “political free-for-all.”208 The Cold War, however, provided a firming up of a Soviet Bloc, composed of Warsaw Pact members, and a Western bloc, composed of NATO members.209 Though never one cohesive or formalized group, the regional groups of Latin America, Western Europe, the United States, the Commonwealth, Benelux and Scandinavia acted of like minds and each voted more than 68% of the time with the majority during the first fifteen years of the General Assembly whereas the Soviet Union voted less than 40% of the time with the majority.210 Most of these countries shared democracy and capitalism, political systems that ideologically separated them from the Soviet bloc.


Marín-Bosch, 141. Ibid., 143. 209 Ibid., 147. 210 Hovet, 102. 208

During this polarized period, the Soviet Union was opposed to the admission of Western European countries or other countries that were supported by the West. Of the 126 times that the USSR invoked its Security Council veto, fifty-one of those were over the applications of new SNYDER | 80

members, including six vetoes over Italy’s proposed membership, four each over Ireland, Portugal and Japan, three over each Austria and South Korea and two over each Finland and South Vietnam.211 The center In the 1950’s a group of relatively small states occupied the center ground in the United Nations and forced the larger powers on either extreme to compromise. This group consisted of the traditional European neutral states, Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Austria, and other global centrist states including Nigeria, Yugoslavia, Mexico, Tunisia and Canada. Instead of being party to either the West or East, they, along with other moderate states, tended to follow the lead of the United Nations Secretariat on many issues.212 In order to gain sufficient votes for the passage of any resolution, the large voting blocs would have to court these centrist states who, averse to getting ensnared in disputes between the giants of the organization, weighed the merits of each issue and voted as such. At a Nobel Symposium Lecture, Irish Taioseach Sean Lemass, described the mediating states’ role as “the conscience of the world” and “the independent arbitrator.”213 These states strove to reduce the influence and monopoly of power that the superpowers held and in lieu of direct compromises between the two poles, the centrist states would play kingmaker and pass resolutions with a softened position.214


Bailey and Daws, 231-237. Lemass, 117. (Nobel Symposium) 213 Ibid., 118. (Nobel Symposium) 214 Vukadinović, 108. (Nobel Symposium). 212

France represents a special circumstance, as it found itself between many voting blocs. In the early history of the United Nations, France was a “neutral or mediating state” between the Soviet and United States voting blocs.215 It had always been France’s view that the United SNYDER | 81

Nations must leave sovereign states alone in their internal matters; what the world called colonies, France considered to be its own départments.216 Under President Charles de Gaulle, the France’s popularity had sunk within the United Nations and consequently the United Nation’s popularity sunk in France.217 From 1946-1965, France became a pariah of the organization, often voting between East and West.218 Only later, as resolutions became sharper disputes between colonizers and newly independent countries, mostly over decolonization, France moved into a voting bloc with Western Europe states against the South. The microstates are centrists The European microstates’ role at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is indicative of how they would have performed in the early two decades of the United Nations. While the character of the General Assembly had changed considerably by the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 with the inclusion of post-colonial states (more on this below), the CSCE resembled the early years of the United Nations closely in membership and agenda. Of the Helsinki Accords’ 35 signatory states, 25 were either original members of the United Nations or part of the 1955 package deal. The concerns of the CSCE were those of European security and the Cold War, not decolonization which had provoked the North-South cleavage of the General Assembly. Rather, the CSCE was a place of dialogue exclusively for East-West matters. The CSCE formed in the mid-1970’s in the spirit of Détente, multilateralism and dialogue. Inherent


Holloway, 286, 287. Couve de Murville, 113. (Lewin). 217 Plantey, 108. (Lewin). 218 Holloway, 287, 288, 290. 216

in this attitude, no European states were excluded from the Conference, except for Andorra which was not judged to be sufficiently sovereign.219 In the interest of including the microstates in principal but not practice, the Conference initially offered the microstates the option to SNYDER | 82

participate as observers but, eager for a rare chance to assert their sovereignty on an international level, they chose full membership.220 In negotiations on accords, the microstates were in the Neutral and Non-Aligned group (NNA), the corps of states neither party to the Warsaw Pact nor NATO with no specific objectives aside from the progress of the CSCE process no matter what tension existed between East and West.221 During the 1982 Madrid Follow-up Meeting, all progress was mired in Cold War gridlock over confidence and security building measures and disarmament. The NNA was essential in breaking this impasse and brought East and West back to the table several times avoiding stalemate and serving as honest brokers.222 Appeals for compromise even came directly from Prince Franz Joseph II of Liechtenstein who came to Madrid to directly plead for progress.223 The leadership and centrism of the microstates was borne out in the CSCE and gives us a great idea of where they would have fallen in the General Assembly’s political spectrum. The microstates additionally do not wish to find themselves as the focus of any international controversy; it is inherent in their foreign policies. With few diplomatic and military resources, they would rather avoid any sort of confrontation if at all possible. Much like the fictitious Grand Fenwick in the novel The Mouse that Roared, a small state would face unmanageable pressure should it go strongly against the world’s status quo or aligned with rogue 219

Sizoo, 77. Ukraine and Belarus, of comparable sovereignty, were also not invited. Albania is the only state to decline its invitation. 220 Ibid., 78. 221 Ibid., 90. NOTE: The naming of this group should not connote that it is was related to the Non-Aligned Movement, except for the one overlap of Yugoslavia. 222 Ibid., 239. 223 Ibid., 197.

states. For these reasons and by nature of their foreign policies, the European microstates do not take positions on contentious issues. An example of their ambivalence comes in what is annually one of the most controversial issues: General Assembly resolutions dealing with the IsraelSNYDER | 83

Palestine issue. Since 2002, each of the microstates has abstained on the three important resolutions perennially brought up on the matter.224 The attitude toward centrality and neutrality is deeply ingrained in the microstates’ foreign policies as taking positions on controversial issues would go past their primary motivations of joining international organizations for extended recognition and increased diplomatic contacts. This desire to recluse themselves from having to decide on the most controversial issues shows that they vote down the middle and owe no loyalty to either pole.

Red San Marino Above, I made brief mention of San Marino’s communist regime, in government from 1945 until 1957. Recall that following the economic devastation of World War II and the depreciated Italian lira, San Marino faced financial hardship.225 In 1945, San Marino put into power the first ever democratically elected communist government at a national level, though this must be understood in its proper context as many small towns and cities of Northern Italy in the immediate aftermath of the War had elected communist mayors, this was hardly shocking.226 I do not believe, however, that if admitted at that point San Marino would have necessarily voted reliably in the Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union could not ensure that San Marino would follow its position on certain issues like it could in its satellite states. Outside of the Iron Curtain, San Marino is non-contiguous with the Soviet Union, meaning that Moscow could not


United States State Department Annual Report to Congress on Voting Patterns in the United Nations General Assembly, 2002-2008. 225 Rogatnick, 174. See above, page 38-39. 226 Quester, 163-164.

use pressure tactics like it did in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania when a bloc member strayed out of line. Italy had greater mechanisms for influence than did the USSR.227 Either way, it was apparent from 1950 that San Marino’s communist government was on the brink of SNYDER | 84

collapse; against great odds it survived seven additional years. Let us not forget the Soviet Union’s opposition to San Marino’s application before the International Court of Justice.228 It seems that though nominally communist, San Marino was tinged but not entirely red. With the deadlock over the admission of members resulting in 1955’s package deal, it is unlikely that Moscow would have supported San Marino, uncertain about its future, leaving it in the center.

The Centrists who Entered If I am to argue that the European microstates were refused membership based solely on their political leanings, I must defend that their foreign policies were very similar in character to those of Austria, Finland and Ireland. These three countries were admitted in 1955 as part of the package deal of sixteen countries that were the result of nearly a decade of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Each country has its own circumstances that enabled them to overcome opposition, each requiring tenacity and well-developed diplomatic connections to the poles. The later influx of ex-colonial countries shifted this balance of power making it unique to the East-West dispute. Austria Following World War II, Austria was occupied by the former Allies until 1955. An essential condition of her admission to the United Nations was her neutrality, signed under a protractedly negotiated State Treaty in 1955.229 Austria maintained an observer mission in New York beforehand and had applied for full membership as early as 1947 but her application 227

See above, page 39. See above, pages 51-52. 229 Zemanek, 408. 228

languished while the East and West stalled all membership requests until the 1955 deal. As an observer, Austria was able to diplomatically lobby existing United Nations members for support for her admission. With the occupying forces on her territory, contact between the new Austrian SNYDER | 85

regime and the major powers was very close. Due to its importance in post-war reconstruction and its deep diplomatic resources, Austria was not a country that the world community could easily ignore. Finland Finland found itself in a rather uncomfortable position in World War II, one of few countries to have to fight both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Her disputes with Russia go back centuries including battle in both World Wars and losing significant territory in the process. In 1948, Finland was forced into a common defense contract with the Soviet Union akin to the one that Moscow had with Romania and Hungary though Finland was neither a part of NATO nor the Warsaw Pact.230 Finnish neutrality was a policy founded after the war and though the USSR kept some influence in the country, it respected her new neutral stance; this neutrality was also welcome by the West.231 In practice, Finland recused itself from Cold War issues in the General Assembly and did not cast votes on the matter.232 Like Austria, Finland applied for membership from the late 1940’s only to have its application ignored and has partaken actively in peacekeeping operations. 233 Ireland The Republic of Ireland’s position in the Cold War spectrum between East and West is more nuanced than Austria and Finland’s. Her neutrality and fortuitous geographic location kept


Mead, 191-192. Nickels, 60-1. 232 Ibid. 233 Nickels, 297. 231

it out of World War II and it wished to maintain its neutrality post-1945. She was openly anticommunist and disliked the Soviet Union’s expansion into Eastern Europe.234 At the same time, Ireland had its complications with the United Kingdom because of its long ethnic conflict over SNYDER | 86

Northern Ireland. Bitter about Ireland’s non-participation in World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom consciously excluded Ireland from the San Francisco Conference of 1945.235 These disputes placed it on an independent trajectory and allowed for either side to see it as a potential ally. This foreign policy was erratic and not vehemently pro-western, lending itself to what one author terms as “under the radar” misperceptions.236 To the Soviet Union, Ireland might realize its enmity of the United Kingdom on the international stage and attempt to use the United Nations to perform retribution on its former lord if not on Cold War issues then perhaps on decolonization or human rights issues. To the United Kingdom, Ireland might add to its Western pro-democracy caucus and build up strength against the Soviet Union. Either way, Ireland was eventually accepted with unanimous support as part of the 1955 package deal. Its application too had lingered since 1947 and it has also actively participated in peacekeeping operations. To compare the center states, they all shared the common trait that they had extensive diplomatic ties with the world’s powers. Austria and Finland had established observer missions in New York and embassies around the world, increasing their presence. In order to keep their applications alive, all three states, had to lobby aggressively so as not to be dropped from the package deal at no cost to the poles. Furthermore, Austria and Finland’s neutralities which were settled on the terms of the Great Powers guaranteed abstentions on Cold War issues. Therefore, these abstentions would not affect the majority total required. Their votes on other issues that 234

MacQueen (in Contemporary Irish Studies), 65-66. Dorr, 104-105 (in Ireland in International Affairs). 236 Wylie, 29. 235

might agree with the North like decolonization issues may have been beneficial to the existing powers. Ireland’s ambiguity was its greatest boon and its possibility to be not simply a nonparticipant but a potential wedge useful for either side helped it overcome the opposition from SNYDER | 87

their political positions. The Soviet Union’s vetoes against centrist countries Austria, Finland and Ireland illustrate both the Soviet opposition to centrists but moreover the USSR’s unwillingness to admit any member until its Warsaw Pact allies were allowed in. The Soviet Union effectively held the membership process hostage until it found a favorable solution. Putting partisan difference aside and allowing the centrist states would dilute Soviet power, explaining its opposition to a package deal that had neither East nor West states. The refusal to bring in the centrists was engendering much discontent in the General Assembly which began introducing resolutions expressing displeasure at the USSR for not welcoming Austria, Finland and Ireland, among other stalled applications. Austria, Finland and Ireland had the diplomatic clout to raise attention to their cause and have such resolutions introduced but the smaller centrists, the microstates, did not. The particular benefits that these countries offered, allowed them to surmount the barriers that arose from their centrism. However the microstates could not offer any sort of comparable individual benefits to both poles. While Austria and Finland had tenacious diplomatic outreach, due to their limited resources, the microstates could not constantly be in the ear of the Great Powers and lobby to the extent like their larger centrist look-alikes could. This brings me to the conclusion that the centrist political positions of the microstates was not entirely a prohibition to their admission but rather a tall obstacle; one that other states with greater resources could overcome but the microstates could not. While the United Nations was able to tolerate a few of the undesired centrist states, the pole may have thought of four additional centrists as too much.

In prioritizing the few seats that they reluctantly gave to centrists, they heeded the tenacious efforts of Austria, Finland and Ireland while ignoring the diplomatically weaker microstates. Postcolonial States SNYDER | 88

While the existing United Nations members had the luxury of refusing the European microstates, the end of colonization did not allow them to refuse any African, Asian or island countries, as to do so would seem backwards and imperialist. Though many colonial powers resisted independence movements, sometimes to the extent of war, there was no stopping the break off of new countries. The western world for moral and practical considerations had to open the door to post-colonial states. Western Europe may have naively believed that its former colonies may follow behind them and vote along with the former metropoles. More likely, the shame of the crumbling defeat of decolonization put the powers in no position to refuse the demands of the states of various sizes that had just proclaimed their freedom. Instead of embittering these new countries to Europe and allowing them to take positions with the Soviet Union, the West could have thought it wiser to act welcomingly in the hopes of securing future cooperation. As a result of colonization, the metropoles shared much with these newly independent states by way of economic ties, shared language and certain cultural traits. The hope that ex-colonial states would one day join forces with their former colonial rulers made these states acceptable by political standards to the Western powers. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, saw opportunity in decolonization, in the hopes of both winning new allies and embarrassing their western adversaries. Whereas the European microstates had firmly established foreign policies of political neutrality, newly independent African, Asian and island states were much more susceptible to influence. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev believed that, inherently, the newly independent countries would ally themselves

with the East as they represented proletariats repressed by western colonizers.237 Furthermore, the collapse of the purely capitalistic colonial system was a boost for Communist ideology and a comparative gain for the East. The fights for African independence were reminiscent of Marx’s SNYDER | 89

long bloody class struggle and the Soviet Union was eager to promote what it viewed as an affirmation of political beliefs. The West’s inability to stem the wave of decolonization and the East’s help in meeting that end created a prioritization of the African, Asian and island microstates over the European microstates and overrode any considerations of disturbing the polar balance. These misperceptions by West and East alike happened only because of the recent emergence of the ex-colonial states. The new states’ foreign policies were fluid and ambiguous. The European microstates, on the other hand, had a firmly ingrained foreign policy mentality that placed them between the two poles with no ambiguity. The rest of the world knew where the historical microstates stood and it did not match the delicate balance of the General Assembly.

Conclusion The costs already high for winning passage or blockage of a resolution, either pole only wished to find new partners, not new centrists to be lobbied. The microstates, who would have acted as these centrists, would have only been further road blocks in the way of the poles acting as they wished. As such, from 1945-1960, the poles discriminated against new members of this centrist attitude. Those centrist states which did break through did so only because of their tenacity to surmount barriers which the microstates could not, as was the case for Austria and Finland, or the ambiguity over which way they would vote, as was the case for Ireland and postcolonial states. Little did the poles know that the postcolonial states would vote with neither


Kanet, 334.

the East nor the West but rather the South, giving new rise to a regime that solidly discriminated against the European microstates. SNYDER | 90

Chapter Five 1960-1989: The Decolonization Double Standard This final chapter explains for the absence of the European microstates from the United Nations during the span of 1960-1989. I first establish the stakes of competition in the General Assembly during this era, characterized by developing countries fighting against their former colonizers in the north for greater human rights, political power and say on issues like Southwestern Africa. Then, I present a conceptual argument of a system that closely matches the General Assembly and look at how in a bipolarized system with one pole maintaining a twothirds supermajority. This argument addresses the hypothesis: HA-B: In a bipolar system where one side controls a two-thirds majority necessary to pass resolutions (like the General Assembly of 1960-1989), a new actor who is perceived to enter with the minority bloc will face opposition from the powerful bloc resulting in barriers to that state gaining membership. There may be a group of centrist states in between the poles; however, as I shall explain below, it is weak and irrelevant. I then provide context, applying this model to the actual political situation of the General Assembly during these years which featured the dominant Non-Aligned Movement and the weak minority pole of Northern states. I proceed by explaining how, though previously seen as centrists between East and West, we may now easily see the microstates as belonging to the Northern bloc. I conclude by discussing the two key events that brought about the end of this regime: the end of decolonization which unraveled the cohesion within the NAM and the fall of the Berlin Wall which heralded the beginning of the end of the Cold War and with it chaos in the geopolitical system. From these explanations, it is clear that while the NAM padded its own majority by adding more member-states whose sovereignty, size, capacity and willingness were often lesser than those of the European microstates, it discriminated against the European microstates that would have voted against it on its most important issues.


The Non-Aligned Movement: A Developing Story As a result of decolonization, the Non-Aligned Movement emerged in the 1960. A group of developing countries, many of whom were former colonial possessions, they did not fit within the NATO or Warsaw Pact alliances. Though its origins go back to the 1955 Bandung Conference, it truly entered the United Nations in 1960. A key event in its formation was the meeting of many heads of state of the future group in 1960 at a special United Nations session in New York to commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of the organization. Here, General Tito of Yugoslavia, Fidel Castro of Cuba, Sukarno of Indonesia, Sékou Touré of Guinea and Nkrumah of Ghana met face to face and discussed the formation of an organization to give their smaller and less developed countries a united global voice.238 The impact of this new coalition was felt immediately with the passage of resolution 1514 (XV), the “Declaration on Decolonization” which called for a rapid fall of decolonization and the granting of independence to former colonies with the support of the Soviet Union.239 Importantly, the resolution established a precedent for looser standards for the independence and subsequently membership to the United Nations of ex-colonies, declaring “Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.”240 This clause’s impact is evident in the admissions of the Gambia and the Maldives. Chief among the NAM’s politics was the issue of decolonization. In addition to the aforementioned Declaration on Decolonization, developing countries pushed other resolutions about the issues in Southwest Africa (i.e. Namibia and Apartheid in South Africa), the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, other issues about Non-Self-


Marín-Bosch, 82. United Nations Document A/1514 (XV). 240 Ibid. 239


Governing Territories, assertions of self-determination and independence.241 The NAM sponsored resolutions dealing with specific conflicts in the developing world, on Algeria, Morocco, Cyprus, Angola and Palestine.242 The resolutions on the Israel-Palestine situation were SNYDER | 93

especially uncomfortable for Northern states. The NAM also pushed non-political resolutions dealing with economic policies, development and economic protection. This agenda was especially harsh on former colonial powers, subjecting them to shame. The election of U Thant as Secretary General after the death of Dag Hammarskjöld represented the early strength of the NAM in the General Assembly. While European states wanted to continue the tradition of one of their own rising to the position of Secretary General, developing countries protested loudly. Instead, they wanted a new leader to come from a developing country, prompting U Thant. Through the coordination of the aforementioned Nkrumah, Tito and Sukarno with the aid of other NAM leaders Nehru and Nasser, U Thant became the frontrunner for the Secretariat. Thant had long been an advocate of developing countries which can be traced back to his participation at the Bandung Conference of African and Asian countries in 1955 as a top adviser to Burmese Prime Minister U Nu, which he continued through the next important Non-Aligned Conference at Belgrade in 1961.243 He was viewed by many in the West as the “embodiment of the Non-Aligned Movement” and described himself as a “fighter against colonialism and imperialism.”244 His leadership of the United Nations marked not only the arrival of NAM countries on the international stage but really their grasp of control and new domination of the geopolitical agenda. Conceptual Argument


Voeten, 211. Ibid. 243 Listopadov, 150. 244 Ibid., 151. 242

Recalling the rules that a two-thirds majority is necessary for successful passage of a resolution and that each member is entitled to only one vote, let us imagine a situation in which one group in the General Assembly commands two-thirds of the votes. There are other actors in SNYDER | 94

the system as well. One group is at a pole to the extreme opposite of the commanding pole but controls less than one third of votes. There are also centrists, as there were in the previous model, however as their votes are not needed in order to secure a two-thirds majority, they have a significantly weaker position than in the previous model and cannot act as kingmakers. The group with the supermajority as such commands the Assembly as long as it maintains cohesion. Accordingly, it controls the membership of the Assembly. It may add new members if it perceives that those new members will vote with it on its most important issues. Though seemingly, adding new members might be superfluous, it is in fact necessary as the bloc as a whole worries about defection from its existing members as internal changes (in the case of states, coups or democratic elections that significantly alter that state’s foreign policy outlook) can imperil the bloc’s majority. The states in the minority would favor the inclusion of new states with which it shared common opinions on the most important issues. However, it had no clout whatsoever in the introduction of new members and could not secure their entry.

Putting the concept into practice: The General Assembly of 1960-1989 Many Northern states worried about the impact that an influx of African and island states would alter the regional voting patterns that had already been established. While Africa and Asia (Pacific and Indian island states included) represented a combined 24% of General Assembly votes in 1945, their proportions had grown to 39% by 1959 and 56% by 1969.245 This all came at the expense of Latin American and European voting power which had inversely slipped over this


Marín-Bosch, 15.

time period. Projections at that time said that if all non-self governing territories were admitted to the United Nations, the balance would be even more heavily non-European.246 It might seem natural that the extant European states would push for the inclusion of European microstates as a SNYDER | 95

sort of compromise to equal out the voting power of the developing states, however no such proposal was ever undertaken. Some significant changes that took place in geopolitics altered the topography and hence voting patterns in the General Assembly in the 1960’s. First, the organization of the NAM now created sufficient force for developing states to have an impact at the General Assembly. The increase in membership from 9 African members in 1959 to 26 African members in 1960 rapidly increased the Third World’s presence at the United Nations.247 Defections by states which formerly supported the United States and Western European countries intensified the growing NAM. Cuba, following the 1959 Revolution went from being one of the United States’ most ardent supporters to a leader in the developing world.248 Most Latin American countries, with the exceptions of conservative outliers Chile and Colombia, abandoned their formerly close alliance with the West and drift toward the NAM over the course of the 1960’s and resembled a firm part of that bloc by 1975 at the latest.249 The change of legitimate representation of China was both a symbol of the strength and the strengthening of the NAM as Northern-leaning Republic of China was kicked out of the United Nations in favor of Southern-leaning People’s Republic of China in 1971. By 1960, the developing world controlled enough influence to block unfavorable resolutions, maintaining more than one third of all votes.250


Blair, 17. Peterson, 45. 248 Marín-Bosch, 145. 249 Holloway, 281, 292. 250 Hovet, 91. 247

The NAM strengthened with the admission of new members. During its reign of dominance from 1960 to 1989, of the seventy-six new member-states admitted to the United Nations, seventy-one were members of the Movement. The newly independent European SNYDER | 96

countries that some consider microstates, Cyprus and Malta, were each part of the NAM. The only exceptions were the two Germanys and three Pacific Ocean countries that enjoy close ties to the United Kingdom and the United States (Fiji, and Samoa and Solomon Islands, respectively). The Non-Aligned Movement’s control over the United Nations system explains the arbitrary admittance of small financially incapable African and island states while the European microstates were excluded. By 1985, the NAM was so powerful that some called it an “automatic majority.”251 The gulf was so large that the top 10% of member-states with which the United States had the lowest Coincidence Index shifted from being entirely composed of Warsaw Pact members in the early days of the United Nations to being entirely composed of Non-Aligned countries from 1981-90.252 The NAM consolidated its power throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s, drastically revising the previous East-West bipolar system. The movement served in a way, to help the period of Détente as it prioritized the issue of disarmament and thus deescalated the rising tensions between the Soviet Union and NATO.253 The top issue priority, however, was decolonization. The NAM pushed decolonization and issues with Southern Africa up the agenda. At its peak, the topic of decolonization made for 37% of resolutions from 1961 to 1970.254 On these issues, there was sharp disagreement between Western Europe and their former colonies.255


Marín-Bosch, 141. Ibid., 133. 253 Ibid., 66. 254 Ibid., 149. 255 Ibid., 149-150. 252

During the period of Non-Aligned dominance, we can see a vast gap between the North and the developing world and the heightening of issues that widened this gap. It is difficult to put a precise figure on the amount of states that, in addition to the 80 NAM members, constituted its SNYDER | 97

majority, but with the support of Eastern European countries and other developing countries, the NAM shared strong coincidence in voting with approximately 143 of the 165 United Nations members in the mid-1980’s, at the height of its power.256 The microstates as Northern votes Considering that the European microstates themselves had no colonial possessions overseas, one’s first instinct might be that the microstates would behave as the honest brokers that they acted as before in the East-West split. However, we might predict their behavior using two other small European countries which shared similarly limited neutral foreign policies, Iceland and Luxembourg. On the issue of colonialism, these states, though they were not colonial powers and had little stake in protecting the colonial establishment, voted consistently with the rest of Western Europe during the 1960’s and 70’s.257 Were the NAM to be watching these states looking for clues as to how the European microstates would act on this, its most important issue, it certainly would have concluded that they would vote with Europe and against the Movement. It is also worth reminding the reader of the strict foreign policy ties that bound Andorra and Monaco to France prior to 1993 and 2002 respectively. France was the most vehement opponent of decolonization and the rights of ex-colonial states. Furthermore, many of the newly independent states were colonies of France and held her in an unfavorable view. It would be against these states’ interests to reward France with multiple extra votes.

256 257

Marín-Bosch, 142. Harbert, 121.

The NAM was not open to the admission of the European microstates on the grounds that it would weaken its supermajority. Their admission would grow the voting bloc of the General Assembly to which the NAM was in opposition, allowing it to get closer to the one-third SNYDER | 98

threshold necessary for the blockage of NAM-supported resolutions. The delicate balance of the system and the Non-Aligned Movement’s slight majority explain for the exclusion of the European microstates up until the late 1980’s. While a small state that was politically opposed to the NAM was unacceptable for membership, a small state with which was aligned was perfectly acceptable. It is most interesting, however, that this opposition was publicly justified using standards to which many NAM members themselves would fail to satisfy, those of sovereignty and capacity/ This double standard explains the inclusion of post-colonial states whose membership violated the norms of sovereignty, size and capacity. The end of the regime With decolonization nearing its end, Namibia achieving independence and the fall of Apartheid on its way in the late 1980’s, the Non-Aligned Movement had outlived its raison d’être. Already, its cohesion had been slipping, as expressed by Confidence Index, during the end of the 1980’s. The United States had aggressively tried to break up the coalition by applying bilateral pressure to individual members of the NAM.258 Perhaps sensing this weakness was the impetus behind San Marino establishing its observer mission in 1987 and Liechtenstein’s diplomatic efforts of the end of the 1980’s. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 sparked chaos in the bipolar international system. The collapse of the socialist bloc causes the NAM to lose strength.259

258 259

Marín-Bosch, 159. Ibid., 153-4.

The sudden and radical shift in world politics at the end of the 1980’s provided the European microstates with an opportunity to join the United Nations at a brief and rare period where their candidatures were unobjectionable. The combination of the unraveling of the NonSNYDER | 99

Aligned Movement and the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe created chaos in the world political system and an attitude of inclusion that created an opening for the microstates. While previously the combined opposition of East-West poles and centrist voters from 19451960 and the NAM’s unilaterally opposition to the European microstates from 1960-1989 created obstacles too high for the microstates to overcome, in the New World Order there was no organized opposition. Instead of realignment, as occurred in the shift from East-West to NorthSouth, the trend was toward dealignment as one author puts it.260 States scrambled to find new partners, creating a desire for wider membership including the European microstates. While some believe that the admission of the microstates was a sort of quid pro quo to balance the multitude of new countries emerging from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,261 this seems like a specious argument as there was no guarantee as to how the Eastern European and Central Asian countries would vote (some to this day are pro-Western while others are pro-Russia) and with the successful cooperation between the United States and Russia in the Gulf War, there was no perception that the two former adversaries would be polar opposites again. The European microstates no longer threatened to change a delicate political balance as there was no such balance at the beginning of the 1990’s. The microstates’ power to weaken a dominant group’s hold of the United Nations no longer existed and their admissions were now welcome.

260 261

Voeten, 187. Eccardt, 23.

Conclusion With fewer blocs, this is a much simpler model to understand. It plays to a more straightforward logic that a supermajority in control of membership will never want to allow in new members that may threaten this majority and its power to bring forward and pass resolutions on its agenda. This second era was perhaps the cruelest to the European microstates. While other states of similarly small size were welcome because they were politically aligned with the dominant Non-Aligned Movement, the European microstates languished outside of the United Nations. The exceptions where Northern states entered were few: the two Germanys, whose entry was the result of a long face-off resolved by the success of Östpolitik, and Samoa, Fiji and Solomon Islands, each of whom were former colonies, most likely provoking confusion as to where their loyalties would eventually lie after United Nations membership. The debate of the 1960s’ effect on the European microstates had both positive and negative effects on the European microstates. It was good in that it renewed interest in the microstates, produced much scholarly work and had people asking aloud why these states were being excluded. At the same time it had its tradeoffs in that it mischaracterized the states and could not produce any breakthrough for membership. While Northern states were quick to make general statements about the incapacities of microstates as a way of discrediting the ex-colonial states and dissuading them from joining the United Nations, they only had the effect of stigmatizing the European microstates as the newly independent ones marched in. All in all, nothing could defeat the double standard of the NAM except for its own demise. That, combined with the end of the Cold War lowered barriers so significantly that the European microstates could finally enter without opposition.

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Conclusion As it is now clear, the European microstates are more than simple entities and the United Nations’ reasons for not including them in its decision-making process were equally complex. While their most obvious characteristics are their small sizes, unique political systems and dependence upon their neighbors, these were not truly the reasons for their exclusion from the United Nations. Previous attempts to affix these reasons as the microstates’ shortcomings are misguided and do not account for exceptions that reflect preferential treatment for other countries. Rather, their geopolitical positions within the context of the General Assembly made them unacceptable. The centrist votes that they would have cast would have made achieving a two-thirds majority or a one-third blocking minority more expensive from 1945-1960. The Northern-leaning votes they would have cast from 1960-1989 would have diluted the South’s two-thirds majority, causing the South to make the European microstates unwelcome while at the same time making like-minded small and incapable ex-colonial states quite welcome. I have argued effectively for the support of my hypotheses: HA-A: In a bipolar system where neither side controls a two-thirds majority necessary to pass resolutions (like the General Assembly of 1945-1960), a new actor who is perceived to enter at the center will face opposition from the existing actors resulting in barriers to that state gaining membership. and HA-B: In a bipolar system where one side controls a two-thirds majority necessary to pass resolutions (like the General Assembly of 1960-1989), a new actor who is perceived to enter with the minority bloc will face opposition from the powerful bloc resulting in barriers to that state gaining membership. However, I understand that my qualitative assessment would benefit from the help of qualitative analysis. While HA-B is much more straightforward and makes sense instinctively, HA-A is more complex. I remain confident in my analyses of the hypotheses but readily welcome a challenge

SNYDER | 101

with quantitative methods and spatial analysis in the hopes of improving my argument. Even if my argument does not hold up to further inspection, the lessons of my thesis are still mostly intact as I show that beyond the conceptual argument, the microstates’ political positions led to SNYDER | 102

barriers being put in place of their inclusion. Other countries were able to overcome these barriers during the first era due to their persistency and diplomatic skills afforded by a longer diplomatic history and greater resources. The European microstates, however, could not surmount these obstacles. This might seem like circular logic to some as their inability to join the United Nations ultimately can be attributed to their limited capacity to lobby for admission. However, we must differentiate between the motivation and the consequence of the barriers being put into place to understand the powerful blocs’ discrimination. The microstates’ sovereignty, size, capacity and perceived lack of willingness would be irrelevant were it not for the barriers placed purely for political reasons. States that were limited in sovereignty, size and capacity all had in common that they were politically allied or perceived to be allied with a powerful bloc already in the General Assembly. While these countries did not have to struggle at all to get in, Austria and Finland did. Furthermore, we must distinguish between the capacity to uphold Charter obligations and the capacity to lobby for entry. The first is a legitimate requirement for admission as indicated in Article 4, Section 1, the second is not. The European microstates had the first capacity, not the second. The fact that the microstates had a limited capacity to lobby does not weaken but rather strengthens my thesis. Were the standards of membership to have been constantly applied to all applicants, the microstates would have been members much earlier than the Soviet and excolonial states of questionable qualifications. Yet as they were instead subjected to unfavorable

political calculations, the microstates faced barriers. Had many of the states who were admitted to the United Nations prior been subjected to the same barriers, they certainly would not have gained entry. The Gambia and the Maldives, for example, would not have been able to lobby for SNYDER | 103

several years as Austria, Finland and Ireland did because they could not even afford to send a delegation to New York in many of their early years as a member. Let us not forget that at the end of the 1980’s, the microstates’ sovereignties,262 size, capacities or willingness did not change, but rather the political structure of the United Nations did. In sum, the United Nations’ opposition was formed due to the microstates’ political positions and had these stances been different, they would not have been excluded. These barriers to centrist states should never have been there in the first place. Their presence, uncalled for by the Charter, created additional requirements, against the International Court of Justice’s 1949 ruling. Sovereignty, size and capacity were not the dependent variables in determining how high the barriers were, rather it was a state’s perceived foreign policy position in the General Assembly that set the height. The microstates had sufficient capacity and could not change their size and could only make incremental changes in their sovereignties. Therefore, the choice before the microstates was to either change foreign policies and ally with one of the poles or wait for a more fortuitous time. The European microstates chose the latter. Others may argue that it was not correct of me to singularize each hypothesis and ignore that a combination of limited sovereignty, small size, limited capacity and perceived unwillingness explain the microstates’ absence. However I would contend that we cannot overlook the political favoritism played in the admissions of Ukraine, Belarus and many excolonial countries in advance of their sovereignty or capacity in order to stack votes for one bloc.


Though Andorra’s constitutional reform certainly is an exception, the rest of the microstates did not have any changes to their sovereignties at this point.

States were willing to break the Charter requirements of membership for states with which they were allied. The only difference between those states and the microstates is the microstates’ political positions. SNYDER | 104

The question also lingers as to Switzerland’s status with regards to the United Nations. Following its rebuff from the United Nations at San Francisco in 1945, popular opinion turned sharply against applying for membership. The Swiss government’s policy evolved and it desired membership to the United Nations in 1981 and argued that its neutrality was no longer an impediment to admission.263 This attempt was stalled by a failed referendum where Swiss voters rejected admission. There is no doubt that Switzerland would have faced the same opposition for being a centrist that the European microstates did, however this would have been rapidly overcome. Switzerland’s extensive diplomatic networks and her proven utility as an interlocutor in the past have earned her a leading role in international affairs. Like Austria and Finland, Switzerland would be very difficult to ignore if it asked earlier for admission as its diplomatic resources are much vaster than those of the microstates. Eventually, Switzerland joined in 2002 with no opposition. Implications The United Nations discriminated against the microstates, yet to the microstates themselves, membership in this seemingly cruel organization remained a cherished goal. The microstates would have reason to abhor the United Nations as a result, but instead they remain ardent supporters, glad to finally have their place on the world stage. This is because the fruits of membership never changed. Despite the arbitrary manner in which the United Nations conferred legitimacy upon new members by recognizing and welcoming them, membership never lessened in value and continued to mark the arrival of a state to official world politics. 263

Conforti, 30.

For the European microstates, after being the potentially diluting centrists in the Cold War-characterized General Assembly of 1945-1960 and the straws that would have broken the camels’ back in the NAM-dominated General Assembly of 1960-1989, they were no longer SNYDER | 105

feared as tipping points that could change the power dynamic in the early 1990’s, allowing for their admissions. Each of these arguments is supported by a conceptual approach so that it is not merely explaining what happened but analyzing the interests of any generic system with the same power balance that the General Assembly had during these time periods. This thesis makes a good start-point for those who are skilled at spatial modeling to analyze the admissions practices of other international organizations. With the aid of a quantitative analysis that can be subjected to a proof, we might be able to draw more concrete conclusions as to the political position of a state and the political resistance that it provokes when trying to gain membership. We might also factor in the state’s economic and diplomatic strength and how those might influence the state’s ability to overcome these barriers. Such an analysis could add a new dimension to such well-research subjects that are understood more in a qualitative fashion like Turkey and the European Union and the Republic of China or Palestine and the United Nations. Though not excluded for political reasons, but most likely for financial reasons, the South Pacific island Republic of Nauru gained its admission to the United Nations as well in the 1990’s. Itself a former German and Japanese colony, it followed the trusteeship system to gain its independence in 1968 and later United Nations membership in 1995. Considering its close links with Australia, which continue to this day, one might assume that despite its foreign policy would be pro-western and support Australia and one of its strongest allies, the United States. The world was shocked when in December 2009, Nauru took the controversial step of recognizing

South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, in defiance of the west, allegedly in return for financial support from Russia.264 This demonstrates one advantage for large states of excluding small states. When left out of international organizations, they lack a degree of legitimacy and SNYDER | 106

can be much more easily contained. Nauru, once unleashed on the world stage, was free to do as it wished. The admission of the European microstates to the United Nations marked their arrival on the world stage and finally gave them the legitimacy that they had been seeking for nearly a century. By not being anybody’s enemy, they had become everybody’s enemy. The power of sovereign equality gave them the chance to settle disputes and go from principalities to kingmakers. As the rest of the world wished not to move the deciding votes on resolutions outside of their coalitions, they continued to refuse the microstates membership. While the myth of the elephant’s fear of mice may only be just that, a myth, we now see that the giants of international politics long avoided the smallest creatures in its domain. However, it was not their size that threatened the Great Powers but rather their equal weight which was so problematic that the United Nations refused to welcome them. Fearing which way a mouse would tip the scale between two elephants, the elephants chose that they would rather have the scale retain its balance.


Radio Free Europe, December 15, 2009.

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